IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1630
Filed May 17, 2013
JEREMIE J. COOKSEY,
Appellant,
vs.
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORPORATION,
Appellee,
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
Applicant asserts the district court and court of appeals erred in
dismissing his appeal because he failed to name the Employment Appeal
Board in the caption of the petition. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED, DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND
CASE REMANDED.
Harry W. Dahl and Pamela G. Dahl of Harry W. Dahl, P.C., Des
Moines, and Philip F. Miller of Philip F. Miller Law Office, West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Andrew T. Tice of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we granted further review to consider whether the
failure of a party to list the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) as a
respondent in the caption of a petition for judicial review of the final
agency decision is fatal where the body of the petition makes it plain that
the appeal is being taken from the final action of the agency and where
the agency is timely served with the petition. The district court
concluded that it was and dismissed the appeal. The court of appeals
affirmed. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the
court of appeals, reverse the decision of the district court, and remand
the case for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
The facts are simple and undisputed. Jeremie Cooksey sought
unemployment benefits from Iowa Workforce Development after his
discharge from employment by Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation. The
administrative law judge found that the employer discharged Cooksey for
misconduct and, as a result, concluded that Cooksey was not entitled to
benefits. The EAB affirmed the administrative law judge. Cooksey filed a
petition for judicial review of agency action in Polk County District Court.
In the petition for judicial review, Cooksey named Cargill in the
caption as a “defendant.” The caption made no mention of the EAB. The
first paragraph of the petition, however, stated:
This action is brought by Petitioner, Jeremie J.
Cooksey, pursuant to Chapter 17A.19(2) of the Iowa
Administrative Procedure Act . . . for review of the final
agency action of the EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD as set
forth in the Decision filed 3/7/2011 . . . AND, as FINALLY
determined in the Employment Appeal Board Decision of
April 4, 2011, denying Petitioner’s Application for Rehearing.
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Cooksey attached a copy of the final decision to the petition. The petition
and its attachments were timely served on the EAB.
The EAB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it was not
named as a party in the petition. Cargill joined the motion to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and Cooksey appealed.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
affirmed. We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below,
we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the decision of the
district court, and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the granting of a motion to dismiss for errors at law.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; McCormick v. Meyer, 582 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa
1998).
III. Discussion.
A. Preservation of Error. Cargill asserts that Cooksey failed to
preserve error in the district court on the argument that he substantially
complied with the requirements of Iowa Code section 17A.19(4) (2011).
According to Cargill, Cooksey relied solely on a claim that Iowa Code
section 17A.19(4) was unconstitutional.
Cooksey counters that in its order, the district court accepted the
EAB’s argument that naming the EAB in the caption is jurisdictional.
Further, citing Doerfer Division of CCA v. Nicol, 359 N.W.2d 428, 437
(Iowa 1984), Cooksey claims jurisdictional questions are not subject to
the same error preservation rules as other issues.
As a general rule, a party may raise a challenge to the subject
matter jurisdiction of a court at any time. In re Jorgensen, 627 N.W.2d
550, 554 (Iowa 2001); St. Clair v. Faulkner, 305 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Iowa
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1981). Cooksey, however, does not challenge the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district court. Instead, he seeks to defend against a
motion to dismiss. As a result, Doerfer and other similar cases are
inapposite.
Nonetheless, we find the issue has been preserved. In paragraph
ten of its motion to dismiss, the EAB asserted dismissal of the petition
was required because Cooksey failed to substantially comply with the
statutory prerequisites by failing to name the EAB in the petition’s
caption. Cooksey filed a resistance, which denied the EAB’s allegation in
paragraph ten “as the Board was and is not a proper, real party, whether
below or at present.” In practical terms, Cooksey recognized that
ordinarily when an appeal of agency action is taken, only the real parties
fight it out on appeal. While Cooksey’s use of the terms “proper party” or
“real party” may have been imprecise, inartful, or overbroad, Cooksey
was plainly asserting that his failure to specifically name the EAB in the
caption was not fatal given the nature of the EAB’s interest in the appeal
of its administrative action and the fact that the employer was named in
the caption. Cooksey’s brief presses the point, noting the EAB “did not
perform any act as an employee nor as an employer.” While Cooksey did
not specifically argue that identifying the EAB’s decision in the body of
the petition and attaching the underlying order to the petition amounted
to “substantial compliance,” the EAB raised the issue of substantial
compliance in its motion and the issue was contested by Cooksey. No
one could have missed the issue.
