Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC16-1711
____________
JAMES GUZMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[February 22, 2018]
PER CURIAM.
James Guzman appeals his convictions for armed robbery and first-degree
murder and sentence of death.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the
convictions but vacate his death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 1992, James Guzman was convicted for the August 10, 1991,
armed robbery and first-degree murder of David Colvin and was subsequently
sentenced to death for the murder conviction. On direct appeal, we reversed
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Guzman’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that
Guzman’s right to conflict-free counsel was violated because his public defender
had a conflict of interest. Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1994).
At retrial, Guzman was again found guilty of first-degree murder and armed
robbery and sentenced to death. Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla.
1998). On direct appeal, we affirmed Guzman’s convictions and death sentence.
Id. at 1162. Post-conviction relief was denied, and we affirmed. Guzman v. State,
941 So. 2d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 2006).
Next, Guzman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the U. S.
District Court, Middle District of Florida, and the court ruled in Guzman’s favor
based on a Giglio2 and Brady3 violation. Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1329-35 (M.D. Fla. 2010). The U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed and remanded Guzman’s case for a new trial. Guzman v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 663 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2011). Guzman now
appeals his convictions and sentence of death following his third trial on these
charges.
2. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
3. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-2-
The evidence at Guzman’s third trial established that on August 12, 1991,
police were dispatched to a motel after a motel employee discovered David
Colvin’s body lying face down on a bed in his motel room, covered in blood.
There was blood spatter across the bed, pillows, and walls, and a fragment of
Colvin’s skull was located by the foot of the bed. The police also found a twisted
and bent samurai sword in the room. However, there was no blood or fingerprints
found on the sword. Colvin’s blood alcohol level was .34 at the time of his death.
The former testimony of Dr. Terrance Steiner, an interim medical examiner
for Volusia County, was introduced into evidence because he was deceased at the
time of the retrial. Dr. Steiner performed an autopsy, which revealed nineteen stab
and incised wounds to Colvin’s body. Colvin received eleven stab wounds to his
face and scalp, four to his back, three to his chest, and one defensive wound to his
left forefinger. One stab wound to Colvin’s left chest was fatal because it cut his
pulmonary artery and punctured his left lung, and Colvin would have lost
consciousness anywhere from twenty seconds to two minutes after receiving this
stab wound. The other stab wounds to his head also contributed to his death.
Colvin’s cause of death was blood loss and shock due to the multiple stab and
incised wounds. Dr. Steiner determined that Colvin died on the evening of
Saturday, August 10, 1991. Additionally, Dr. Steiner stated that the sword found
at the scene was consistent with the wounds Colvin received.
-3-
Allison Sylvester, the lead homicide detective on the case, testified that she
responded to the crime scene on the morning of August 12, 1991. During the
initial investigation, Detective Sylvester interviewed Martha Cronin and James
Guzman, who lived together in a room at the motel. Guzman and Cronin denied
knowing anything about Colvin’s murder. However, Officer Robert Walker
testified that several months later, in November 1991, when he arrested Cronin for
violating her probation, Cronin became upset and said she had knowledge about a
man who was killed in a motel room with a sword. Cronin also stated that she
knew the location of a ring that had been stolen from the victim.
At trial, Cronin testified that in August 1991 she met Guzman, and he moved
into her motel room. They formed a business relationship where he protected her
while she engaged in prostitution, and in return, Cronin paid for Guzman’s room,
food, and drugs. This eventually turned into a romantic relationship. At some
point after Guzman moved in, Guzman, while fiddling with his survival knife, told
her that it would be easy to rob Colvin because he was old, drunk, and known to
carry money. At the same time, Guzman also said, “A dead witness can’t talk.”
On the morning of Saturday, August 10, 1991, Guzman told Cronin that he
was taking Colvin to run some errands. Upon return, Guzman showed her that he
had Colvin’s keys. Cronin then left the motel room to engage in prostitution.
When she returned around 2:30 or 3 p.m., Guzman was not in the room. A short
-4-
time later, Guzman returned to the room, carrying a garbage bag with rags or
towels in it and went straight to the bathroom. Then, Guzman left the room with
the bag and returned a minute later without it. Guzman sat down and told Cronin,
“I did it.” She asked him what he did, and he clarified, “I killed David.” He said
he stabbed Colvin with a samurai sword and showed Cronin a ring and money.
Cronin examined the ring and saw that it appeared to have blood on it. She
testified that it was the same ring that Colvin wore. Cronin told Guzman to get rid
of the ring, and he left the room, taking the ring with him. Guzman returned later
without the ring and said that he gave the ring to a drug dealer known as “Paco” in
exchange for money and drugs.
