FILED
Feb 22 2018, 8:12 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffery A. Earl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D. Z., February 22, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
32A05-1708-JV-1907
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Karen M. Love,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D03-1704-JD-86
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 1 of 24
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, D.Z., appeals the juvenile court’s delinquency
adjudication for an act that would have been a Class B misdemeanor if
committed by an adult.
[2] We reverse.
ISSUE
[3] D.Z. presents us with four issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive
and which we restate as: Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by
admitting D.Z.’s incriminating statements to a school official, who was working
in cooperation with law enforcement.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Around February or March 2017, graffiti of a sexual nature began to appear on
the walls of the boys’ restrooms at Brownsburg High School, in Indiana.
Assistant principal Demetrius Dowler (Dowler) commenced an investigation to
find the person responsible and reviewed surveillance video footage of the
hallways where the related bathrooms are located. On March 15, 2017, Dowler
reported “mischief of vandalism and graffiti” on the bathroom walls and stalls
to Officer Nathan Flynn (Officer Flynn) and requested his assistance with the
ongoing investigation. (Tr. p. 17). Officer Flynn is a police officer with the
Brownsburg community schools and is employed “by the school for law
enforcement duties.” (Tr. p. 17). In that capacity, he is “called to investigate
allegations of misconduct within the school.” (Tr. p. 17). Together, Officer
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Flynn and Dowler started a methodical search of the boys’ restrooms and
narrowed down time frames when graffiti was located. They used these time
frames to review surveillance footage to determine who was in the restrooms
during the time when new graffiti appeared. After reviewing the surveillance
video, both Officer Flynn and Dowler pinpointed seventeen-year-old D.Z. as a
suspect.
[5] On March 17, 2017, Dowler called D.Z. down to his office for a “discussion”
right before the “[e]nd of the day.” (Tr. pp. 55, 56). Dowler questioned D.Z. in
his office with the door closed. D.Z. was not offered the opportunity to speak
to a parent or guardian prior to the commencement of the interview, nor was
his parent or guardian contacted prior to D.Z.’s removal from class. During
this conversation, D.Z. was not advised that “he had a right not to answer
questions that might incriminate himself.” (Tr. p. 56). Dowler informed D.Z.
that he had been “tracking some restroom graffiti” and explained the
investigation to him. (Tr. p. 61). Dowler clarified that he “knew that [D.Z.]
was the one that was responsible for graffiti on the wall.” (Tr. p. 61). D.Z.
responded that he didn’t know why he did it. After D.Z. showed remorse,
Dowler told him that “what [he] did was wrong and so we’re going to have to
definitely take care of it.” (Tr. p. 62). Dowler suspended D.Z. for five days.
After his discussion with D.Z., Dowler left the room and informed Officer
Flynn that D.Z. had “admitted to the messages/writing on the wall.” (Tr. p.
43). Dowler then contacted D.Z.’s father. Meanwhile, Officer Flynn, in full
police uniform, entered Dowler’s office and spoke to D.Z. The officer did not
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advise D.Z. of his constitutional rights, contact D.Z.’s father, or record the
interview. Eventually, at the end of the interview, Officer Flynn “let [D.Z.]
know he was being charged with a crime.” (Tr. p. 44).
[6] On April 18, 2017, the State filed a Petition Alleging Delinquency, claiming
that D.Z. had committed acts that would be an offense if committed by an
adult, namely, criminal mischief and harassment. On July 17, 2017, the
juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing. During the hearing, D.Z.
moved to suppress, and the State agreed to suppress, the testimony of Officer
Flynn regarding incriminating statements made to him by D.Z. as D.Z. had not
been informed of his Miranda 1 rights prior to uttering the statements. The
juvenile court granted the motion. At the conclusion of the fact-finding
hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding on the allegation of criminal
mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult, but found that
the State had not established the harassment allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt. That same day, the juvenile court placed D.Z. on probation for four
months.
[7] D.Z. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided when necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 4 of 24
[8] D.Z. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting into
evidence, over his objection, the incriminating statements he made during the
meeting with the assistant principal. He maintains that these statements were
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of
his rights under Miranda.
