NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 12, 2017
Decided February 26, 2018
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐2122
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States
Plaintiff‐Appellee, District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
v.
No. 3:16‐CR‐30111‐SMY
MICHAEL RAY DAVIS,
Defendant‐Appellant. Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Davis pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and
was sentenced to 96 months in prison. He challenges his sentence, arguing that the
district court erred in calculating his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The
judge started from a base offense level of 26, relying in part on two prior convictions for
“crimes of violence.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(1), 4B1.2(a). One of the predicates is an
Illinois conviction for attempted armed robbery. Davis maintains that the Illinois crime
of attempted armed robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. We reject this
argument and affirm.
No. 17‐2122 Page 2
A grand jury indicted Davis on one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The firearm in question was semiautomatic with a large‐capacity
magazine. He eventually pleaded guilty. The probation office began its calculation of
the Guidelines sentencing range by assigning a base offense level of 26 based on two
case‐specific characteristics: (1) Davis’s offense involved a semiautomatic firearm
capable of accepting a large‐capacity magazine, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1)(A); and (2) he
has two qualifying convictions under § 2K2.1(a)(1)(B), which applies if the defendant
has at least two prior adult convictions for either a “controlled substance offense” or a
“crime of violence.”
The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as a felony punishable by more than
one year in prison that
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a
forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful
possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive
material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2016 ed.) (emphasis added). The Application Notes explain that the
term “crime of violence” includes “the offense of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and
attempting to commit such offenses.” Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added).
The probation office identified two qualifying crimes of violence: an Illinois
conviction for aggravated battery and an Illinois conviction for attempted armed
robbery. Davis objected to counting the latter conviction. He argued that attempted
armed robbery is not a crime of violence because an attempt crime requires only a
“substantial step” toward completing the substantive offense, not “a violent step.” The
judge rejected this argument, noting that robbery is a specifically enumerated crime of
violence and Application Note 1 expressly sweeps in attempts to commit a crime of
violence. Starting with a base offense level of 26, the judge calculated a Guidelines
sentencing range of 87 to 108 months and imposed a sentence of 96 months, the middle
of the range.
No. 17‐2122 Page 3
On appeal Davis renews his contention that his Illinois conviction for attempted
armed robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under the Guidelines. His argument
is somewhat different than the one he advanced in the district court. He now maintains
that the Illinois attempt crime “encompasses conduct broader than a generic attempt.”
That’s incorrect. Illinois attempt law, like its federal counterpart, requires a “substantial
step” toward the completed offense. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8‐4(a) (“A person
commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he or she
does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.”)
(emphasis added); United States v. Muratovic, 719 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Attempt
convictions require specific intent to commit the full robbery and a substantial step
taken toward that end.”); see also People v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ill. 1992); People v.
Terrell, 459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. 1984); People v. Garrett, 928 N.E.2d 531, 536 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2010).
There’s nothing unique about Illinois’s attempt statute that sets it apart from the
generic offense. Indeed, in a similar case involving a conviction for attempted armed
robbery under Illinois law, we said it would be frivolous to argue that the “substantial
step” requirement in Illinois attempt law is more lenient than the generic contemporary
requirement. United States v. Andrews, 419 F. App’x 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2011).
Davis fares no better with his argument that Illinois armed robbery does not
qualify as a crime of violence. As we’ve noted, § 4B1.2(a)(2) expressly lists robbery as a
qualifying predicate crime of violence. If more were needed, we have repeatedly held
that Illinois robbery is a crime of violence under the “force” clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1). See
United States v. Chagoya‐Morales, 859 F.3d 411, 422 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Bedell,
981 F.2d 915, 915–16 (7th Cir. 1992). Davis concedes the point but gives us no reason to
overrule these decisions. The district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.