Further, the district court’s order dismissing the case relied upon
“the reasons as stated in [the EAB’s] motion to dismiss,” which plainly
includes the assertions in paragraph ten that Cooksey did not
substantially comply with the requirement to name the agency as a
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respondent. See Murphree v. US Bank of Utah, N.A., 293 F.3d 1220,
1222–23 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting when the district court incorporated the
defendant’s arguments as the basis for granting summary judgment, the
appellate court must review the “[d]efendant’s memoranda . . . to
determine whether the district court correctly granted summary
judgment”); Mitchell v. Policherla, Nos. 237578, 238217, 2003 WL
21205982, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 22, 2003) (considering statute of
limitations claims raised in the defendants’ arguments and incorporated
into trial court rulings); see also People v. Fletcher, 917 P.2d 187, 197
(Cal. 1996) (finding, during the defendant’s second trial, that error was
preserved on an argument when the defendant raised the argument
during his first trial and the district court incorporated the argument
when the issue was raised during the second trial).
When the district court enters an order incorporating the reasons
made in the motion to dismiss as grounds for dismissal, we take the
order at face value. We assume that the district court read the motion to
dismiss, understood the arguments that were made, and relied upon
them in reaching a ruling. Any suggestion that the district court would
be surprised under these circumstances amounts to an attack on the
diligence of the district court that we refuse to entertain.1 In short, the
EAB is far off target when it claims substantial compliance is a newfound
argument on appeal when the EAB raised the issue in its motion to
1The issue of substantial compliance is far better preserved here than were
issues considered by the majority of this court in State v. Iowa District Court, where the
court considered due process and funding issues that were never at any time, in any
form, presented to the district court and never argued on appeal. 828 N.W.2d 607, 609,
613–15 (Iowa 2013); id. at 618–19 (Appel, J., dissenting). It was unnecessary for the
parties below to raise these issues because the larger issue, namely, the validity of the
district court’s consent order, was preserved. If we are consistent with District Court,
the larger issue of substantial compliance should be considered preserved here, even if
the arguments, like in District Court, were incomplete below and improved on appeal.
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dismiss, the defendant resisted it, and the district court incorporated the
EAB’s substantial compliance argument in its ruling.
In light of the district court’s express incorporation of the
substantial compliance arguments of the EAB in its ruling, and the
contested nature of the issue below, we agree with the court of appeals
that error was preserved on the substantial compliance question. As we
recently noted in LaMasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012),
“[i]f the court’s ruling indicates that the court considered the issue and
necessarily ruled on it, even if the court’s reasoning is ‘incomplete or
sparse,’ the issue has been preserved.” See also State v. Paredes, 775
N.W.2d 554, 561 (Iowa 2009) (noting that “where a question is obvious
and ruled upon by the district court, the issue is adequately preserved”);
cf. Sorci v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 671 N.W.2d 482, 489–91 (Iowa 2003) (holding
error not preserved on issues not presented to the district court).
Similarly, in State v. Chrisman, 514 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Iowa 1994), we held a
defendant preserved error when he challenged only the seizure of tennis
shoes and not the search that led to their discovery. We noted “the
district court ruled that the ‘searches made herein were consensual,’ ”
and thus the larger issue of the validity of the search was preserved. Id.
Here, the issue of substantial compliance was plainly raised in the trial
court and ruled upon by the district court.