[9] A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, and we will reverse such a ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of
discretion. Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans.
denied. An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. In making
this decision, this court does not reweigh evidence and considers conflicting
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cole v. State, 878
N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Regarding the “abuse of discretion”
standard generally, our supreme court has observed, “to the extent a ruling is
based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence it is reversible, and
the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.” Pruitt v. State, 834
N.E.2d 90, 104 (Ind. 2005).
[10] “A juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled to have the court apply those
common law jurisprudential principles [that] experience and reason have
shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial.” In re K.G.,
808 N.E. 2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct.
1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). “Without question, these include . . . the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 5 of 24
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination[.]” Id. “In protection of the
rights against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona, established that ‘the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’” P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d
710, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Such procedural safeguards include an
advisement to the accused that he has the right to remain silent and that
anything he says can be used against him.” Id.
[11] We have previously reiterated that “[t]he special status accorded juveniles in
other areas of the law is fully applicable in the area of criminal procedure.”
S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “To give
effect to that status in the context of waiving intricate, important, and long
established Fifth . . . Amendment rights, we require that a juvenile be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to consult with a parent or guardian before solicitation
of any statement.” Id. That is, in cases where a juvenile is subject to custodial
interrogation, such child must be read his rights under Miranda and the State
must obtain the waiver of such rights pursuant to the juvenile waiver statute.
See I.C. § 31-32-5-1. As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the
juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and
subject to interrogation. See S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 430. Therefore, the threshold
question becomes whether D.Z. was in custody, and if so, whether the
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questioning by the assistant principal constituted interrogation as recognized
under the federal and state constitutions.
III. Custodial Interrogation in the Schoolhouse
[12] D.Z. contends he was subjected to a custodial interrogation because no
reasonable juvenile who is called into the assistant principal’s office and
questioned behind closed doors regarding an ongoing investigation into
vandalized bathrooms would have felt free to leave prior to being dismissed by
the assistant principal. In response, the State asserts that the assistant principal
was merely conducting a disciplinary investigation, which resulted in the
imposition of school discipline.
[13] The purpose of Miranda is to dispel the inherently coercive effect of police
custody and interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “[T]he
special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are not required where a
suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a subject in custody is
subjected to interrogation.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct.
1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). “Interrogation has been defined as a process of
questioning by law enforcement officials which lends itself to obtaining
incriminating statements.” S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 430. “Under Miranda,
‘interrogation’ includes express questioning and words or actions on the part of
the police that the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. 2002)
(citing Innis, 446 U.S. 301). The United States Supreme Court has held that the
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safeguards outlined in Miranda also apply to the functional equivalent of
interrogation by the police. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02.
[14] Whether a person is in custody depends upon objective circumstances, not
upon the subjective views of the interrogating officers or the subject being
questioned. Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. For an interrogation to be custodial in nature, one does not necessarily
have to be under arrest. S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 430. To be custodial in the non-
arrest context, the interrogation must commence after the person’s freedom of
action has been deprived in a significant way. Id. This is determined by
examining whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances would believe
he is not free to leave. Luna v. State, 788 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ind. 2003).
[15] While the determination as to whether a student is in custody and in need of
Miranda safeguards is easily solved when the student is at the stationhouse,
whether these same concerns that powered the Miranda decision are present in
the modern schoolhouse setting is a more intricate question. This court
previously provided a thorough analysis of the law concerning the issue in S.G.
v State, 956 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, where we
summarized prior Indiana cases that addressed the issue of whether a student
was in custody when questioned at his or her school, including State v. C.D., 947
N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); G.J. v. State, 716 N.E.2d 475 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999); and S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied,
disapproved on other grounds by Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (Ind. 2009).
In each case, the appellate court held that there was no Miranda violation. In
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S.A., we found that there “was no coercive atmosphere to protect against”
where “the questioning took place in the school building, by the vice-principal,
and a major portion of it occurred in the presence of the student’s father.” S.G.
956 N.E.2d at 677. In G.J., juvenile G.J. was questioned by the dean in the
dean’s office regarding whether he had brought marijuana to school. Id. The
record did not indicate if an officer was present in the dean’s office during
questioning. Id. In C.D., a high school student was suspected of being “under
the influence of some substance.” Id. at 677. Following an investigation in the
principal’s office by a police officer, who was trained as a drug recognition
evaluator, this suspicion was confirmed and C.D. was considered to be under
the influence of marijuana. Id. at 677. A search of C.D.’s backpack by the
principal revealed a controlled substance. Id. This court determined that the
principal’s action fell within the ambit of “an educational purpose” and that
“C.D.’s examination was intended to carry out an educational function or
school purpose, not to further a criminal examination.” Id. at 677-78. Because
the officer examined C.D. at the principal’s request and in his presence, the
investigation “did not transform [] into a custodial interrogation.” Id.