Officer Walker testified that he found “Paco,” whose real name is Leroy
Gadson, Jr., and recovered the gold ring. At trial, Gadson testified that in 1991 he
was a drug dealer and occasionally sold Guzman drugs. Moreover, in August
1991, Guzman went to him and asked to trade the gold ring for drugs.
The former testimony of Paul Rodgers, Guzman’s former cellmate, was
presented because he was deceased at the time of the retrial. Rodgers testified that
Guzman initially told him that he thought a man named Curtis Wallace killed
Colvin. Then, Guzman changed his story and said that he killed Colvin. Guzman
explained that he used Colvin’s key to enter his motel room in order to rob him.
At first, Colvin was asleep and Guzman rummaged through Colvin’s drawers. But
-5-
Colvin woke up, and Guzman used a samurai sword that was hanging on the wall
to kill Colvin while Colvin was sitting on the bed. Guzman was unsure about the
exact number of times he stabbed Colvin, but estimated that it was ten or eleven
times. Afterwards, Guzman cleaned the room, took Colvin’s ring and $600, and
went back to his motel room. Later, Guzman traded the ring for drugs.
Robert Harris, a gas station attendant, testified that on August 10, 1991, at
about 10 a.m., Colvin came into the gas station with a man who was wearing a
black vest and a black leather chauffeur’s cap. Additionally, Margaret Post, a
waitress, testified that on the morning of August 10, 1991, Colvin and Guzman
came into the IHOP where she worked, and she waited on them. Guzman was
wearing a black leather hat, black leather vest, and a pair of jeans. She noticed that
Colvin was wearing his gold ring, and she described Colvin as very intoxicated.
Leroy Parker, a crime-lab analyst, responded to the motel to perform
bloodstain-pattern analysis. Parker testified that based on his observation and
analysis, Colvin was on the bed at the time of his murder. Parker explained that
the bloodstains high on the wall were created from a forceful impact with the
victim. He determined that the sword found at the scene was consistent with the
blood spatter evidence. Also, Kelly May, a senior crime-laboratory analyst,
testified that Guzman’s fingerprints were on Colvin’s vehicle and the telephone
inside Colvin’s room.
-6-
In Guzman’s case-in-chief, he presented testimony from Carmelo Garcia, a
former inmate who was incarcerated with Guzman. At some point during their
incarceration, Garcia told Guzman that a prostitute confided in him that she lied to
the police, which led to a man named “Chico,” Guzman’s nickname, being falsely
imprisoned. Later, Garcia found out that this prostitute was Martha Cronin.
Guzman also testified in his own defense. He stated that on the morning of
August 10, 1991, he drove Colvin around town, making stops at a gas station, a
local bar, and an IHOP. While they were at IHOP, Curtis Wallace stopped by their
table and asked Colvin about money Colvin owed him. Colvin stated he would
pay Wallace after they got back to the motel. Colvin and Guzman returned to the
motel sometime before noon, and they each went to their own room. Guzman
claims that was the last time he saw Colvin.
Next, Guzman went out with Cronin on the street, where she engaged in
prostitution. Cronin gave Guzman a signal to wait on the street for her, but after
she did not return within 20 to 30 minutes, he decided to go back to the motel
room. Cronin returned to the motel room around 1 or 2 p.m. with Wallace. Cronin
was wearing a ring that she got from Wallace, and she asked Guzman to take the
ring to Gadson to sell it for drugs. Guzman traded the ring for drugs and money
and returned to the motel room, giving Cronin the drugs but keeping the money for
himself.
-7-
In rebuttal, the State presented Cronin and Detective Sylvester. Cronin
testified that she did not recognize a picture of Garcia taken some time between
1991 and 1992, and she denied telling anyone during that timeframe that she spoke
to the police about Colvin’s murder. Additionally, Cronin stated that Wallace had
nothing to do with Colvin’s ring. Detective Sylvester testified that after the ring
was recovered from Gadson, she questioned Guzman about it, and he claimed he
did not recognize the ring.
The jury found Guzman guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and
first-degree felony murder. The jury also found Guzman guilty of robbery with a
deadly weapon.
Guzman’s penalty phase was held on May 3, 2016. The State presented
evidence that Guzman previously pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of
Brenda Fowler, the attempted second-degree murder of Elinda Williams, two
counts of armed kidnapping, and two counts of armed robbery. At the time of the
crimes, Guzman was seventeen years old. Guzman was sentenced to 30 years’
imprisonment but was released on April 19, 1991, after only serving a little over
nine years. Additionally, the State presented victim impact testimony from
Colvin’s widow. In mitigation, the defense introduced into evidence Guzman’s
high school diploma and a composite of certificates Guzman received. The jury
-8-
unanimously found all four aggravating factors the State presented and
recommended death by a vote of eleven to one.
