UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT _OF COLUMBIA
TONY ]). PARKSJ
Plaintif’f,
V` l Case No_ l:l7-cv-00825~TNM
GIANT OF MARYLAND, LLC,
Def`endant.
Tony D. Parks was formerly employed at various grocery stores owned by Giant of
. Mary'land,l LLC. VOn April 3, 2017, he brought a pro se suit against Giant in D.C_ Superior Court,
alleging that alter being promoted he “was not given the proper raise,’7 and after he filed a
“retaliation suit” he Was “threaten[ed] by a manager[,] transferred and written up then
terminated.” Notice ofRemoval, Ex. Aat 7 (hereinatter Cornplaint). Giant removed to this
Court and then moved to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Parks’ claims were completely preempted by
federal labor laws. Mem. In Support ofMot. Dismiss 5-9 (Mot. Dismiss). For the reasons that
follow, l conclude that Mr. Parks’ pay claims survive the motion to dismiss,` but that his other
claims must be dismissed
I. Background
Mr._ Parks’ hand-written complaint-consists of only a single paragraph, alleging that his
problems began when he was working as “a shop steward . . . for Giant” and he observed a
manager “stealing hours.” Compl. 7. When Mr. Parks informed human resources,'the manager
. -.tried to fire him, but “the NLB- (national labor board) [sic] stepped in and they transferred fhim].
[He] was commended and promoted for [his] good work but was not given the proper raise.” _Id.
Mr. Parks “complained to H.R.” but F‘they denied [his] promotional raise_” Id. Mr_ Parks then
“complain[ed] and filed [a} retaliation suit,” after which he “was threatened by a manager[,]
transferred and written up[,] then terminated_” Id.
In response to Giant’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Parks Submitted a filing that summarized
his original allegations in more detail and added other factual claims, including that Giant
“started putting [his-] life in danger and not letting [him] practice [his] reli_gion».” Response to
Mot_ Dismiss 1-2 (hereinafter Opp.). He also discussed the union’s involvement, saying that the
“case manager” filing his “multiple NLB [sic] charges” “had a heavy work load and couldn’t get
to it at first [and] also we had to keep adjusting it”'and that he “went to the Union on all
occasion[s] and unfortunately they were unable to-help me[_] [T]his is the reason why I had to
Seek outside help[_]” Opp. 3. In a further filing, Mr. Parks again summarized all of his prior n
allegations and claimed that “[a]s for the Union they are i_n bed with the company and have
always been no help[_} [I]t’s the reason I have to depend on outside help_” Am. Response 3. '
II. Legal Standards
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to cstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Ashcroft v. ]qbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2069) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
crosses from conceivable to plausible when it contains factual allegations t_hat, if proved, would
,‘allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged_”’ Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D,C. Cir. 2015)' (alteration
omitted)_(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In this inquiry, a court must “draw all reasonable
'inferences.f`rorn those allegations in the plaintiff" s favor.” _ Id.
l[I. Analysis
A. The Claims At Issue
At the outset, I must consider which allegations are to be considered: those in the initial
complaint alone, or those claims as supplemented by the Plaintiff” s subsequent filings l
conclude that the latter course is clearly appropriate here, in light of Mr_ Parks’ pro se status and
the applicablecase law.
Ordinarily, “[i]n determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, we may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.” E.E. O.C. v_ Sl. Francr's Xavr`er
Parochial Sch.-, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.¢. Cir. 1997)_ However, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to
be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however'inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings dra_Hed by lawyers_”’ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (queiing asceer v. camera 429 U.s_ 97, 106 (1976)). owns may “consider
supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being
urged.” Greenhil! v. Spellr`ngs, 482 F_3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In at least two n
circumstances, the D_C. Circuit has held that a district court abused its discretion “in failing to
consider a pro se litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive to a
motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foodsll/Ikt. Grp., Ii'zc., 789 F_3d l46, 152 (D.C_ Cir. 2015)
(quoting Rz`chardson v. Unitea' Srates, l93 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.Cir. 1999)). Both Br`Own-and
Richarcison found it significant that allowing the plaintiff to effectively amend his complaint
would cause the defendant no prejudice, id_; Richardson, 193 F.3d at 549, and Giant here makes
no claim of_pr__ejudic_e. See Res_p_onse_ [Dkt. #_ 12] _l-_7. Accordingly, _I will consider the
complaint’s allegations that Mr. Park_s was inappropriately denied a raise and subjected to
retaliation for filing suit, as well as the additional allegations raised in his subsequent filings1
B. Plaintiff’s Pay Claims Survive
' The first claims at issue are Mr. Park’s claims that he was “denied [his] promotional
raise,i’ Compl. 7, a loss that originally caused`him to lose “seventy five (75¢) a[n] hour” and
“[n]ow” causes him to “lose a dollar . a[n] hour.” Opp. 2. Giant contends that this type of
claim “necessarily relies on an interpretation of the wage provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement [CBA] between Giant and the United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400 that
governed the terms of Plaintifi" s employment.” Mot. Dismiss l. If the terms of Mr. Parks’
employment are indeed determined by this CBA, then “that claim must either be treated as a
{Labor Management Relations Actl § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-
\ contract law.” Allz's-Chalmcrs Corp. v.-Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)', Lingle v. Norge Dl`v. of
Magr`c Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 3§9, 399-400 (`1988) (“If the resolution of a state law claim depends
uponthe meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law . . . is
preempted and federal labor law principles necessarily uniform throughout the Nation must be
employed to resolve the dispute.”). But even if I construe Mr. Parl