[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 13, 2005
No. 05-10296 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-01247-CV-J-12-MMH
DUKE FREDERICK CRANFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT BAYER, Director of Prisons,
JAMES CROSBY, Secretary, DOC,
JAMES COUNTRYMAN, Chaplain,
S. HASKELL, Senior Chaplain,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 13, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Duke Frederick Cranford (“Cranford”), a prisoner proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
After prison officials prevented Cranford, a Muslim, from participating in a prayer
and khutba (sermon) prior to noon during Eid Al-Fitr (the three-day Islamic
celebration following Ramadan), Cranford filed suit against: (1) Robert Bayer, the
Director of Prisons in Nevada; (2) Michael Moore, the Secretary of the Department
of Corrections in Florida; and (3) James Countryman and J. Haskell, Chaplain and
Senior Chaplain at Hamilton Correctional Institute (“HCI”) in Florida. The
Defendants were never served a copy of Cranford’s complaint, and the district
court, acting sua sponte, dismissed his suit without prejudice.
On appeal, Cranford first argues that the district court abused its discretion
by dismissing his complaint as frivolous, because under Islamic law, he was
required to pray in a specified manner, and the defendants restricted his First
Amendment right to freedom of religion by prohibiting him from doing so.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a claim as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 251
F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001). A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
2
merit either in law or fact. Id. As we have explained, “because district judges
remain more familiar with and are more experienced to recognize potentially
frivolous claims . . . [a] determination of frivolity is best left to the district court.”
Id.
In evaluating prisoners’ constitutional challenges to prison regulations that
implicate constitutional rights, courts have “[a]ccorded wide-ranging deference [to
prison administrators] in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security.” Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 510 (11th Cir.
1996). Accordingly, in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96
L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Supreme Court held that when a prison regulation impinges
upon an inmate’s constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at
2261. To determine whether a prison policy is reasonable, district courts must
determine (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify the
regulation; (2) whether, under the restriction imposed, prisoners have alternative
means for exercising the asserted constitutional right; (3) the impact that
accommodating the asserted constitutional right will have on prison staff, inmates,
3
and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the regulation in question is
an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107
S.Ct. at 2261-62.
In the instant case, the Defendants were not served with Cranford’s
complaint, and, thus never responded to his allegations. The district court relied
upon the Chaplaincy Services’ justification for the decision to split the prayer and
khutba, as stated in its response to Cranford’s grievance – that the decision to do so
was “common practice within the correctional setting due to time, space and
staffing concerns” – but there is no evidence in the record indicating what the
official policy, regulation or practice is. Nor is there evidence of the rationale for
the practice, or how it was applied to Cranford. Without such evidence, it is
impossible to apply the Turner test to determine if that policy was reasonable. See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. Accordingly, the Defendants
should be required to respond to Cranford’s claim and to provide an explanation
relating to the regulation that prohibited Cranford from conducting a prayer and
khutba before noon during Eid Al-Fitr, and why Defendants contend it satisfies the
Supreme Court’s standard set forth in Turner. Therefore, the district court abused
its discretion in dismissing Cranford’s complaint as frivolous, and we vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
4
VACATED AND REMANDED. 1
1
Cranford’s pending motions are denied.
5