Nevertheless, since we issued S.G., the educational landscape has undergone
some significant changes.
[16] There can be no dispute that the task of safeguarding children in our schools
and maintaining appropriate discipline is an issue of paramount public
importance. Education is mandatory, and we entrust our children to the school
system, believing that they will be in an environment that is clean, safe, and
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conducive to learning. Every parent, indeed, all of society, expects this.
However, “[w]alking the halls of America’s public schools today, one should
not be surprised to see a police officer.” Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda:
Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 Loy.L.Rev. 39, 1
(2006). In recent years, the presence of police in schools has changed more
than just the frequency and nature of interactions between students and police
and many schools have instituted ‘zero tolerance’ for school behavior. Id.; See
N.C. v. Com., 396 S.W. 3d 852, 863 (Ky. 2013). When viewed in protecting
innocent children, this certainly has merit. But the use of zero tolerance has
caused a dramatic shift away from traditional in-school discipline towards
greater reliance on juvenile justice interventions. N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 863.
Such policies, which emphasize criminal charges, can serve to change the
nature of questioning a student for purposes of school discipline into a criminal
investigation. Id. In light of this changing educational landscape, school
administrators have altered their activities to collaborate more actively with
police officers. Id. In fact, school administrators in Indiana, under auspices of
the Indiana Department of Education, as well as in several states across the
country, are being instructed in law enforcement techniques of interviewing and
interrogation. 2
2
On October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, the Indiana Department of Education advertised “training”
in the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation for school administrators, with a focus on:
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[17] Just as a school cannot pretend ignorance of the rules of criminal procedure,
neither can police officers ignore, as beyond their responsibility, the ways in
which school administrators take advantage of their presence and actions. See
Holland, Schooling Miranda, at 15. Police officers are not divested of their law
enforcement authority when they enter schools; schools employ them precisely
because they wield this authority. Id. at 17. As such, the presence of law
enforcement in schools on a daily basis serves notice that crimes will be charged
for conduct the officer believes violates the law. N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 864. This
is not inappropriate, but it does change the nature of questioning a child for
school discipline purposes to an improper police interrogation absent
constitutional safeguards. Id.
[18] “[O]ther states have extended the concept of custody to school situations in
which a school official, rather than a police officer, does the questioning,
holding that the officer’s pervasive presence can significantly increase[] the
likelihood [that the student] would produce an incriminating response to the
principal’s questioning.” S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 678-79. In N.C., the student
admitted to giving hydrocodone to another student, in response to questioning
by the assistant principal who was working in conjunction with the school
resource officer. N.C., 396 S.W.3d at 854. The officer was present during the
Reid Nine Steps of Interrogation: review the interrogation process, beginning with how to
initiate the confrontation, develop the interrogational theme, stop denials, overcome
objections, and use the alternative question to stimulate the admission.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www.doe.in.gov/safety/reid-technique-interviewing-and-
interrogation-oct-26 (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
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discussion. Id. After the assistant principal informed N.C. that he was subject
to school discipline, the assistant principal left the room, leaving N.C. with the
officer. Id. The officer then informed N.C. that he would be charged with a
crime. Id. At no time was N.C. advised that he was free to leave, was given
Miranda warnings, nor were his parents called. Id. Recognizing that a proper
balance has to be struck between “the important public policy concerns of
educators and parents to provide an appropriate and safe school environment
while still protecting the individual rights of a child,” the Kentucky supreme
court held that
any statement obtained may not be used against a student as a
basis for a criminal charge when law enforcement is involved or
if the principal is working in concert with law enforcement in
obtaining incriminating statements, unless the student is given
the Miranda warnings and makes a knowing, voluntary statement
after the warnings have been given.
Every custodial interrogation, when law enforcement is involved
will not necessarily invoke the giving of Miranda warnings, for
example, if the matter purely concerns school discipline. There
are many school disciplinary matters where the presence of the
law enforcement officer will maintain order and create a safer
environment for the administrator and student. However,
statements obtained without giving Miranda warnings are subject
to suppression if a criminal charge is brought.
