IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, :
: ID No. 1607007865
v. : In and For Kent County
:
KEVIN WALKER, :
:
Defendant. :
OPINION
Submitted: January 5, 2018
Decided: February 21, 2018
Gregory R. Babowal, Esquire, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Dover, Delaware, for
the State.
Stephanie H. Blaisdell, Esquire, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Dover,
Delaware, for the Defendant.
Clark, J.
Prior to Defendant Kevin Walker’s (hereinafter “Mr. Walker’s”) criminal
trial, the Superior Court granted Mr. Walker’s motion to suppress evidence seized
from an illegal search. That Order applied to his criminal trial. The search at issue
was based on an administrative warrant authorized because of Mr. Walker’s status
as a probationer and initiated by Mr. Walker’s probation officer. Mr. Walker now
moves the Court to exclude the same evidence from his violation of probation
hearing.
The Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed whether the exclusionary rule
applies to violation of probation hearings. Furthermore, no Delaware court has
issued a written decision regarding its applicability in the context of when a
probation officer executes an improperly issued administrative warrant. For the
reasons outlined herein, the exclusionary rule does not apply in violation of
probation proceedings, even when the illegal search was a result of an administrative
warrant issued and executed by probation officials. Accordingly, Mr. Walker’s
motion to suppress is DENIED.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mr. Walker began probation on May 10, 2017 as a result of a felony driving
under the influence conviction. On June 5, 2017, Delaware probation officers
conducted a pre-approved administrative search of Mr. Walker’s residence, based
upon a tip by a past proven reliable informant that Mr. Walker possessed heroin that
2
he planned to distribute. The administrative warrant was authorized pursuant to 11
Del C. § 4321(d), which permits probation officers to conduct searches of
individuals on probation provided the search is authorized “in accordance with
Department procedures.” The Department of Correction promulgated Probation and
Parole Procedure 7.19 that lists requirements for issuing an administrative warrant
to search the property of probationers. 1
As a result of this search, probation officers discovered 252 bags of heroin in
Mr. Walker’s bedroom along with other drug paraphernalia. The officers also
recovered a locked safe and took it to Delaware State Police Troop 3. After forcing
the safe open, they discovered a loaded handgun, five doses of a narcotic pain killer,
and approximately five grams of marijuana. When law enforcement processed Mr.
Walker at Sussex Correctional Institution, they also discovered a log of heroin
concealed in his rectum.
After a suppression hearing, a separate judicial officer of this Court held that
the probation officers’ reliance on a tip involving Mr. Walker did not comply with
Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19. Accordingly, the Court granted Mr. Walker’s
motion to the suppress the seized evidence from his upcoming criminal trial. The
Court held that the tip did not substantially comply with that procedure because the
1
See Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008) (discussing Procedure 7.19 and its four
requirements).
3
probation officers failed to follow their agency’s requirement to corroborate the tip
and to investigate the informant’s motives. Because substantial compliance with
probation procedures is required under 11 Del. C. § 4321, that Court held that
allowing the State to introduce evidence at trial would render regulations
promulgated under it meaningless.
Though the suppression order resulted in the dismissal of the underlying
criminal action, the State seeks separately to prove that Mr. Walker’s criminal
conduct violated conditions of his probation. Mr. Walker argues that the finding in
the criminal proceeding collaterally applies to his probation revocation hearing
because it is based on the same conduct. He accordingly moves this Court to exclude
the illegally obtained evidence from consideration at his violation of probation
hearing.
For purposes of judicial economy, the Court heard argument regarding the
suppression issue, reserved decision, and then conducted a contested violation of
probation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Walker acknowledged that
he would appropriately be held in violation if the evidence is not suppressed. The
State likewise agreed that without the evidence that is the subject of the motion, it
did not meet its burden of proving a violation of probation at the hearing.
4
II. Discussion
The Delaware Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the exclusionary
rule applies to violation of probation hearings. 2 However, the Superior Court has
twice held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress illegally obtained
evidence in violation of probation hearings.3
In State v. Kinard, the Superior Court held as a matter of first written
impression, that evidence suppressed from use at trial should not be suppressed from
use at a violation of probation hearing. 4 The Kinard court based its holding primarily
on Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,5 where the United States
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in Pennsylvania parole
revocation hearings. 6 In Kinard, the court applied the balancing test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court to our State’s probation revocation proceedings. 7
In doing so, it recognized the differences between parole hearings (at issue in Scott)
and probation revocation hearings. After carefully conducting the required
2
Jenkins v. State, 8 A.3d 1147, 1155 n.41 (Del. 2010) (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court
has not addressed whether the exclusionary rule should apply to violation of probation hearings);
but cf. Burton v. State, 781 A.2d 692 (Table), 2001 WL 760842, at *1 (Del. May 24, 2001)
(holding, however, that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in Delaware parole proceedings).
