NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCO HEYWARD, No. 17-16412
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04802-JCS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HAYWARD POLICE DEPARTMENT; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Joseph C. Spero, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted February 13, 2018***
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Marco Heyward appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising from his detention. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Oyama v. Univ. of
Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Heyward’s
unlawful detention claim because Heyward failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants McCrea and Wright lacked probable cause
to detain him. See Cal. Penal Code § 602(c); United States v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d
1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) (probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists if “under
the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer, a prudent
person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had
committed a crime”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Heyward’s
excessive force claim because Heyward failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether defendants McCrea and Wright’s use of force in handcuffing Heyward
was unreasonable. See Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528,
537 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing framework for analyzing an excessive force claim
under the Fourth Amendment); Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261
F.3d 912, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment on an excessive
force claim where plaintiff failed to provide specific facts that the force used by the
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application of handcuffs was unreasonable).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Heyward’s equal
protection claim based on racial profiling because Heyward failed to raise a triable
dispute as to whether defendants McCrea and Wright’s actions constituted
intentional discrimination against Heyward based on his membership in a protected
class. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To
state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause a plaintiff must
show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the
plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Heyward’s claim
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because
Heyward failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether a constitutional deprivation
resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom. See Cameron v. Craig, 713
F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements of a Monell claim).
Contrary to Heyward’s contention, the record does not show that defendant
White recorded the incident.
We reject as without merit Heyward’s contentions concerning judicial bias,
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and fabrication and suppression of audio recordings.
AFFIRMED.
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