COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00292-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF D.R., A
CHILD
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 323-103837-16
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellants D.B. (Mother) and J.R. (Father) appeal the trial court’s final
order terminating their parental rights to D.R. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2016). As to Mother, the trial court found by clear and
convincing evidence that her actions satisfied the termination grounds listed in
family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (N), and (O) and alleged in the
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
petition for termination. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (N), (O). As to
Father, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that his actions
satisfied the termination grounds listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), (N), and (O) and alleged in the petition for termination. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). The trial court further found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was
in D.R.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
On October 17, 2017, Mother’s appellate counsel filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. On October 30 and
31, 2017, Father’s counsel did likewise. Both counsel state that they have
conducted a professional evaluation of the record and, after a thorough review of
the applicable law, have reached the conclusion that there are no arguable
grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of the trial court’s termination order
and that the appeal is frivolous.
Both counsel’s briefs and motions present the required professional
evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on
appeal and referencing any grounds that might arguably support the appeal. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also In pre K.M., 98 S.W.3d
774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding Anders procedures
apply in parental-termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 02-01-00349-CV, 2003
WL 2006583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further,
Mother’s counsel and Father’s counsel informed them of their right to request the
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record and to file a pro se brief. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In addition, this court informed Mother of these rights
and gave her until November 11, 2017, to notify this court of her intent to
respond. See id. This court also informed Father of these rights and gave him
until November 15, 2017, to notify this court of his intent to respond. Mother did
not file a pro se response. On November 10, 2017, Father filed a “Motion to
Dismiss Counsel,” in which he requested that his appointed counsel “be
released” and that we appoint him a new attorney. Father also filed a response
to his counsel’s Anders brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to
determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. See Stafford v. State,
813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920,
922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). When analyzing whether any
arguable grounds for appeal exist, we consider the record, the Anders brief, and
any pro se response. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed Mother’s counsel’s and Father’s counsel’s
briefs, the appellate record, and Father’s response. Finding no reversible error,
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we agree that Mother’s and Father’s appeals are without merit.2 See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849,
850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Having found nothing in the record
that might arguably support Mother’s and Father’s appeals, we affirm the trial
court’s final order of termination.3 However, we deny Mother’s counsel’s and
Father’s counsel’s motions to withdraw, as both counsel have failed to show the
requisite good cause separate and apart from their determinations that there are
no arguable grounds for appeal. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex.
2016).
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: GABRIEL, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.
DELIVERED: February 9, 2018
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Having independently reviewed Mother’s counsel’s and Father’s counsel’s
briefs, the appellate record, and Father’s response and determined that no
arguable grounds for appeal exist, we deny Father’s “Motion to Dismiss
Counsel.”
On December 18, 2017, Father filed a “Pro Se Motion Request for Trial
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De Novo to Include Affidavit of Errors” and two documents both entitled “Pro Se
Motion Request Order for Reinstatement of Visitation Rights.” We deny these
motions as moot.
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