3
State v. Kinard, 2005 WL 2373701, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 2005); see also State v. Waters,
2007 WL 1098120, at *2 (Del. Super. April 11, 2007) (citing Kinard without further analysis and
holding that “[t]he exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings.”).
4
Kinard, 2005 WL 2373701, at *3.
5
524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998).
6
Id. at 364.
7
Kinard, 2005 WL 2373701, at *2–4.
5
balancing, it found the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable in Delaware’s probation
revocation process as well.8 Specifically, the Kinard court balanced, on one side of
the scale, its finding that the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable,
probative evidence, which would impose significant costs upon the probation
process.9 Against those costs, it balanced the benefit of what its deterrent effect
would be if enforced in probation revocation hearings. 10 Of note, the illegal search
at issue in Kinard involved police conduct where the police had no knowledge of the
suspect’s probationary status. In establishing its rule, the Kinard court noted that at
the time all nine United States Circuit Courts of Appeals and the significant majority
of state courts had declined to extend the exclusionary rule to probation violation
proceedings.11
While establishing an appropriate general rule, Kinard analyzes a different
situation than the one at hand. Namely, Kinard involved police officers that were
unaware of a defendant’s probationary status. 12 After a warrantless search, the
8
Id. at *3.
9
Id. at *2–3.
10
Id.
11
Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Finney, 897 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 830–34
(3rd Cir. 1983); United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53–55 (9th Cir. 1975) overruled by U.S. v. Herbert, 201 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162–63 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown,
488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970)).
12
Id. at *1.
6
officers discovered drugs on the defendant, which led to a subsequent search of his
home.13 It involved a criminal investigation only. Mr. Walker correctly argues that
this case is in part distinguishable from Kinard because Kinard did not involve an
administrative search that was conducted because of the defendant’s status as a
probationer. Mr. Walker also correctly recognizes that Scott created a balancing test,
which Kinard applied in declining to extend the exclusionary rule to violation of
probation hearings.14 That balancing test weighs the deterrent benefit of suppressing
evidence against the costs of hampering the enforcement of probation conditions.15
Mr. Walker seeks to distinguish Kinard by arguing that an illegal probation related
search calls for a different weighing of factors than does Kinard. Specifically, he
argues that the result of a balancing of costs versus benefits in this case favors
suppressing the evidence from his violation of probation hearing. In contrast, the
State counters that Kinard’s general rule should be applied in all violation of
probation hearings, under any circumstance.
Prior to the start of the January 5, 2018 probation revocation hearing, the
Court heard argument regarding Mr. Walker’s motion to suppress the use of this
evidence. At argument, the Court observed that some states decline to apply the
exclusionary rule at violation of probation hearings as a general rule, but
13
Id.
14
Id. at *3.
15
Id.
7
nevertheless carve out an exception when the evidence was seized as a result of a
search directed at a probationer because of his probationary status. 16 As a result, the
Court invited the parties to provide written memoranda of law stating their respective
arguments regarding whether the evidence in this case should be excluded because
the search was directed at a probationer and was based on an administrative warrant
authorized because of Mr. Walker’s probationary status. The Court acknowledged
at the argument that accepting the appropriateness of Kinard’s general rule would
not necessarily be dispositive of the issue in this case. Mr. Walker and the State then
timely filed memoranda of law.
As a threshold matter, this Court sees no reason to depart from the holding of
Kinard that the exclusionary rule does not apply to violation of probation
proceedings as a general rule. The Kinard Court persuasively and logically applied
the balancing test created by the United States Supreme Court in Scott, and,
consistent with many other courts, found the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable in
violation of probation proceedings. 17 The Court must now consider, under these
circumstances, whether an exception should be made to the general rule articulated
in Kinard. Here, the deterrent effect calculus could be different when an improperly
16
See Aaron L. Weisman, Annotation, Admissibility in State Probation Revocation Proceedings
of Evidence Obtained Through Illegal Search and Seizure, 92 A.L.R. 6th 1 §§ 4–5 (2014)
(discussing the various approaches to this issue including the jurisdictions that employ an
exception to the general rule).
17
Kinard, 2005 WL 2373701, at *3.
8
conducted administrative search is conducted by the same probation officers that
seek to revoke a defendant’s probation.
Kinard balanced the value of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect against
the cost of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process.18 Mr.
