NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50350
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00022-AB-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JESUS GARCIA, AKA Chuy, AKA Jesus
Garza Garcia,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 15, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: McKEOWN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,** District
Judge.
Jesus Garcia appeals his conviction based on the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Garcia argues that evidence derived from an investigatory stop
should have been suppressed because the officers did not have reasonable
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
suspicion to stop the car. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The Fourth Amendment permits investigatory stops “only upon a showing of
reasonable suspicion: a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires
specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences,
form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal
conduct.” United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the officers had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting
that the car’s windows were tinted beyond the level permitted by California
Vehicle Code § 26708. During the evidentiary hearing, the officers testified that
the car’s windows were tinted so darkly that they were unable to see the occupants
inside of the vehicle. Officer Osorio added that this was true even when the
headlights of the officers’ car were pointed directly into the car. The officers
testified that, given their training and experience, this observation indicated that the
tinting was beyond the permissible level. The district court expressly credited the
officers, and “afforded greater weight” to Officer Osorio’s testimony given “her
additional experience on the job, her consistent description of the circumstances,
and her credible demeanor during the hearing.”
2
Contrary to Garcia’s argument, the facts here are not similar to those in
United States v. Caseres. In Caseres we held that a mere observation that the
windows were tinted, without additional articulable facts suggesting that the
windows were “not factory-installed, legally tinted safety glass,” was too
speculative. 533 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, on the other hand, the
officers not only saw the tinting, but observed that it was so dark that they were
unable to see the occupants even when headlights were pointing into the car, and
they had prior experience in these matters. These “specific, articulable facts,”
especially when coupled with the credibility finding, were sufficient to support a
reasonable suspicion.
AFFIRMED.
3