In any event, even if Cooksey’s resistance is considered flawed, the
preservation issue was resolved when the district court ruled on the
substantial compliance issue. In Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Iowa 2005), the plaintiff filed a
petition for declaratory judgment against Farm Bureau seeking
uninsured motorist benefits. The uninsured motorist provision of
Otterberg’s policy stated Farm Bureau would pay damages for bodily
7
injuries the insured is “legally entitled to recover” from the owner or
operator of an uninsured vehicle. Id. Farm Bureau counterclaimed and
then moved for summary judgment, claiming Otterberg was not “legally
entitled to recover” damages under a provision in the workers’
compensation statute. Id. Otterberg did not file a motion resisting the
summary judgment motion and the district court, accepting Farm
Bureau’s argument, granted the motion. Id. at 27. Otterberg appealed,
arguing that the “legally entitled to recover” language in his policy did not
bar his recovery. Id.
On appeal, Farm Bureau argued Otterberg failed to preserve error
on the “legally entitled to recover” provision because he failed to contest
the issue in the district court. Id. Farm Bureau relied on Bill Grunder’s
Sons Construction, Inc. v. Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2004), in which
we held,
“if the movant [for summary judgment] has failed to
establish its claim and the court nevertheless enters
judgment, the nonmovant must at least preserve error by
filing a motion following entry of judgment, allowing the
district court to consider the claim of deficiency.”
Otterberg, 696 N.W.2d at 28 (quoting Ganzer, 686 N.W.2d at 197–98).
We distinguished Ganzer, however, as a case where the issue raised on
appeal by the nonresisting party “was not an issue considered and ruled
on by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.”
Id. In contrast, we determined in Otterberg that the “legally entitled to
recover damages” issue, which was raised on appeal by Otterberg, had
been presented to and decided by the district court. Id. Because the
issue was presented to and decided by the district court, we held the
issue was preserved even though Otterberg did not resist the argument
in response to the motion for summary judgment. Id. As noted by this
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court in rejecting Farm Bureau’s argument that a rule 1.904(2) motion
should have been filed to preserve the issue:
If the district court considered the issue raised on appeal by
the nonmovant in ruling on an uncontested summary
judgment motion, the rationale for requiring the nonmovant
to file a postjudgment motion with the district court to
preserve error on appeal is inapplicable. Thus, if a motion
for summary judgment presented the issue to the district
court and the district court ruled on it, the rule requiring the
district court to first consider issues raised on appeal is
satisfied.
Id.
In this case, the issue of substantial compliance was raised by the
EAB in its motion for summary judgment and was ruled upon by the
district court. Thus, under Otterberg the claim is preserved. See id.; see
also State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 202–03 (Iowa 2009) (finding claim
preserved when neither party raised the issue, but the district court
ruled upon it); Yunek v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 11–1693, 2012 WL 3194113
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding argument that terms in
contract were ambiguous was preserved where nonmoving party failed to
make the argument below but district court considered the issue in
ruling on motion for summary judgment).
B. Positions of the Parties. On appeal, Cooksey asserts the
district court erred in dismissing his petition because he substantially
complied with Iowa Code section 17A.19(4), which provides “[t]he petition
for review shall name the agency as respondent.” While recognizing that
the EAB was not named in the caption, he asserts that the technical
omission does not defeat jurisdiction. Cooksey emphasizes that because
the EAB was timely served and paragraph one of the petition specifically
indicates it is an appeal of the EAB’s final agency action, no prejudice is
present.
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Cargill asserts that because the EAB was not included as a
respondent in the caption of the appeal, it was not named as a
respondent in the petition as required by Iowa Code section 17A.19(4).
Although conceding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy
the procedural prerequisites for jurisdiction, Cargill argues that Cooksey
failed to substantially comply when he failed to name the EAB as a
“respondent.” While Cargill recognizes that the petition was timely
served upon the EAB, Cargill argues that the failure to name the agency
in the caption of the petition as a respondent is a fatal flaw requiring
dismissal of the appeal.
C. Iowa Caselaw. We have confronted the question of the impact
of the failure to properly name the administrative agency as a respondent
in an administrative appeal. In Frost v. S.S. Kresge Co., 299 N.W.2d 646,
647 (Iowa 1980), we considered a case where a party named the
Industrial Commission instead of the Industrial Commissioner in a
petition for judicial review of agency action. Utilizing a substantial
compliance standard, we held that the error did not defeat subject matter
jurisdiction because the commissioner received actual notice of the
proceeding and no prejudice occurred. Id. at 648. Similarly, in
Buchholtz v. Iowa Department of Public Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 792–
93 (Iowa 1982), we held that naming the department of public instruction
instead of the board of public instruction did not defeat jurisdiction in an
action under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act when there was no
showing of prejudice and the record indicated the board received timely
notice.