Certainly, all trained law enforcement officers know how to give
Miranda warnings and to ensure that the school officer and the
child are aware when criminal charges may be triggered. This is
not an undue burden when measured against the consequences a
child faces in the juvenile justice system or the adult criminal
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system, which clearly can be punitive. And, this protection does
not prevent a school official from filing a criminal complaint,
though the voluntariness of any confession remains a question of
law for the court in every case, even if Miranda warnings have
been given.
Id. at 864, 865; see also State v. Antonio T., 352 P.3d 1172, 1179 (N.M. 2015); In
re K.D.L., 700 S.E.2d 766, 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
[19] Turning to the facts before us, we conclude that D.Z. was submitted to a
custodial interrogation at which he should have been advised of his rights
pursuant to Miranda. The evidence establishes that after Dowler and Officer
Flynn’s investigation was complete and a suspect was identified, Dowler called
D.Z. to his office for a discussion. The assistant principal questioned D.Z. in
his office with the door closed. No reasonable student would have believed that
he was at liberty to leave the office—it is undeniable that juveniles are
susceptible to the influence of authority figures and the constraining effect of
being in a controlled setting of a school, where “disobedience [can be] cause for
disciplinary action.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 276, 131 S.Ct. 2394,
2405, 180 L.Ed.2d 130 (2011). As such, the circumstances of a school setting—
where a refusal to comply with the request or command of school officials can
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have far-reaching consequences, including potential criminal charges—have
become inherently more coercive recently than ever before in the past. 3
[20] Although on its face appearing to be a school disciplinary proceeding, the
‘discussion’ between Dowler and D.Z. amounted in essence to an interrogation,
geared towards a criminal proceeding. When Dowler reported the “mischief of
vandalism and graffiti” to Officer Flynn and requested his assistance with the
ongoing investigation, the school and law enforcement investigations became
inextricably intertwined and Dowler was aware that criminal charges could
ensue. (Tr. p. 17). In his office behind closed doors, Dowler explained the
nature and method of the investigation to D.Z. After D.Z. made the
incriminating statements, Dowler ended the conversation, imposed a five-day
school suspension, and immediately informed Officer Flynn, who was waiting
outside Dowler’s office, of D.Z.’s admission. Without advising D.Z. of his
Miranda rights, Officer Flynn proceeded to interrogate the student. Conceding
that the officer should have Mirandized D.Z., the State now relies on D.Z.’s
statements to the assistant principal as the basis to bring criminal charges
against him. This sequence of events strongly suspects that the assistant
principal and the officer were purposefully exploiting the school administrator’s
assumed ability to question without warnings and raises troubling echoes of the
“confession-first” mode of interrogation found problematic by our United
3
A student’s fear of arrest for refusing to obey the directives of an authority figure at school is not
unreasonable given the frequency with which school-based arrests for such refusals and other misconduct are
documented in the mainstream media.
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States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159
L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). 4 If we no longer allow the Seibert interrogation technique
in the stationhouse, why should we bless it in the schoolhouse?
[21] Police officers cannot avoid their duty under Miranda by attempting to have
someone act as their agent in order to bypass the Miranda requirements. Sears v.
State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Ind. 1996), overruled on other grounds Scisney v. State,
701 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1998). All relevant factors indicate that D.Z. was in
custody and deprived of his freedom. He was being interrogated by Dowler in
an effort to elicit incriminating statements about vandalizing the restroom
without being informed of his rights, and he confessed without full knowledge
of the consequences for so doing. Because the assistant principal and Officer
Flynn acted in concert in obtaining these incriminating statements, and both
were aware of the probability of criminal charges, D.Z. should have been
advised of his Miranda rights. Absent these warnings, the juvenile court abused
its discretion in admitting D.Z.’s statements to the assistant principal. As a
consequence, we conclude that the State cannot establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that D.Z. committed criminal mischief, if committed by an adult. We
reverse the juvenile court’s finding of delinquency.
4
In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a police protocol to intentionally proceed without
Miranda warnings until after an incriminating statement has been rendered, caused post-Miranda statements
to be inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
[22] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it admitted D.Z.’s incriminating statements to a school official,
who was working in cooperation with law enforcement.
