NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORMA RIVERA, No. 16-15932
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01332-JAD-GWF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC, DBA
Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Norma Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Kwan v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1692f(1) because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the
alleged communications were attempts to collect a “debt” as defined by the
FDCPA. See Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions
taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default
and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the
FDCPA.”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970-71 (9th Cir.
2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement
activity, it does so only through Section 1692f(6)”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under § 1692g
because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she made a timely debt
validation request or that defendant’s response failed to comply with the
requirements of § 1692g. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claims under
2 16-15932
§§ 1692d, 1692j, and 1692i because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to state
plausible claims for relief. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692j and 1692i; Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-15932