Further, in Green v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 299 N.W.2d
651, 654 (Iowa 1980), we considered whether a claimant seeking judicial
review complied with Iowa Code section 96.6(8) (1979), part of the Iowa
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Employment Security Act, which stated that “any other party to the
proceeding before the appeal board shall be named in the petition.”
(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) Though the claimant
named her employer in exhibits mentioned in and attached to the
petition, she did not designate her employer as a respondent in the
caption of the petition. Id. We held the claimant substantially complied
with the statute because the employer’s name was mentioned in the
exhibits and because there was no prejudice. Id.
On the other hand, we have taken a different view where the
petition in an administrative proceeding totally failed to name the real
party in interest. In Ball v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 308 N.W.2d
54, 55 (Iowa 1981), a former employee sought to appeal an adverse
unemployment benefits ruling. The claimant, however, did not name the
employer as a party in the district court proceeding. Id. The department
of job service sought to dismiss the action under Iowa Code section
96.6(8), which, as in Green, provided that the other party to the
proceedings before the appeal board “ ‘shall be named in the petition.’ ”
Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 96.6(8)).
We held that the district court erred in not dismissing the petition.
Id. at 56. We emphasized that unlike in Green, Ball did not name his
employer anywhere within the allegations of the petition for judicial
review. Id. Further, no exhibits were attached to the petition reflecting
the course of the controversy and the parties before the appeal board. Id.
Under these circumstances, we held dismissal was required. Id.
In Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v. Employment Appeal Board, 449
N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1989), we considered whether an employer who
filed a petition for judicial review of an award of unemployment benefits
paid to an employee could subsequently amend the petition to challenge
11
the benefits paid to additional employees. We held that additional
employees could not be named after the thirty-day period for filing a
judicial review petition expired. Id. at 639. This case reflects the
common sense notion that the filing of a petition of judicial review as to
one employee is not a bootstrap that may be used to extend the thirty-
day time limitation with respect to other employees who were not named
either in the caption or in the body of the original petition. See id. at
638–39.
We have also dismissed an administrative appeal where there has
been a failure to file the petition in the correct county. In Anderson v.
W. Hodgeman & Sons, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 418, 420–21 (Iowa 1994), we
emphasized the distinction between original actions and appellate
jurisdiction. We concluded that where appellate jurisdiction is involved,
a petition must be filed in the county allowed by the statute. Id. at 421.
Anderson, however, did not address the question of what constitutes
compliance with the notice requirements of an administrative appeal
under Iowa Code section 17A.19(4). See id.
We also refused to excuse a naming error in Iowa Department of
Transportation v. Iowa District Court, 534 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1995). In
Iowa Department of Transportation, a party contesting a license
revocation proceeding sought a nunc pro tunc order in a related criminal
case. Id. at 458. The party did not name the department in the criminal
case, and as a result, the department did not receive notice of the
proceedings. Id. Under these unique circumstances, we held the
statutory prerequisites for judicial review of Iowa Code section 17A.19
were not met. Id. at 459. Iowa Department of Transportation is
distinguishable from this case because it did not involve a proceeding
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where the agency was clearly identified in the body of the petition and
was served with the petition.
D. Caselaw from Other States. A number of state cases take the
view that generally where a state agency is identified in the body of a
pleading seeking to commence an appeal of agency action, but not in the
caption, there is no jurisdictional defect.
The notion that the body of the pleading, rather than the caption,
is controlling in determining the parties before the court was embraced
in Associated Grocers’ Co. of St. Louis v. Crowe, 389 S.W.2d 395, 398–
400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). In Crowe, Associated Grocers’ Company filed a
petition naming the individual members of the Industrial Commission of
Missouri as respondents rather than the commission itself. Id. at 398.
