Digitally signed by
Reporter of Decisions
Reason: I attest to the
Illinois Official Reports accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2018.02.08
15:20:40 -06'00'
Hastings Mutual Insurance Co. v. Blinderman Construction Co.,
2017 IL App (1st) 162234
Appellate Court HASTINGS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-
Caption Appellee, v. BLINDERMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
and THE ESTATE OF ROBERT WOODS by Cynthia Sosnowski of
the Estate and Person of Robert Woods, Defendants (Blinderman
Construction Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellant).
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-16-2234
Filed October 24, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CH-19115; the
Review Hon. Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Cremer, Spina, Shaughnessy, Jansen & Siegert, of Chicago (Brian A.
Appeal O’Gallagher and Margaret Domanski, of counsel), for appellant.
Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, of Wheaton (Ray H. Rittenhouse, of
counsel), for appellee.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Hyman and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case raises the question of whether a subcontractor’s insurer has a duty to defend the
general contractor, an additional insured under its policy, in a lawsuit brought by an injured
employee of the subcontractor. In the underlying lawsuit, the Estate of Robert Woods, the
injured employee of the subcontractor, JM Polcurr, Inc. (Polcurr), sued the general contractor,
Blinderman Construction Company, Inc. (Blinderman), for negligence. The complaint
included no allegations about the acts of Polcurr. Polcurr’s insurer, Hastings Mutual Insurance
Company (Hastings), filed a separate lawsuit for a judgment declaring that it had no duty to
defend Blinderman in the underlying lawsuit. The circuit court granted a motion for summary
judgment in favor of Hastings on its complaint.
¶2 In this appeal, we hold that the absence of allegations about Polcurr in the underlying
complaint does not suffice to meet Hastings’s burden of proving that the injury occurred
through no fault of Polcurr. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The Public Building Commission of Chicago hired Blinderman to serve as general
contractor for a construction project at Sauganash Elementary School. On June 22, 2010,
Blinderman hired Polcurr to do the electrical work for the project. Blinderman’s contract with
Polcurr required Polcurr to purchase insurance naming Blinderman as an additional insured for
Polcurr’s work on the project. Polcurr purchased the required insurance from Hastings.
¶5 On July 19, 2011, Robert Woods suffered a severe injury at work on the project. He
regained consciousness in the hospital about one month later. He has not worked since the
accident. A court appointed Woods’s daughter, Cynthia Sosnowski, to serve as plenary
guardian for Woods and Woods’s estate.
¶6 The Underlying Lawsuit: Estate of Woods v. Blinderman
¶7 In February 2014, the Estate of Woods filed a complaint against Blinderman, alleging that
Woods fell from a ladder while working at Sauganash for Polcurr. The estate alleged that
Blinderman
“a. Failed to provide a safe and suitable support and platform for the work;
b. Failed to properly supervise, coordinate, inspect, manage, control and schedule
the work;
c. Failed to provide a safe place of work; and
d. Failed to warn of the dangerous condition then and there existing, when
Defendants knew, or should have known, that warning was necessary to avoid injury to
Plaintiff.”
¶8 Blinderman tendered defense of the lawsuit to Hastings. Hastings rejected the tender,
citing, as a basis for the rejection, the following clause in its insurance policy:
“With respect to the insurance afforded to these additional insureds, the following
exclusions apply:
***
-2-
*** [L]iability arising out of the sole negligence of the additional insured or by
those acting on behalf of the additional insured.”
¶9 Blinderman filed a third-party complaint against Polcurr, arguing that Polcurr should pay a
share of any liability assessed against Blinderman because Polcurr failed to inspect the
premises, improperly maintained Woods’s work area, failed to warn Woods of dangerous
conditions, and permitted Woods to use an unstable ladder without appropriate safety
equipment.
¶ 10 Hastings’s Complaint
¶ 11 In November 2014, Hastings filed the complaint that initiated the case now on appeal.
Hastings sought a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Blinderman
for its potential liability in Estate of Woods v. Blinderman. Blinderman and Hastings both filed
motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action.
¶ 12 Blinderman supported its motion for summary judgment with its third-party complaint
against Polcurr and depositions of two Polcurr employees. According to the employees,
Blinderman gave no directions to Polcurr employees about their work. Polcurr employees,
including Woods, used only Polcurr equipment. Blinderman had a safety program and a safety
inspector at the worksite. At times, Blinderman’s inspector directed workers for the
subcontractors to take specific measures for their safety.
¶ 13 The circuit court held that the court could not consider the allegations of the third-party
complaint when determining whether Hastings had a duty to defend Blinderman. The circuit
court held that the exclusion for liability arising from Blinderman’s sole negligence applied,
and Hastings had no duty to defend Blinderman because the underlying complaint did not
allege or suggest that Polcurr acted negligently. Blinderman now appeals.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 We review de novo the order granting Hastings’s motion for summary judgment. Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). Our supreme court set
out the basic principles applicable here:
“If the underlying complaints allege facts *** potentially within policy coverage,
the insurer is obliged to defend its insured ***. An insurer may not justifiably refuse to
defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the underlying
complaints that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the case *** potentially
within[ ] the policy’s coverage. ***
The underlying complaints and the insurance policies must be liberally construed in
favor of the insured. *** All doubts and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the
insured.” (Emphases omitted.) United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin
Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73-74 (1991).