[23] Reversed.
[24] Baker, J. concurs with separate concurring opinion
[25] Brown, J. dissents with separate opinion
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D.Z., Court of Appeals Case No.
32A05-1708-JV-1907
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Baker, Judge, concurring.
[26] I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to acknowledge the
State’s compelling argument that when D.Z. sat down with Dowler, it was
merely a school disciplinary meeting that in no way implicated D.Z.’s Miranda
rights. Historically speaking, there is truth in that argument. Unfortunately, I
believe it ignores the reality of today’s school hallways. The frequent—in some
places, constant—presence of officers in our schools has, in my view, changed
the nature of the school disciplinary process.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 17 of 24
[27] In this case, Dowler and Officer Flynn investigated the vandalism together.
Together, they reviewed surveillance footage, conducted a methodical search of
the boys’ restrooms, and pinpointed D.Z. as the primary suspect. Dowler
initially interviewed D.Z. without Officer Flynn. Immediately after that
interview, however, Dowler informed Officer Flynn of the content of his
conversation with D.Z., which ultimately led to an allegation that D.Z. was
delinquent. Under these circumstances, and given the general evolution of the
school disciplinary process into something quasi- (or actually) criminal in
nature, I fully concur with the majority’s determination that the finding of
delinquency should be reversed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 18 of 24
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D.Z., Court of Appeals Case No.
32A05-1708-JV-1907
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Brown, Judge, dissenting.
[28] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the court abused its
discretion by admitting D.Z.’s statements to assistant principal Dowler when
school resource officer Flynn was not present in the school office, and where
there is no evidence that Dowler was acting as an agent of the police.
[29] Ind. Code § 20-33-8-10 provides that a “principal may take action concerning
the principal’s school or a school activity within the principal’s jurisdiction that
is reasonably necessary to carry out or prevent interference with an educational
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function or school purposes.” 5 School purposes are defined as “the purposes for
which a school corporation operates, including. . . [t]o promote knowledge and
learning generally [and] [t]o maintain an orderly and effective educational
system.” Ind. Code § 20-33-8-4. D.Z.’s graffiti appeared in four different boys’
bathrooms, made explicit reference to lewd sexual acts, and derogatorily
targeted seventeen female students of the classes of 2017, 2018, and 2019, four
or five with whom D.Z. had class. Unfortunately, pictures were taken of these
messages and shared on social media and two girls found out that they were the
subject of the graffiti before the school could remove it. Viewed from a
schoolhouse perspective, D.Z.’s actions interfered with the maintenance of an
orderly and effective educational system, Dowler’s February and March
investigation was an attempt to identify the cause of the interference, and his
discussion with D.Z. was an attempt to restore order. See Linke v. Northwestern
Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 982 (Ind. 2002) (“However, a preventative or
rehabilitative search conducted by a school corporation is substantively
different than a search conducted to enforce the law. A preventative or
rehabilitative search is inherent to a school corporation’s function. Students
generally understand that the ‘preservation of . . . a proper educational
environment requires close supervision’ and thus the intrusion on privacy is less
5
Educational function is defined as the “performance by a school corporation or its officers or employees of
an act or a series of acts in carrying out school purposes.” Ind. Code § 20-33-8-2.
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severe.”) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349-350, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83
L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)).
[30] To the extent that the majority asserts that school and law enforcement
investigations became “inextricably intertwined” or that Dowler’s questioning
amounted to an “interrogation, geared toward a criminal proceeding,” the
record does not indicate that Dowler acted as Officer Flynn’s agent in an
attempt to bypass any Miranda requirements. See S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668,
680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Cf. Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Ind. 1996)
(“The purpose of Miranda is to dispel the inherently coercive effect of police
custody and interrogation. Based on this rationale, it has also been held to
apply to police custody and the functional equivalent of interrogation by the
police. The police also cannot avoid their duty under Miranda by attempting to
have someone act as their agent in order to bypass the Miranda requirements.”
(internal citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Scisney v. State, 701
N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1998). Rather, the situation here is similar to that in State v.