The first paragraph of the pleading, however, stated the pleader
“petitions the court to review a decision of the Industrial Commission of
Missouri,” and the third paragraph identified the decision of the
commission being challenged. Id. The Missouri court held Associated
Grocers’ had complied with a statutory requirement to commence an
action “against the commission,” noting the effect of the petition must be
read from its four corners and in its entirety and that to reach any other
result would “ ‘rob, by construction, [the complaint’s] language of its
plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Id. at 399 (quoting Hood v. Nicholson, 38
S.W. 1095, 1098 (Mo. 1897)).
Similarly, in Nigbor v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations, 355 N.W.2d 532, 535–36 (Wis. 1984), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the failure to name the Labor and Industry Commission
in the caption of a petition for review of an administrative decision was
not fatal even though a statute required that the petition’s title include
the names of all parties. The Wisconsin court reasoned the body of the
13
complaint clearly showed that the complaint was against the commission
and that no one was misled by the complaint. Id. at 536; see also
Hopper v. Indus. Comm’n, 558 P.2d 927, 932 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding although the respondent employer was not named in the title or
body of the petition, the fact that the claim was identified in the title and
body by reference to the industrial commissioner claims number was
sufficient); D.C. Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers, 680
A.2d 434, 438 (D.C. 1996) (holding failure to name the Public Employee
Relations Board in caption of action contesting ruling of the board on
collective bargaining issue was not fatal when the board was identified on
the first page of the petition for review, the petition identified the board
as the agency that issued the order from which review was sought, and
the petition was served on the board); Klopfenstein v. Okla. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 177 P.3d 594, 597–99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (holding
administrative procedure act provision requiring naming of respondents
is jurisdictional and statute is satisfied by naming agency in the body of
the complaint); Skagit Surveyors & Eng’rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit Cnty.,
958 P.2d 962, 969 (Wash. 1998) (failure to name all parties in petition for
review of agency action is not fatal to subject matter jurisdiction where
order being appealed identified all parties and was attached and
incorporated in the petition).
There are some state cases that take a somewhat different
approach. For example, in ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 727
N.E.2d 1022, 1024, 1028 (Ill. 2000), the court dismissed an
administrative appeal when a party named a board, rather than the
state, as a party. The Illinois court concluded the applicable statute
required strict compliance, and naming the board, instead of the state,
was fatal to the petition for judicial review. Id. at 1025. The strict
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compliance approach in ESG, however, is inconsistent with our cases
that hold substantial compliance with Iowa Code section 17A.19(4) is
sufficient to vest subject matter jurisdiction with the district court.
Buchholtz, 315 N.W.2d at 793; Frost, 299 N.W.2d at 648. Further, the
ESG court emphasized that the board and the state were in fact different
entities and that the state, which was the proper party, had never been
named in any fashion in the underlying pleading. 727 N.E.2d at 1027.
ESG is thus distinguishable from this case, where the administrative
agency and the order from which appeal was sought were identified in
the body of the petition.
E. Federal Caselaw. We next turn to federal caselaw. Unlike the
Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act does not have a “naming” requirement. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), however, provides the title of the
action in a complaint “must name all the parties.” While any analogy to
cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) is inexact, the logic
embraced in these cases is nevertheless instructive to us. See Schering-
Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 999 S.W.2d
773, 776–77 (Tenn. 1999) (petition for further review of agency action is
akin to a notice of appeal).
The majority of federal caselaw under Rule 10(a) stands for the
proposition that the allegations in the complaint, and not the caption,
determine the nature of the cause of action. As noted by the Ninth
Circuit:
[T]he caption of an action is only the handle to identify it and
ordinarily the determination of whether or not a defendant is
properly in the case hinges upon the allegations in the body
of the complaint and not upon his inclusion in the caption.
15
Hoffman v. C. H. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 303–04 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled
on other grounds by Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29–30 (9th Cir. 1962).
The Hoffman approach is the prevailing view in federal courts
under Rule 10(a). See, e.g., Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846, 849
(8th Cir. 2006) (noting a caption is not determinative, but may be given
considerable weight when determining who is a party); Marsh v. Butler
County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
caption of a complaint is not part of the statement of the claim, but may
be useful in settling ambiguities in the complaint); Greenwood v. Ross,
778 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting the caption is not
determinative as to who is party to the suit); Blanchard v. Terry & Wright,
Inc., 331 F.2d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1964) (while United States is not named
in the caption of the complaint, courts must look to allegations of the
complaint in order to determine the nature of the cause of action); Spring
Water Dairy, Inc. v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul, 625 F.