On August 30, 2016, the trial court sentenced Guzman to death in
accordance with the jury’s recommendation. The court found four aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) committed by a person previously
convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person (very great weight); (2) committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission of a robbery (substantial weight); (3) committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody (substantial weight); and (4) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC)
(very great weight). The trial court found that Guzman’s age at the time of the
crime, twenty-seven, was a single statutory mitigating circumstance. Additionally,
the trial court found three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Guzman was
fifty-two at the time of sentencing (some weight); (2) Guzman was a drug user at
some point in his life (little weight); and (3) Guzman had good conduct while
incarcerated (little weight).
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Guzman raises multiple issues. We also independently review
whether there is sufficient evidence to support Guzman’s conviction. However,
because we remand for a new penalty phase based on Hurst error, we do not
-9-
discuss his other penalty phase claims or the proportionality of his sentence.4
A. Denial of Cause Challenges to Prospective Jurors
Guzman first asserts that the trial court erred in denying cause challenges to
prospective jurors Mr. Monagas, Ms. Routte, and Ms. Woods. Guzman used
peremptory challenges to strike Mr. Monagas and Ms. Woods, but Ms. Routte sat
on the jury. Guzman asserts that Mr. Monagas and Ms. Routte should have been
excused because they were too distracted to sit on the jury and Ms. Woods should
have been dismissed because of her views on the death penalty. The State counters
that the trial court properly denied Guzman’s cause challenges.
“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay
aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence
presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.” Lusk v. State,
446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984). “[B]ecause trial courts have a unique vantage
point in their observation of jurors’ voir dire responses,” they have “great
4. Additionally, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Guzman’s
motion to continue and his motion to disqualify the Office of the State Attorney for
the Seventh Judicial Circuit. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992)
(“The decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless
and until they are overruled by this Court.” (quoting Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d
141, 143 (Fla. 1980))); Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395 (Fla. 1996)
(“[D]isqualification is proper only if specific prejudice can be demonstrated.”).
- 10 -
discretion when deciding whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause based on
juror competency.” Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 939 (Fla. 2003).
First, defense counsel properly preserved this issue for review because
Guzman exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and identified Ms. Routte as
an objectionable juror who sat on the jury. See Kopsho v. State, 959 So. 2d 168,
173 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 2004)).
Second, we note that “[a] defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice if the trial court
grants the same number of additional peremptories as cause challenges that were
erroneously denied.” Id. (quoting Busby, 894 So. 2d at 97).
The first challenged venireman we address is Mr. Monagas. During voir
dire, when counsel asked him if serving on the jury would cause a financial burden
that would distract him during the trial, he replied that he would get some money
from his job and could live on that but he believed he would not do a good job on
the jury because he is easily bored and might fall asleep during the trial. Based on
his response, defense counsel challenged Mr. Monagas for cause. However, the
record reflects that both defense counsel and the trial court acknowledged that Mr.
Monagas was “probably the liveliest of the jurors,” and that he was playful and
laughing during the voir dire process. Therefore, because the trial court was in a
better position to assess the ability of Mr. Monagas to serve on the jury and there
was nothing in his responses to indicate that he was unable to render a verdict
- 11 -
solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by
the court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Guzman’s cause challenge of Mr. Monagas. See Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 369,
373 (Fla. 1994) (concluding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
the cause challenges).
The second challenged prospective juror, Ms. Routte, was asked several
times whether she would be distracted from the trial by her work commitments.
Ms. Routte responded, “I think I would be tired,” and explained that she had a new
person working for her that she believed could manage the business without her.
Ms. Routte did not state that she would be unable to focus on the trial. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Guzman’s challenge to Ms.
Routte because there was nothing in her responses to indicate that she was unable
to render a verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the
law given. See id. Further, Guzman’s argument that the trial court’s denial of the
cause challenge to Ms. Routte was inconsistent with the court’s rulings on other
cause challenges is without merit.
Last, since we determined that the trial court did not err in denying the cause
challenges to Mr. Monagas or Ms. Routte, we do not have to consider whether the
trial court erred in denying the cause challenge to Ms. Woods because the court
provided Guzman an additional peremptory challenge. Thus, even if the trial court
- 12 -
erred in denying the challenge to Ms. Woods, it would not constitute reversible
error. See Kopsho, 959 So. 2d at 173; Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877, 889 (Fla.