Walker argues that, in this context, the need for deterrence weighs more heavily in
favor of exclusion because the illegal search was initiated and executed as a
probation-related matter. Accordingly, unlike in Kinard, the actors sought to be
deterred in this case align directly with the actors prosecuting the matter. This
argument recognizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress injury,
but to deter future unlawful police conduct.19 The Court finds that applying the rule
in violation of probation hearings would have a greater deterrent effect on the agency
charged with following proper procedures than that of a separate police agency that
is focused instead on the prosecution of criminal offenses. At a minimum, this
difference requires an independent weighing of these factors.
The Scott decision involved an appeal of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
decision that itself carved out an exception to the general rule against applying the
exclusionary rule in parole proceedings where the officer performing the search
knew that the subject was a parolee.20 The United States Supreme Court declined to
18
Id.
19
U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (U.S. 1974).
20
Scott, 524 U.S. at 367–68.
9
adopt that exception, finding that sufficient deterrence is still provided in cases
where “parole officers may act like police officers and seek to uncover evidence of
illegal activity.” 21 The Court reasoned that such parole officers are “undoubtedly
aware that any unconstitutionally seized evidence . . . could be suppressed in a
criminal trial.”22 The majority in that decision also relied on the premise that parole
officers’ relationships with parolees are “more supervisory than adversarial.” 23
Here, when weighing the separate deterrent effect under this set of
circumstances, the result is not a fait accompli. First and foremost, the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue even as to the general rule.24
Second, at least the State of Florida, in addressing Scott, has distinguished probation
from parole and found that the exclusionary rule applies fully in probation revocation
hearings.25 Third, notwithstanding the United State Supreme Court’s application of
the balancing test to Pennsylvania, many States still have applied an exception to
this general rule when the officers knew about the defendant’s probationary status.26
21
Id. at 369.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 368.
24
See Jenkins, 8 A.3d at 1154 n.41 (summarizing the Superior Court authority and declining to
address the issue).
25
See State v. Scarlett, 800 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the differences between
probation and parole hearings are material enough to require application of the exclusionary rule
even in light of the Scott decision).
26
See generally Weisman, supra note 16 at §§ 4–5 (discussing the splits of authority regarding
the admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal
searches and seizures).
10
Those courts also base that exception in part on the theory that the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule outweighs the cost of excluding reliable evidence when
officers are aware of the defendant’s probationary status. Namely, if undeterred,
those officers learn that illegally seized evidence can be used to revoke probation. 27
Consistent with the Scott decision’s refusal to uphold the Pennsylvania
exception requiring knowledge alone, the majority of States creating this exception
also require an assessment of the probation or police officer’s subjective intent when
conducting the search.28 This line of cases requires a finding of bad faith, lack of
27
See, e.g., People v. Knight, 388 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ill. 1979) (recognizing “[w]hen the police at
the moment of search know that a suspect is a probationer, they may have a significant incentive
to carry out an illegal search even though knowing that evidence would be inadmissible in any
criminal proceeding. The police have nothing to risk: If the motion to suppress in the criminal
proceedings were denied, defendant would stand convicted of a new crime; and if the motion were
granted, the defendant would still find himself behind bars due to revocation of probation. Thus,
in such circumstances, extension of the exclusionary rule to the probation revocation proceeding
may be necessary to effectuate Fourth Amendment safeguards.”); Ex parte Caffie, 516 So.2d 831,
836 (Ala. 1987) (likewise recognizing “[u]nder certain circumstances, consideration may weigh in
favor of the extension of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings. For example,
where illegal acts of the police were directed specifically at a probationer or where they shock the
conscience, the deterrent effect that exclusion of such evidence would have outweighs the need of
the sentencing court for full and reliable information.”); State v. Davis, 375 So.2d 69, 74 (La. 1979)
(writing that “[k]nowledge that illegally seized evidence can be used in probation revocation
proceedings might in some instances provide incentive to law enforcement officers to purposely
disregard the constitutional rights of probationers. These possibilities do not warrant general
applicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings. Still, the court does not and
will not condone blatant violations of probationers’ constitutional rights. In appropriate cases,
where it is demonstrated that an illegal search and seizure was conducted in bad faith and was
consciously and purposely directed at a probationer with knowledge of his status as such, the court
may and should exercise its discretion to exclude and not consider evidence so obtained.”).
