NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0085n.06
CASE NO. 17-1526
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL ERICKSEN and MICHAEL ) FILED
ERICKSEN, ) Feb 20, 2018
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
UNITED STATES of AMERICA, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
Before: NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Daniel and Michael Ericksen appeal the
district court’s dismissal of their lawsuit. We AFFIRM.
I.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers guarding the international border with
Canada found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Daniel Ericksen’s car, handcuffed him, and
detained him in a jail cell until local police arrived to take him into custody. Ultimately, Daniel
pled guilty to a state-court misdemeanor charge and served one month probation.
Meanwhile, Daniel sued in federal court claiming that the CBP officers had violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him and searching his car.1 The district court dismissed
the complaint, finding that the officers had “committed no Fourth Amendment violation when
they conducted a routine search of [his] vehicle and arrested him, when he presented at an
Case No. 17-1526, Ericksen v. United States
international border checkpoint carrying marijuana and drug paraphernalia in his vehicle’s
trunk.” Ericksen v. Doe, No. 15-CV-10088, 2015 WL 4041316, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2015).
Daniel appealed, raising 19 issues for review, though “[h]is primary challenge [was] to
the district court’s ruling that the [officers] properly subjected him to a border search.” D.E. v.
John Doe, 834 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2016). We affirmed and explained that “routine searches
of vehicles at the border do not require a warrant or any level of suspicion.” Id. at 727. We
further explained that Daniel’s “detention for roughly one hour was reasonable.” Id.
Meanwhile, Daniel and his father, Michael Ericksen, sued the United States in federal
court, based largely on these same events but this time accusing the CBP officers of false arrest,
false imprisonment, and battery. The district court dismissed the suit based on issue and claim
preclusion. Ericksen v. United States, No. 16-CV-13038, 2017 WL 930034, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 9, 2017). Specifically, the district court held that “Daniel’s claim of false arrest and
imprisonment is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because this court previously found
that Daniel’s detention and arrest at the international border was lawful, and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.” Id. at *2. The court next ordered “dismissal of Daniel’s battery claim under the
doctrine of claim preclusion[,] . . . [which] operates to bar claims [that] should have been
litigated in an earlier proceeding.” Id. at *4. Finally, the court rejected Michael’s separate claim
of false arrest and imprisonment on the same basis as it had rejected Daniel’s, concluding that
“Michael has failed to state a claim for false arrest or imprisonment.” Id. at *5.
In a separate order, the district court had previously denied the Ericksens’ motion to
disqualify the judge, which was predicated on their claim that the prior rulings against them
demonstrated the judge’s bias against them. But the court’s rulings had been legally correct, as
1
Daniel did not in that complaint accuse any of the officers of battery or any type of excessive force.
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Case No. 17-1526, Ericksen v. United States
confirmed by our affirmance in the prior appeal. Therefore, the Ericksens had failed to show the
bias necessary to disqualify the judge so the judge necessarily denied the motion.
II.
The Ericksens contend that the district court judge should have granted their motion for
his disqualification because a federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and here—according to the
Ericksens—the judge’s prior rulings, which went against them, demonstrated his bias against
them. This question of whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . is objective and is not
based on the subjective view of a party.” United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir.
1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When the accusation of impartiality “springs from
the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial,” the accusing party must show that the
impartiality was “so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). Moreover, “[i]t has long been regarded as normal and
proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving
the same defendant.” Id. We review the district court’s decision on such a charge for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 837 (6th Cir. 2013). Here, the Ericksens
accuse the district court of impartiality because of—and only because of—the court’s rulings
against them, with which they continue to disagree. But in our view, and the view of the prior
panel, the district court’s prior rulings were legally correct, meaning that under our objective
assessment, impartiality has not reasonably been questioned in this case. Consequently, we
cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Ericksens’ motion.
The Ericksens next contend that the district court erred by applying issue preclusion to
Daniel’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment. But the court had previously determined,
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and we had affirmed, that Daniel’s arrest and detention were proper, given that the search was
valid, inasmuch as searches at the border do not require a warrant or any level of suspicion.
“[O]nce a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is
conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior
litigation.” United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
Even accepting that Michael’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are not
precluded, as he was not a party to the previous litigation, see id., he nonetheless fails to state a
claim. Under Michigan law, “brief confinements or restraints are insufficient for false
imprisonment.” Moore v. City of Detroit, 652 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). The
only restraint on his liberty that Michael suffered was his presumed inability to leave while CBP
officers searched his bag and conducted a warrant check. That brief delay did not amount to
even constructive imprisonment or arrest.
Finally, the Ericksens contend that the district court erred by applying claim preclusion to
Daniel’s claim of battery. Whether or not the claim is precluded, Daniel nonetheless fails to state
a claim. Daniel’s battery claim is premised on the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest; he does not
argue that excessive force was used. As the district court explained, Michigan law permits an
arresting officer to “use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest.” Young v.
Barker, 405 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). This court has already held that searching
Daniel’s car was lawful, as was detaining him afterward, D.E., 834 F.3d at 727; the arrest that
linked that search to that detention was necessarily lawful as well. Using reasonable force to
effectuate that arrest did not constitute battery.
III.
For the foregoing reasons and as further articulated in the district court’s thorough and
well-written opinion, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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