NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANCELMO V. RAMOS, No. 12-56435
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00562-DMG-
JEM
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
This matter has been stayed since February 23, 2017 pending resolution of
Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-56884, or further order of the court. We
hereby lift the stay.
Ancelmo V. Ramos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ramos’s fraud claims related to the
origination of his mortgage loan because Ramos failed to allege facts sufficient to
show that defendants made a knowing and intentional misrepresentation on which
Ramos relied. See Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268,
274 (Cal. 2004) (elements of fraud claim under California law); see also Kearns v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing heightened
pleading standard for fraud claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
The district court properly dismissed Ramos’s remaining claims based on
fraud unrelated to the origination of his mortgage loan and violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act because these claims are predicated on Ramos’s
theory that the loan agreement is unenforceable, and Ramos failed to allege facts
sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief under that theory. See Hebbe, 627
F.3d at 341-42.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find that
defendants’ counsel violated Local Rule 7-3 because the record supports a finding
that counsel complied with the rule. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-3 (counsel contemplating
the filing of a motion must contact opposing counsel at least seven days prior to
filing); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth
standard of review and noting that “[b]road deference is given to a district court’s
interpretation of its local rules” (citation omitted)).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as meritless Ramos’s contentions that the district judge exhibited
bias and violated due process.
Ramos’s request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
Ramos’s pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 29, 42, and 45) are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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