28
See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 610 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (requiring a nexus between
an officer’s knowledge of the defendant’s probationary status and the illegal action directed toward
the probationer before applying the exclusionary rule to revocation probation proceedings); Davis,
375 So.2d 69, 74 (La. 1979) (requiring officers to act in bad faith and purposefully directed toward
a probationer before applying the exclusionary rule to revocation of probation proceedings); State
v. Proctor, 559 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (declining to extend exception to the
11
good faith, or conduct that is sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience of the
court. On the other side of the split of authority are the many state and federal
circuit courts that apply the blanket general rule finding the exclusionary rule
inapplicable in probation revocation hearings, without exception.29
This case involves a search based on an administrative warrant authorized
because of Mr. Walker’s probationary status and initiated by a probation officer. It
is clear that the officers were aware of Mr. Walker’s probationary status, and
exclusion as a consequence would provide additional deterrence in the probation
venue. However, the Court must balance the cost of impeding the truth-finding
process and its detrimental impact on the probation process against the benefit of the
rule’s deterrent effect. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Scott in
the parole setting, litigating suppression issues would transform the process from a
“predictive and discretionary effort” to a trial-like proceeding “less attuned” to the
exclusionary rule when officers are aware of probationary status but conduct the search in good
faith); Hughes v. Gwinn, 290 S.E.2d 5, 10 (W. Va. 1982) (requiring knowledge of probationary
status and evidence of police harassment); Holcomb v. State, 644 So.2d 46, 48 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994) (holding that the exception to the exclusionary rule applies only when illegal acts are
directed at probationer because of his status); People v. Ressin, 620 P.2d 717, 720–21 (Colo. 1980)
(holding that the exception to the exclusionary rule only applies when officers knowingly engaged
in a pretextual arrest and exploratory search of the defendant because of his probationary status);
Chase v. State, 522 A.2d 1348, 1363 (Md. 1987) (holding that the exception to the exclusionary
rule does not apply when officers conduct a search in good faith).
29
See, e.g., State v. Alfaro, 623 P.2d 8, 9 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that the exclusionary rule could
not be invoked at a violation of probation hearing); State v. Jacobs, 641 A.2d 1351, 1354 (Conn.
1994) (holding that the exclusionary rule would not apply to prevent the fruits of a claimed illegal
search from being introduced at a probation revocation hearing); see also Kinard, 2005 WL
2373701, at *3 n.9 (listing the Federal Court of Appeals decisions that refuse to apply the
exclusionary rule in violation of probation hearings).
12
interests of the parolee and the public. 30 Although the Court recognizes that
probation revocation proceedings are more adversarial than parole proceedings and
also involve legally trained judicial officers, for the reasons discussed below, the
Court finds that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in any probation revocation
proceeding.
Admittedly, courts that have adopted an exception to the rule based on an
officers’ knowledge of defendant’s probationary status have done so under the
theory that knowledge of a suspect’s probation status may incentivize officers to act
illegally because they will know that illegally seized evidence cannot be used at a
probation revocation hearing.31 However, the majority of jurisdictions applying this
exception have held that mere knowledge of the suspect’s probationary status is not
sufficient to trigger it.32
Most of the cases applying Mr. Walker’s advocated exception find
suppression of evidence appropriate only upon a showing of bad faith or harassing
conduct by the officers involved. For example, Mr. Walker cites People v. Knight.33
30
Scott, 524 U.S. at 367.
31
See, e.g., Knight, 388 N.E.2d at 418 (Ill. 1979) (quoting Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 n.5 (9th Cir.
1975). Winsett, however, was subsequently overruled by U.S. v. Herbert, 201 F.3d 1103, 1103
(9th Cir. 2000). In Herbert, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon Scott and overruled
Winsett by holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable in Federal probation revocation proceedings.
32
See, e.g., Chase v. Maryland, 522 A.2d 1348, 1363 (Md. 1987) (applying the “good faith
standard” in this context and applying the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings only upon
a showing that the police “did not act in good faith”).
33
388 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. 1979).
13
In Knight, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed whether evidence seized as a result
of police harassment of a probationer must be suppressed, and did not hold that all
illegally seized evidence must be suppressed when the officers knew the defendant
was a probationer.34 Furthermore, Knight was decided years before the Scott
decision and did not apply the then non-existent balancing test. Rather, Knight
articulated an exception requiring a finding of harassment by an officer of a known
probationer as a trigger for applying the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
proceedings.35
Some jurisdictions find a similar exception only when the officers do not act
in good faith. For example, Mr. Walker cites Dabney v. State,36 where the Supreme
Court of Arkansas discussed a possible good faith exception in dicta. Mr. Walker
asserts that this standard would apply when the officers’ sole purpose of the search
was to revoke probation. However, in Sherman v. State, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas discussed Dabney, and clarified that an exception to the rule applies only
when officers act in bad faith.37 In evaluating whether officers acted in bad faith,
the Sherman Court considered whether the officers conducted the search in order to
34
Id. at 418.
