NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUQRIS THOMPSON, No. 16-16341
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01286-JAD-NJK
v.
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and GRABER,*** Circuit Judges, and ELLIS,**** District
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
This case was submitted to a panel that included Judge Kozinski, who
retired. Following Judge Kozinski’s retirement, Judge Graber was drawn by lot to
replace him. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. Judge Graber has read the briefs
and reviewed the record.
****
The Honorable Sara Lee Ellis, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
Judge.
Luqris Thompson was exonerated and released from prison after spending
approximately four and a half years in prison for a robbery he did not commit. He
subsequently filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the District of Nevada, alleging
violations of his federal constitutional rights and state-law claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment
against the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) and Detective
George Libbey arising from the investigation of the robbery and Thompson’s
subsequent wrongful conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Ah Quin v.
Cty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013). We also review
the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
de novo. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994).
Thompson contends that Libbey violated his rights under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to obtain and disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence to Thompson before his criminal trial. Thompson did not
adduce any evidence that Libbey knew of, but failed to disclose, any exculpatory
evidence or that he acted in bad faith in failing to obtain exculpatory evidence.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Libbey on the Brady claim and in favor of LVMPD on the related municipal
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liability claim arising under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
Thompson’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is premised
on his theory that Libbey intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence before the
criminal trial. But, again, Thompson failed to adduce any evidence that Libbey
knew of, but failed to disclose, any exculpatory evidence or that he acted in bad
faith in failing to obtain exculpatory evidence. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.
Thompson also failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment against Libbey in his Fifth Amended
Complaint. There are no plausible facts with which Thompson could amend his
complaint to state a claim for false imprisonment; therefore, we affirm the district
court’s decision to dismiss this claim. However, there are facts on which
Thompson could amend his complaint to state a claim for malicious prosecution.
Specifically, in his Fifth Amended Complaint (which did not include the already-
dismissed malicious prosecution claim), Thompson alleged that Libbey had
coached the victim during her grand jury testimony to bolster her identification of
Thompson. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal with prejudice and remand the
case with instructions to allow Thompson leave to amend his malicious
prosecution claim against Libbey.
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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum disposition. The parties shall
bear their own costs on appeal.
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