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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FRED WILSON
Appellant No. 1373 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered April 9, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0108842-1997
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2018
Appellant, Fred Wilson, appeals pro se from the April 9, 2014 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying as
untimely Appellant’s second petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Following review,
we affirm.
The PCRA court provided the following procedural history:
Following a jury trial, before the Honorable Judge Darnell C. Jones
II, [Appellant] was found guilty of first degree murder, robbery,
and criminal conspiracy. On October 6, 1997, [Appellant] was
sentenced to life in prison for the murder charge, ten to twenty
years for the robbery charge, and five to ten years for the charge
of criminal conspiracy. [Appellant] filed a direct appeal. The
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on December
16, 1999, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur
on May 15, 2001.
[Appellant] filed his first timely PCRA petition on March 14, 2002.
Counsel was appointed and an amended PCRA petition was filed
on April 18, 2005. After a further pro se filing by [] Appellant,
appointed counsel filed a supplemental PCRA petition on February
28, 2007. The court ultimately denied his petition on September
18, 2007. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of his petition
on January 26, 2009 and the Supreme Court denied a petition for
allowance of appeal on August 19, 2009.
[Appellant] filed his current post conviction petition of August 2,
2012.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/14, at 1. The court explained that it conducted “a
diligent and exhaustive review of the record and applicable case law,” and
determined Appellant’s petition was “patently untimely.” Id. Therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and dismissed it. Id.
By order entered on April 10, 2017, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s
request for nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his rights to appeal the April 9,
2014 dismissal of his petition. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court
did not direct Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained
of on appeal and the PCRA court did not issue an opinion supplementing its
April 9, 2014 opinion.
Appellant presents one issue for our consideration:
Whether Appellant suffered actual prejudice resulting from
trial/appellate/PCRA counsel ineffectiveness, and, if so, whether
the PCRA court’s refusal to consider Appellant’s request for nunc
pro tunc reinstatement of his right to direct appeal based on the
determination that his claim relating to ineffective assistance for
failing to protect Appellant’s right on direct appeal to challenge
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the trial court’s error in admitting the videotaped confession that
his non-testifying codefendant gave to police was previously
litigated or waived, is supported by de facto findings in the
certified record and is free of legal error?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the PCRA court erred
in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. The PCRA contains the
following provisions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
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of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). The PCRA’s timeliness provisions are jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).
The record reflects that our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition
for allowance of appeal on May 15, 2001. Appellant did not seek a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. As a result, Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final on August 13, 2001, when the time for
Appellant to file a petition for a writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup.Ct. R. 13(1). Therefore, to be timely, Appellant was
required to file his petition by August 13, 2002. Because Appellant filed the
instant petition on August 2, 2012, it was patently untimely because it was
filed nearly ten years past the deadline.
Appellant contends that the § 9545(b)(1)(iii) after-recognized
constitutional right exception applies in this case. Specifically, Appellant avers
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) and this Court’s analogous case of
Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin, 5 A.3d 363 (Pa. Super. 2010), apply
retroactively and save his case from the PCRA’s time bar.
Appellant’s contention fails. First, as the PCRA court correctly observed,
a petitioner raising the after-recognized constitutional right exception has
sixty days to raise the issue. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). PCRA Court Opinion,
4/9/14, at 3 (unnumbered). However, Appellant’s petition was filed more than
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sixty days after both decisions. Therefore, Appellant’s attempt to invoke the
after-recognized constitutional right exception fails. See Commonwealth v.
Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 517 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Further, as the PCRA court recognized, Melendez-Diaz does not apply
to Appellant’s case. While Melendez-Diaz applies retroactively to cases on
direct appeal, this Court determined that the case does not apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51
A.3d 231, 236 (Pa. Super. 2012) and Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d
1144, 1147 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Therefore, even if Appellant filed his
petition within 60 days of Melendez-Diaz or Barton-Martin, those cases
would not save his petition from the PCRA’s time bar because their retroactive
application is limited to cases on direct appeal.
We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s petition was untimely
filed and that the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to entertain its merits.
Likewise, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits, if any, of the
petition. Therefore, we shall affirm the April 9, 2014 order dismissing the
August 2012 petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/12/18
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