35
Id.
36
646 S.W.2d. 4, 5 (Ark. 1983).
37
308 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Ark. 2009).
14
harass a probationer.38 Arkansas did not hold that the search of a known probationer
is per se harassment, even if the search violated the probationer’s rights.
In Mr. Walker’s case, because the good or bad faith of the officer was
irrelevant to the underlying suppression motion, no evidence was adduced one way
or the other regarding the officer’s motivation. The State argues correctly that a fair
reading of the Court’s decision in that matter certainly does not establish any bad
faith. Rather, the violation seems to have been a technical one in nature. On the
other hand, were the Court to apply an exception allowing exclusion in situations
involving bad faith, Mr. Walker would be due the chance to address that additional
issue through a supplemental hearing. It would not have been relevant in the
companion case’s suppression hearing.
To date, this Court is unaware of an instance where the Delaware Supreme
Court has recognized a subjective, separate bad faith or harassment benchmark in
any Fourth Amendment, Delaware Constitutional, or statutory search and seizure
analysis. The only foray into this venue has been the Superior Court case, State v.
Heath,39 which has not been endorsed by other Superior Court decisions or by the
Delaware Supreme Court.40 Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court has rejected
38
Id. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Arkansas referenced searches that shock the conscience
of the Court. Id.
39
929 A.2d 390 (Del. Super. 2006).
40
See Turner v. State, 25 A.3d 774, 777 (Del. 2011) (observing that Heath was not appealed, other
Superior Court decisions have not followed Heath, and that Heath’s reasoning in finding a
15
the “good faith” exception articulated in United States v. Leon,41 thus declining to
permit a good faith exception to the warrant requirement based upon Delaware
Constitutional protections.42 In the face of the Delaware Supreme Court’s repeated
direction that the linchpin of search and seizure analysis is objective, this Court will
not interject a subjective component into the analysis. As the Delaware Supreme
Court has held
[i]n analyzing . . . the reasonableness of a seizure, pat down search, an
arrest warrant or search warrant, the reviewing court does not focus on
the subjective motivations or intent of the particular person, but instead
makes an objective determination of . . . what is required under the
law.43
Delaware courts’ analysis in this regard is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court holding in Whren v. United States.44 With Whren, the matter is
settled as to the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court
has not extended the analysis beyond the objective benchmark contemplated in
Whren. Accordingly, notwithstanding Delaware constitutional law, the benchmark
for search and seizure analysis in Delaware is also objective in the case at hand. It
Delaware Constitutional violation based on the subjective intention of an arrest officer was
incorrect).
41
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
42
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 814–20 (Del. 2001).
43
Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 19 (Del. 2008); see also Murphy v. State, 45 A.3d 670, 674 (Del.
2012) (holding that if objective facts justify a traffic stop, the stop is legal, notwithstanding the
officer’s harboring a different subjective motivation)
44
517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996) (holding that constitutional review of the legality of searches and
seizures does not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved).
16
therefore follows, that when evaluating the applicability of the exclusionary rule to
probation hearings, assessing law enforcement’s actions for harassment, bad faith,
or conduct that shocks the court’s conscience is not available under Delaware law.
In the final analysis, even in this context, the burden on the probation system
would be too great when weighed against the need for effective deterrence of future
probation-focused law enforcement misconduct. Financial costs regarding
enforcement, strain on the Court and judicial resources, and impact on both
prosecuting and defense attorneys, in an already resource-strained system, would be
significant. On the other side of the scale, in this context, the suppression of
evidence from the criminal trial also serves a significant, although not as direct,
deterrent role. For instance, in this case, the State was forced to dismiss new criminal
charges because of the suppression decision in the criminal case. In most such
situations, there will be sufficient future deterrence through exclusion of the
evidence from new criminal proceedings.
In this Court’s view, the orderly process of ensuring that probationers comply
with conditions of their probation would be overly disrupted by imposing the
exclusionary rule in any way in such proceedings. Since (1) the weight of persuasive
authority finding any exception to the general rule qualifies that rule only if those
courts find bad faith or harassment, and (2) no subjective evaluation of the officers’
17
intentions is appropriate under the search and seizure analysis of Delaware law, the
general rule properly applies to this case.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the officers’ knowledge of Mr. Walker’s
probation status does not justify extending the exclusionary rule to bar the evidence
seized from use at his violation of probation hearing. Under these circumstances,
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to revocations of probation proceedings.
Accordingly, Mr. Walker’s motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
18