J-S71011-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ANDERSON :
: No. 1844 EDA 2017
Appellant
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0533961-1991
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2018
Appellant, James Anderson, appeals from the order dismissing his third
petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541–9546, as untimely. We affirm.
Following a jury trial, Anderson was convicted of first-degree murder,
criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. Anderson was 21
years old at the time he committed these crimes. On January 25, 1993,
Anderson was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and our
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on November 17, 1995. Anderson
filed his first PCRA petition in 1997. The PCRA court denied Anderson’s
petition, and this Court affirmed. Anderson’s subsequent PCRA petition was
denied as untimely.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Anderson filed this petition on March 24, 2016, challenging his sentence
under the dictates of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which found
that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth
Amendment to the United States’ Constitution. Specifically, Anderson argued
that the rationale underlying the Miller decision should apply to individuals
aged 18-25 at the time of their crimes, as their brains are not fully developed.
The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice, and ultimately dismissed Anderson’s
petition as untimely. Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Prior to reaching the merits of Anderson’s claim, we must first consider
the timeliness of his PCRA petition, as it implicates the jurisdiction of this Court
and the PCRA court.
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness
requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not
address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised
therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
Anderson’s judgment of sentence became final on February 15, 1996,
when his 90-day period for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme
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Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. His third
PCRA petition—filed over twenty years later on March 24, 2016—is patently
untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Anderson’s
petition unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the
statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner asserting one of these exceptions must file a
petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have first been presented.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Anderson attempts to plead in his PCRA petition an exception to the
PCRA time-bar under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), a newly announced
constitutional right. Anderson contends the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Miller should be interpreted to provide relief for offenders aged 18-
25 at the time of their crimes. As Anderson filed his petition within 60 days of
the announcement of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),
which held that Miller retroactively applies to cases on state collateral review,
he asserts he has met the exception, and is entitled to PCRA relief. We
disagree.
Despite Anderson’s desired interpretation, both Miller and
Montgomery are specifically limited to juvenile offenders. See Miller, 567
U.S. at 465; Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. Our Court has held that because
the decision in Miller is limited to juvenile offenders, a petitioner who was not
a juvenile at the time of his crime cannot invoke the case to meet an exception
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to the PCRA time-bar. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90,
94 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa.
Super. 2013). As Anderson was not a juvenile at the time of his crime, Miller
is simply inapplicable to him.
Anderson has not met his burden of proving that his patently untimely
petition falls within one of the three limited exceptions to the PCRA’s
jurisdiction time-bar. We affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing his petition
for relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/16/18
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