2001) (“[Defendant] must establish that the trial court erred in denying the
challenges for cause as to both [potential jurors] because the trial court did award
the defense one additional peremptory challenge . . . .”). Thus, we reject this
claim.
B. Challenge to State’s Peremptory Strike of Minority Juror
Guzman also contends that the trial court reversibly erred when it allowed
the State to strike an African-American venirewoman without providing a genuine
race-neutral reason. We disagree.
In Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (footnotes omitted),
we established a three-step guideline for resolving an allegation of discrimination
in the use of peremptory challenges:
A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory
challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that
basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial
group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for
the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must
ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the proponent
of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2).
If the explanation is facially race-neutral and the court believes that,
given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is
not a pretext, the strike will be sustained (step 3).
- 13 -
Importantly, “[t]here are no specific words which the court must state to satisfy
step three of the Melbourne analysis.” Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1119 (Fla.
2009) (quoting Simmons v. State, 940 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).
“Rather, the most important consideration is that the trial judge actually ‘believes
that given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a
pretext.’ ” Id. at 1120 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 40 (Fla. 2000)).
Further, reviewing courts should keep in mind that “peremptories are presumed to
be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner,” and “the trial court’s decision turns
primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.” Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764-65.
In this case, during voir dire, defense counsel asked the potential jurors
which television stations they watched. Ms. Fields, an African-American,
indicated that she watched CNN, whereas, Ms. Bentley, a Caucasian, indicated that
she watched Fox News. Subsequently, the State exercised a peremptory challenge
against Ms. Fields. Defense counsel asked for a race-neutral reason, and the State
explained that they wished to strike CNN viewers and preferred jurors who
watched Fox News. Then, defense counsel challenged the genuineness of the
State’s reason, asserting that Ms. Bentley also watched CNN. A discussion ensued
wherein the State explained that they listed Ms. Bentley as a Fox News viewer in
their notes, and the trial judge stated that Ms. Fields was the only CNN viewer
- 14 -
according to his notes. In response, defense counsel stated, “That’s fine, your
Honor.” The trial judge then found the State’s reason to be race-neutral and
overruled the defense’s objection.
The trial court satisfied the Melbourne guidelines. First, the trial court made
a sufficient step-one inquiry in asking the State for a race-neutral reason for
striking Ms. Fields. Thereafter, the State satisfied step two by providing a facially
race-neutral reason for the strike by explaining that it wanted to strike jurors who
watched CNN as opposed to Fox News. When Guzman questioned the
genuineness of the State’s explanation, the record clearly shows that the trial judge
considered the genuineness of the State’s reason by referencing his own notes and
stating that the only juror he had down as a CNN viewer was Ms. Fields.
Thereafter, the trial court sustained the objection under step three as allowed when
no pretext is found. See Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1120-21; Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d
930, 943 (Fla. 2017) (“Nothing in the record suggests that the State’s strike was
based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror or that she was
singled out for special treatment.”). Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling
Guzman’s objection to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge on Ms. Fields.
C. Motion to Strike Jury Panel
- 15 -
Guzman further claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to strike the jury panel based on statements made by a prospective juror,
Mr. Monagas, during voir dire. However, we disagree.5
Mr. Monagas commented that Guzman “already served 25 years” in
response to information presented to the entire jury panel that the trial was for a
murder committed in 1991, and it appears that this statement was based on his
hypothesis that Guzman had been in jail since the time of the murder. In essence,
Mr. Monagas’ statements in the presence of the jury amounted to a hypothetical
question and did not disclose evidence or facts not presented at trial. As such, the
statement was not tantamount to telling the venire that Guzman had a prior
conviction. See Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 41 (Fla. 2017) (holding that the
5. As we explained in Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 41 (Fla. 2017):
The denial of a motion to strike the jury panel is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Williams v. Osking, 105 So. 3d 653, 655 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2013). “In order for the statement of one venire member to taint
the panel, the venire member must mention facts that would not
otherwise be presented to the jury.” Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888,
897 (Fla. 2005). Additionally, “[a] venire member’s expression of an
opinion before the entire panel is not normally considered sufficient to
taint the remainder of the panel.” Id.
A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Guzman’s motion to strike the entire jury panel because Mr.
Monagas did not reveal any information about Guzman’s prior criminal history. In
fact, there is no indication that Mr. Monagas knew anything about Guzman’s prior
criminal history.
