NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY L. BECKNER, individually, No. 12-56945
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03379-GHK-
FFM
v.
RECONTRUST COMPANY, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
This matter has been stayed since February 2, 2015, pending issuance of the
mandate in Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-56884, or further order of the
court. We hereby lift the stay.
Mary L. Beckner appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Kwan v.
SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
Dismissal of Beckner’s FDCPA claims was proper because the alleged
communications were not attempts to collect a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA.
See Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions taken to
facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure . . . are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that
term is defined by the FDCPA.”); see also Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852
F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “the FDCPA regulates security
interest enforcement activity . . . only through Section 1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for
the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only to the collection of
a money debt”).
Dismissal of Beckner’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) was
proper because Beckner failed to allege facts sufficient to show that ReconTrust
Company’s conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6); Ho,
858 F.3d at 572-73 (determining that 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) protects a consumer
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against abusive practices of a security enforcer); Dowers, 852 F.3d at 971
(discussing protections for borrowers under § 1692f(6)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on ReconTrust
Company’s motion to dismiss without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);
C.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7-15; Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa
Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 832 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court was within its
discretion to dispense with oral argument.” (citations omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Beckner’s request to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 16) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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