NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FEB 14 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
B. E. L., individually and on behalf of his No. 14-17316
minor child, B.E.L.,
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00066-SOM-BMK
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION and KATHRYN
MATAYOSHI, in her official capacity
as Superintendent of the Hawaii Public
Schools,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Susan O. Mollway, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 12, 2018**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CLIFTON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court affirmed the Administrative Hearing Officer’s conclusion
that the State of Hawaii Department of Education did not violate the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq. We affirm.
B.L. (“Parent”), individually and on behalf of his minor son (“Student”),
argues that the district court erred in refusing to address the alleged procedural
violations in Student’s 2013 Individualized Education Plan (“2013 IEP”). The
district court explained that Parent waived those arguments by failing to raise them
in his request for a due process hearing. Parent does not address any of the district
court’s explanations but instead repeats the same arguments he made
unsuccessfully to that court. Therefore, the arguments have been waived.
Robinson v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2015).
Moreover, under the IDEA, “[t]he party requesting the due process hearing
shall not be allowed to raise issues at the due process hearing that were not raised
in the notice filed under subsection (b)(7), unless the other party agrees otherwise.”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B). The notice only argued that the 2013 IEP denied
Student a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) because it was overly
restrictive. The DOE did not agree to the addition of other arguments, and it raised
Parent’s failure to exhaust the other issues as an affirmative defense. We agree
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with the district court that the additional procedural arguments may not be
considered.
Nor did the 2013 IEP deny student a FAPE. To determine if a placement is
overly restrictive, this Court balances: “(1) the educational benefits of placement
full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement;
(3) the effect [the student] had on the teacher and children in the regular class; and
(4) the costs of mainstreaming [the student].” Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
conclusions of law de novo. L.J. v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996,
1002 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, we must give “due weight” to the Administrative
Hearing Officer’s decision, which “requires this court to refrain from substituting
its own notions of educational policy for those of the school authority it reviews.”
Id. at 1002-03.
Parent states a general disagreement with the district court’s application of
the Rachel H. factors but does not offer any specific challenges. The district court
concluded correctly that Student’s placement was appropriate. The record showed
that Student was far behind his peers in reading and math, and that he had already
received accommodations in the general education classroom that did not help.
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Parent presented no reason why Student could not obtain non-academic benefits of
general education classroom placement during the larger part of the day when he
was placed in such a classroom. Student’s special education teacher testified that
his confidence improved in her classroom. Student’s general education teacher
testified that it would be difficult to teach multiple grade levels in her classroom.
Parent’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Parent argues that the
2013 IEP shows that Student was on par with his grade level for language arts, but
the same document noted the many areas in which Student needed to improve, and
his special education teacher testified that he could not succeed in a second grade
setting. The evaluation cited by Parent that shows that Student was on par with his
general education peers and that Student’s reading and math skills were “low
average” does not outweigh other evidence in the record. The private school in
which Student was enrolled when Parent removed him from his home school
specialized in educating gifted students with dyslexia, and his classroom placement
there had limited relevance to his placement under the 2013 IEP. Any admission
by Student’s teachers about their ability to implement the 2013 IEP in a general
education classroom or the legality of teaching below grade level in a general
education classroom did not detract from the balancing required by the Rachel H.
factors. General statements about the placement of non-native English speakers
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and students who may have greater learning disabilities than Student, without
more, were immaterial.
AFFIRMED.
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