C.D., where an investigation, first initiated by a school official, is subsequently
assisted by a law enforcement officer, who is not independently investigating
the matter. 947 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[Officer] Richhart
was not independently investigating the matter. Instead, Richhart
examined C.D. at [school official] Vanwanzeele’s request and in Vanwanzeele’s
presence.”). Here, only Dowler and academic coach Zack Baldwin took
photographs of the graffiti. Dowler personally reviewed the video footage from
specific days to identify “who was where” and took still images from the video.
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Transcript Volume 2 at 54. He testified the investigation’s “focus was finding
out who was doing the graffiti,” that he “went back to [the] date and time [of
finding each graffiti] and ran through the video of the window and, sure
enough, it had [D.Z] entering and exiting at the time the writing was not on the
wall and the time the writing was on the wall,” and that he called D.Z. in to
have a discussion with him “once [he] had realized that [D.Z.] was a part of
each video that [he] had went back and looked at.” Id. at 54-55, 72-73. Dowler
had spent many hours investigating the graffiti on his own before asking Officer
Flynn to join him “a little bit before” March 15, 2017. Id. at 55. Officer Flynn
testified that Dowler
indicated that there had been graffiti – it was kind of on-going for
several months and he had been investigating it, looking into it.
The custodians would find it and let him know that it was found,
and so, they had very broad time frames. So, when it came to
me, he said hey, this has been on-going for a while and, so, I kind
of stepped in at that point to help him narrow down that
investigation and get some time frames that could be more
helpful.
Id. at 17-18. When asked if he controlled the surveillance personally, set it up,
or reviewed the videos afterwards on a regular basis, Officer Flynn testified, “I
don’t maintain it. I do review the videos frequently,” and that he did not recall
whether he discussed with Dowler the possibility that there could be criminal
charges resulting from the graffiti. Id. at 19. Dowler also responded “[n]ot that
I remember” when asked if “at any time while you were investigating the
graffiti, did you discuss a criminal investigation.” Id. at 55.
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[31] When it came to speaking with then-seventeen-year-old D.Z., Dowler stated to
Officer Flynn that he wanted to speak to D.Z. by himself because he “had a
rapport with him” and wished to have the “conversation without [Officer
Flynn] present.” Id. at 43. Dowler questioned D.Z. at seventh period in his
office with the door closed. Id. at 55-56. When asked if D.Z. was “free to leave
your office during the discussion . . . [c]ould he have gotten up and walked out
if he wanted to,” Dowler answered, “I wouldn’t have held him.” Id. at 57. He
testified similarly that D.Z. was allowed to go home with the other students
when they were dismissed. When asked about the nature of the conversation in
his office, Dowler testified:
Yes. What I had, is I had first told [D.Z.] what I had seen. That
I had been tracking some restroom graffiti and that I kind of
zeroed in and had seen that he had been in some of the restrooms
that the graffiti was found and that I had kinda closed the gap, so
to speak, on when the graffiti was written and that I had video of
him going into and coming out of those restrooms where the
graffiti was not before in that little time frame that we had and,
therefore, I knew that he was the one that was responsible for
graffiti on the wall. At that moment, I kinda went into the
question of is there a reason why you did this. Did you write this
because you had hard feelings towards girls or something of that
nature. His comment was no, I don’t know why I did it. I didn’t
have anything against them of any sort. So, then it just became
why would you do this and it became just a basic conversation of
he really didn’t have a reason and, so, I just kind of said okay,
what you did was wrong so we’re going to have to definitely take
care of it. You know, we’re gonna have to take care of it and
work on it from here.
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Id. at 61-62. Dowler explained to D.Z. that he faced a consequence of five days
of suspension out of school. Id. at 63. Officer Flynn testified that he did not
direct Dowler in any questioning, that when Dowler decided to bring in D.Z.
for questioning, he was not in the office at the time of questioning, that he had a
conversation with D.Z. after Dowler’s conversation, and that he entered
Dowler’s office only after Dowler had exited, spoke to D.Z., and eventually let
D.Z. know he was being charged.
[32] While it may be true that schools are different than they used to be, I would
hold on these facts as this Court did in C.D., 947 N.E.2d at 1022-1023; S.G.,
956 N.E.2d at 679-680; and G.J. v. State, 716 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), and find that no Miranda violation occurred in the statements made to
Dowler outside the presence of Officer Flynn and affirm the trial court’s
finding.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 32A05-1708-JV-1907 | February 22, 2018 Page 24 of 24
D.Z. v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion