UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4657
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BERNARD O CRANK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (4:15-cr-00044-RBH-1)
Submitted: February 22, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2018
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, Anne Hunter Young,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bernard Crank appeals from the district court’s order revoking his supervised
release and imposing an eight-month term of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Crank’s sentence is reasonable.
The Government has declined to file a response. Crank was notified of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s judgment revoking supervised
release and imposing a term of imprisonment. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,
373 (4th Cir. 2015). To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find by a
preponderance of the evidence a violation of a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). Here, Crank admitted to violating his supervised release conditions
as charged. Given the nature of the violations, the district court acted within its
discretion in revoking his release.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a district court must consider the
Chapter Seven policy statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. B (2016),
and the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences under
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2012), the district court ultimately has broad discretion to
revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013).
2
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if a district
court considered the Chapter Seven advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors
it is permitted to consider in a revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461
F.3d at 439-40. A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed,
up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the
sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
We discern no error in the district court’s decision to impose an eight-month term
of imprisonment. The sentence is within the statutory maximum and the advisory policy
statement range based on Crank’s violations and criminal history. USSG § 7B1.4(a), p.s.
The court adequately stated permissible reasons for the sentence, noting Crank’s repeated
violations of supervised release. The court further stated that it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors it was permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation
proceeding.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the revocation
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Crank, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Crank requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Crank.
3
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4