[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-11485 SEPTEMBER 13, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-02369-CV-JOF-1
SHARON SAFFOLD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SPECIAL COUNSEL, INC.,
MODIS PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC.,
MPS GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 13, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sharon Saffold, an African-American female, appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of her former employers, Special
Counsel, Inc., Modis Professional Services, Inc., and MPS Group, Inc.
(collectively, “Special Counsel”). In her complaint, Saffold alleged claims based
on retaliation (race) and hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).1 On appeal,
Saffold argues that the district court erred by entering summary judgment on her
retaliation claim because (1) a causal connection existed between an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge she filed and her
termination nine days later, and (2) in addition to retaliation based on the EEOC
complaint, Special Counsel also retaliated against her based on internal complaints
in which she opposed the actions of a co-worker.
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo and
view all the materials and “factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004). “Summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
After thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
1
In the district court, Saffold abandoned her claim based on a hostile work environment.
That claim is not at issue in this appeal.
2
Title VII prevents an employer from retaliating against an employee who
“has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,
a plaintiff must show: “(1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2)
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection
between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment
decision.” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000).
First, Saffold argues there was a causal connection between her EEOC
complaint and her termination. To establish a causal connection between
participation in a protected activity and adverse employment action, “a plaintiff
need only show that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly
unrelated.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir.
2000) (quotations omitted). To make this showing, a plaintiff must generally
establish “that the decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the time of
the adverse employment action.” Id. “[C]lose temporal proximity between the
employee’s protected conduct and the adverse employment action is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact of a causal
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connection.” Id.
Here, the evidence shows that Saffold’s supervisor contemplated terminating
Saffold prior to receiving the EEOC charge. At that point, which was 30 days
prior to her termination, Saffold, who was employed as a temporary employee and
paid on an hourly basis, was given a monthly project list for the following month
with three projects that she was to accomplish. After an additional 30 days within
which Saffold failed to accomplish any of the projects, or otherwise gain revenue
for Special Counsel, Saffold’s supervisor proceeded with the previously
contemplated termination.
When an employer makes a tentative decision before protected activity
occurs, the fact that an employer proceeds with such a decision is not evidence of
causation. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272, 121 S.Ct.
1508, 1510, 149 L. Ed. 2d 509 (2001) (holding that, where an employer
contemplated transferring an employee before the employer learned that the
employee filed a Title VII suit, the employer’s decision to proceed “along the lines
previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined,” did not establish
evidence of causality). Like in Breeden, Saffold failed to present any evidence on
the “causal connection” element of her prima facie case because her supervisor
simply followed through with the “previously contemplated, though not yet
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definitively determined” plan to terminate Saffold based on her failure to produce
revenue for the company. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 272, 121 S.Ct. at 1510.2
We are likewise unpersuaded with Saffold’s argument that her informal
complaints constituted protected activity. Title VII protects individuals who have
filed formal EEOC complaints and individuals who have filed informal complaints
internally to their supervisors. Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d
712, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002). To prove retaliation under Title VII, however, a
plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that she has engaged in a protected activity.
Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587. To demonstrate that she participated in a protected
activity, “a plaintiff must show that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg.
Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). In that regard, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a subjective belief that her employer was engaged in
unlawful employment practices and that her “belief was objectively reasonable in
light of the facts and record presented.” Id. at 1312 (emphasis in original).
According to the evidence, before Special Counsel notified Saffold of
certain work deficiencies and contemplated disciplinary action, one of Saffold’s
2
Shotz v.City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003), is distinguishable from
the case at bar since that case involved adverse actions taken only after the employer learned of the
plaintiff’s protected activity.
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co-workers engaged in e-mail communications which offended Saffold, thereby
prompting her to complain, internally, to her supervisors. The district court found
that Saffold’s complaints did not constitute protected activity because any belief
that she was being subjected to discriminatory conduct, based on the comments,
was not objectively reasonable. As the district court noted: “almost all of
[Saffold’s] complaints had no relationship to race; rather, they stemmed from a
personality conflict [with a co-worker].” Based on our review, the district court
did not err by concluding that the complaints did not constitute protected activity
under Title VII. Accordingly, Saffold could not rely on them to establish her
prima facie case.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Special Counsel.
AFFIRMED.
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