NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MORES JAVIER ROJAS-CRUZ, No. 16-71056
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-310-874
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Mores Javier Rojas-Cruz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying a motion to continue and ordering
removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretion the agency’s denial of a motion to continue, and review de novo
constitutional claims. Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.
2008). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Rojas-Cruz’s motion for a
fourth continuance for failure to show good cause, where the IJ repeatedly warned
him that no further continuances would be granted, and where he had over 21
months to complete his applications for relief but did not submit them by the
deadline set by the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29 (an IJ “may grant a motion for
continuance for good cause shown”); 1003.31(c) (applications not filed by deadline
set by IJ are deemed waived); Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.
2009).
The record does not support Rojas-Cruz’s contention that his waiver of his
statutory right to counsel was not intelligent and voluntary. See Tawadrus v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In order for a waiver [of the right
to counsel] to be valid, an IJ must generally: (1) inquire specifically as to whether
petitioner wishes to continue without a lawyer; and (2) receive a knowing and
voluntary affirmative response.”(internal citations omitted)).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Rojas-Cruz’s unexhausted contention
regarding the rescheduling of his October 2013 hearing. See Tijani v. Holder, 628
F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).
2 16-71056
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
3 16-71056