- 16 -
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to strike the
jury panel where prospective juror’s remarks did not reveal her knowledge of the
defendant’s previous crimes), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 452 (2017); cf. Evans v.
State, 36 So. 3d 185, 185-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (reversing for a new trial
because a venireperson’s comments during voir dire that he knew the defendant
from his work at the jail implied that the defendant had been previously convicted
of a crime). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Guzman’s motion to strike the jury panel.
D. Sufficiency
Although Guzman did not raise this issue, we have “a mandatory obligation
to independently review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in which a
sentence of death has been imposed.” Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 227 (Fla.
2010). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to
determine whether “a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the elements
of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jeffries v. State, 222
So. 3d 538, 546 (Fla. 2017).
Applying this standard, we conclude that competent, substantial evidence
supports Guzman’s conviction based on both theories of first-degree premeditated
murder and felony murder. First, testimony from several witnesses, including
- 17 -
Guzman, Martha Cronin, the gas station attendant, and the waitress, established
that Guzman was with Colvin in the morning on the day of Colvin’s murder.
Moreover, Cronin testified that days before Colvin’s murder, Guzman told
her that Colvin would be easy to rob because he was old, drunk, and known to
carry money. Guzman also said that “a dead witness can’t talk.” On the day of
Colvin’s murder, Guzman left in the morning to take Colvin to run errands and
returned later with Colvin’s keys. Cronin left the motel room, and when she
returned in the afternoon, Guzman was not in the room. Soon after, Guzman
returned to the room with a garbage bag but then left with the bag and quickly
returned without it. At that point, Guzman confessed to Cronin that he killed
Colvin by stabbing him with a samurai sword, showing Cronin some money and
Guzman’s ring. Guzman then left the room to sell the ring for money and drugs.
Furthermore, Rogers, Guzman’s former cellmate, testified that Guzman
admitted that he killed Colvin with a samurai sword and stole $600 and a ring,
which he traded for drugs. Additionally, detectives recovered the ring from
Gadson, a drug dealer. Moreover, Gadson testified that he sold drugs to Guzman
in exchange for the ring.
Also, both Parker, a crime-lab analyst who testified regarding the bloodstain
pattern, and Dr. Steiner, who performed the autopsy, testified that the samurai
sword found at the scene could have been the murder weapon. Accordingly,
- 18 -
competent, substantial evidence exists to support Guzman’s first-degree murder
conviction under theories of first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder.
E. Hurst
Finally, Guzman argues that Hurst error is not harmless and that he is
entitled to either a life sentence with parole after twenty-five years or a new
penalty phase. We agree that Guzman is entitled to relief under Hurst and remand
this case for a new penalty phase.
Before Guzman’s third trial, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016), in which it held that
Florida’s former capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because
it “required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient
aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty,” even
though “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact
necessary to impose a sentence of death.” On remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d
40, 57 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), after Guzman’s penalty
phase, we held:
[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death,
the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose
death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of
death.
- 19 -
We also concluded that Hurst “error is capable of harmless error review,”
explaining:
The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed
to the conviction.
202 So. 3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)).
Although the jury unanimously found the aggravating factors, “based on the
jury’s eleven-to-one recommendation for a sentence of death, we cannot determine
that the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to
impose a sentence of death.” Bailey v. Jones, 225 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2017)
(holding that a nonunanimous jury recommendation for death is not harmless even
when “no reasonable juror would have failed to find” the existence of the
aggravating factors). Nor can we “determine that the jury unanimously found that
the aggravators outweighed the mitigation.” Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568, 570
(Fla. 2017). “We can only determine that the jury did not unanimously
recommend a sentence of death.” Id. Therefore, because we cannot say that there
is no possibility that the error did not contribute to the sentence, the error in
Guzman’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
we vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase. See Jackson v.
- 20 -
State, 213 So. 3d 754, 792 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he proper remedy is to remand for a
new penalty phase, rather than remand for the imposition of a life sentence.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Guzman’s convictions, vacate his
sentence of death, and remand for a new penalty phase.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur as to the conviction and dissent as to the
sentence.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LAWSON, J., concurring specially.
I fully concur in that portion of the opinion affirming Guzman’s convictions
and concur specially in the reversal of Guzman’s death sentence. See Okafor v.
State, 225 So. 3d 768, 775-76 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,
Terence R. Perkins, Judge - Case No. 641991CF006795XXXAES
Jeffrey D. Deen, Regional Counsel, Junior Barrett and Michael P. Reiter, Assistant
Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Fifth
District, Ocala, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
- 21 -
for Appellee
- 22 -