See also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 107-08
(1992).
¶ 16 The Wilkin court held that the insurer in that case had a duty to defend because the policy
exclusions “d[id] not preclude potential coverage under the policy.” Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 81.
¶ 17 The circuit court here held that the policy exclusion for liability arising from Blinderman’s
sole negligence established that Hastings had no duty to defend Blinderman. “[T]he insurer
-3-
bears the burden of establishing that a claim falls within a provision of the policy that limits or
excludes coverage.” Old Second National Bank v. Indiana Insurance Co., 2015 IL App (1st)
140265, ¶ 22; see Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill. 2d 446, 453-54 (2009). Thus,
Hastings had the burden of showing that Blinderman’s liability arose out of the sole negligence
of Blinderman or those acting on Blinderman’s behalf and not from the negligent acts or
omissions of Polcurr.
¶ 18 The circuit court focused on the absence of allegations about Polcurr in the complaint the
Estate of Woods filed against Blinderman. By adopting that focus, the circuit court ignored the
context in which the Estate filed its complaint. In Pekin Insurance Co. v. Centex Homes, 2017
IL App (1st) 153601, the court said:
“[T]he allegations of the underlying complaint must be read with the understanding
that the employer may be the negligent actor even where the complaint does not
include allegations against that employer. [Citation.]
***
*** ‘[S]ilen[ce] as to any acts or omissions’ by the named insured must be
understood as the possible result of tort immunity for employers under the workers’
compensation laws and should not be a basis for refusing to defend an additional
insured.” Centex Homes, 2017 IL App (1st) 153601, ¶¶ 36-38 (quoting Ramara, Inc. v.
Westfield Insurance Co., 814 F.3d 660, 677 (3d Cir. 2016)).
¶ 19 The Estate of Woods in its complaint did not specifically allege that Polcurr’s acts or
omissions caused the injury. But the estate did not expect to recover damages from Polcurr and
had no reason to include allegations about the acts or omissions of Polcurr. The complaint’s
silence concerning Polcurr’s acts or omissions does not suffice to meet Hastings’s burden of
showing that Polcurr’s acts or omissions did not contribute to causing the injury.
¶ 20 Hastings cites Pekin Insurance Co. v. Roszak/ADC, LLC, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1055 (2010), for
the proposition that “without any allegations in the complaint suggesting” that the
subcontractor acted negligently and caused the injury, the subcontractor’s insurer had no duty
to defend the general contractor. Roszak, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1064; see American Country
Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501, 512 (1999) (subcontractor’s insurer has no duty to
defend additional insured where underlying complaint does not suggest that subcontractor’s
negligent acts caused injury). In Roszak, the policy provided:
“ ‘Who is An Additional Insured *** is amended to include as an insured any person or
organization for whom you are performing operations when you and such person or
organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement that such person or
organization be added as an additional insured on your policy. Such person or
organization is an additional insured only with respect to liability incurred solely as a
result of some act or omission of the named insured and not for its own independent
negligence or statutory violation.’ ” Roszak, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1058.
¶ 21 The additional insured in Roszak bore the burden of proving that the limiting language did
not apply because the limiting language appeared in the coverage grant and not in a separate
exclusionary clause. Because the limiting language the circuit court relied on here appeared in
a separate exclusion, we have no basis for shifting the burden of proof from the insurer to the
insured. The insurer must meet the burden of proving that its exclusions apply and preclude
coverage. Addison Insurance, 232 Ill. 2d at 454.
-4-
¶ 22 We note that Blinderman’s third-party complaint against Polcurr includes allegations
consistent with the Estate’s complaint, showing how Polcurr’s acts or omissions might have
contributed to causing Woods’s injury. However, Blinderman would need to use those
pleadings only if it bore the burden of proving that Polcurr’s acts or omissions might have
contributed to causing Woods’s injury. Because the Estate’s complaints include no allegations
about Polcurr’s acts or omissions, and Hastings has presented no evidence concerning
Polcurr’s acts or omissions, Hastings has not met its burden of proving that Blinderman’s
liability in the underlying case arose out of Blinderman’s “sole negligence.” Thus, we need not
address Blinderman’s argument that the court should have considered the allegations of the
third-party complaint Blinderman filed against Polcurr to help the court determine whether the
injury resulted from the sole negligence of Blinderman. We also need not address
Blinderman’s argument that Hastings knew true but unpleaded facts that showed Polcurr might
owe Blinderman compensation for Polcurr’s role in causing the injury. We reverse the
summary judgment entered in favor of Hastings and remand for proceedings in accord with
this opinion.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 In the underlying complaint that the Estate of Woods filed against Blinderman, the estate
alleged that Woods sustained an injury while working for Polcurr but included no other
allegations about Polcurr’s conduct. We hold that, because Polcurr’s insurer, Hastings,
presented no evidence concerning Polcurr’s conduct, Hastings has not met its burden of
proving that Polcurr’s conduct did not in any way contribute to causing the injury Woods
sustained. Therefore, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Hastings and remand for
further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
¶ 25 Reversed and remanded.
-5-