NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATT P. JACOBSEN, No. 13-15498
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00486-MMD-
WGC
v.
HSBC BANK USA, N.A.; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Matt P. Jacobsen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient
to show that defendants were debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii)
(excluding from the definition of debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its
own behalf); Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions
taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure . . . are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as
that term is defined by the FDCPA.”).
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act claim because “letters challenging only a loan’s validity or its
terms are not qualified written requests that give rise to a duty to respond under
§ 2605(e).” Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir.
2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (loan servicers only need respond to requests
for information related to the servicing of loans).
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Jacobsen failed to allege facts
sufficient to show a predicate act. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.
v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2014)
(elements of a civil RICO claim).
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s quiet title claim because
2 13-15498
Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he paid the debt owed on the
property. See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996)
(per curiam) (“In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
prove good title in himself.”), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am.
Family Ins. Grp., 217 P.3d 563 (Nev. 2009).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the
title documents. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard review and explaining the circumstances in which the
district court may take judicial notice of documents extraneous to the pleadings in
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jacobsen’s
complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.
See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 770 F.3d at 845 (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is not an
abuse of discretion if amendment would be futile).
AFFIRMED.
3 13-15498