NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: PETER EMANUEL KVASSAY, No. 16-60082
Debtor, BAP No. 15-1420
______________________________
PETER EMANUEL KVASSAY, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
ROBERT KVASSAY, Trustee of the
Kvassay Family Trust Dated February 26,
1993; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kirscher, Kurtz, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted February 8, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chapter 7 debtor Peter Kvassay (“Peter”) appeals from the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of his
motion for an order to show cause why his brother, Robert Kvassay (“Robert”),
trustee of the Kvassay Family Trust, should not be held in contempt for allegedly
violating a discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524. We review de novo
decisions of the BAP, and for an abuse of discretion a bankruptcy court’s decision
whether to award sanctions. DeVille v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539,
547 (9th Cir. 2004). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount
them here. We affirm.
We agree with the BAP that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Peter’s contempt motion. Robert could not have violated the discharge
injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524 because the injunction was not applicable to the
debts at issue, as Robert had filed a timely dischargeability action under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4) and (6). See Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Ybarra (In re Ybarra), 424 F.3d
1018, 1027 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming “the BAP’s determination that [the
creditor] did not violate the discharge injunction” because “these debts would not
have been subject to the injunction” since the creditor “was attempting to collect
debts that the bankruptcy court held were not discharged”); see also Ackerman v.
Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that Ҥ 524 does
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not enjoin creditors who have successfully invoked § 523, which provides a list of
exceptions to discharge, from taking action”).
We also agree with the BAP that any error by the bankruptcy court in
summarily denying Peter’s contempt motion without articulating any findings was
harmless because at a hearing in the related dischargeability action the court
provided a clear basis for its ruling. See Jess v. Carey (In re Jess), 169 F.3d 1204,
1208-09 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s
“sparse” findings required a remand because no additional findings were necessary
“to understand the issues completely and to render judgment”); see also Veal v.
Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 919-20 (9th Cir. BAP
2011) (“Even when a bankruptcy court does not make formal findings . . . the
[appellate court] may conduct appellate review ‘if a complete understanding of the
issues may be obtained from the record as a whole or if there can be no genuine
dispute about omitted findings.’” (citation omitted)).
Contrary to Peter’s argument, the bankruptcy court was not required to issue
an order to show cause under Local Rule 9020-1 because the court explicitly told
Robert that he did not need to file an opposition and Robert was not required to
respond under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014(a). See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9014(a) (“No response is required [to a contested matter motion] under
this rule unless the court directs otherwise.”). Finally, contrary to Peter’s
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contention, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the bankruptcy court
denied his contempt motion on a legal, not a factual, basis.
AFFIRMED.
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