Supp. 713, 721 n.5 (D. Minn. 1986) (observing that while plaintiffs
should have listed parties in the caption, the failure to do so does not
mean they cannot maintain action where the complaint makes explicit
mention of the parties and the parties have been served); see also 5A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1321, at 388–89 (3d ed. 2004) (observing that the caption is not
determinative of the parties to an action or a district court’s personal or
subject matter jurisdiction).
There is also a similar line of cases under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(c). Rule 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal shall “specify
the party or parties taking the appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A). The
Rule further provides that an appeal “must not be dismissed for
informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.” Id. R. 3(c)(4). The
16
federal courts have held that if it appears on the face of a notice that an
appeal is intended by a party not named, the appeal is well taken. Raley
v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011); Retail
Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339 F.3d 1146, 1148
(9th Cir. 2003); K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545
F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008–09 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Finally, there is federal authority under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 15(a), which requires that a petition for review of an agency
order “name the agency as a respondent.” See Fed. R. App. P. 15(a)(2)(B).
At least two federal courts have found sufficient compliance with the
Rule in situations where the agency, as here, was not named in the
caption. See Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 410 F. App’x 332,
333 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the document does identify the agency and
the ITC received notice of the appeal because Lincoln served a copy on
the ITC, the failure to include the agency again in the caption of the
appeal appears harmless and is not a jurisdictional deficiency.”); Rhine v.
Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 596 F.3d 1161, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
OWCP does not appear in the petition, but it was served and appeared as
a respondent on the day the petition was filed. . . . Because petitioner
provided notice to the OWCP and the OWCP subsequently appeared as a
respondent, the court in effect found that Rhine had complied with Rule
15(a)(2)(B).”).
F. Discussion. The overarching goal of the law must be to
achieve substantial justice among the parties. See Arnold v. Collins, 195
Iowa 1140, 1141, 193 N.W. 408, 409 (1923) (“The controversy is largely
one in which the mere technicalities of procedure and practice have been
so magnified and exaggerated as to obscure the proper end and aim of all
litigation, the effectuating of substantial justice between the contending
17
parties.”). As a result, the law in Iowa for decades traditionally has
sought to avoid highly technical requirements that might serve no useful
purpose and yet deprive parties of their day in court. That is the
essential teaching of our caselaw, the caselaw of other states, and the
federal authorities on the question of the consequence of the failure to
name a party in a caption where the party is otherwise identified in the
notice or pleading. At the same time, we must recognize that courts
must follow jurisdictional mandates imposed by valid statutes. See
Anderson, 524 N.W.2d at 420; Sioux City Brick & Tile, 449 N.W.2d at
638–39.
Under the specific facts of this case, we conclude the statutory
requirement that the EAB be named in the petition has been satisfied.
The agency was not named in the caption, but it was named in the body
of the petition. As a result, the case is more akin to Green, where we
found substantial compliance when the caption failed to mention the
party but the decision appealed from was identified and attached to the
pleading, than to Ball or Iowa Department of Transportation, where there
was a total failure to name a party within the four corners of the petition.
We reaffirm the view expressed in Green, and supported in the
state and federal caselaw, that where a statute provides that the petition
shall “name the agency as respondent,” see Iowa Code § 17A.19(4), the
contents of a petition seeking review of administrative action should be
evaluated in its entirety. As we stated in Green, where it was sufficient
that the employer was named in an exhibit attached to the petition, “[w]e
find no requirement that the employer be named in a caption to the
petition.” 299 N.W.2d at 654. Under the authority of Green, when a
respondent in an administrative action is identified in the body of the
petition and served with notice, as was the EAB, the matter is not
18
subject to dismissal for failure to name the party in the caption. Id.; see
also Hopper, 558 P.2d at 932; D.C. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 680 A.2d at
438; Crowe, 389 S.W.2d at 398–99; Nigbor, 355 N.W.2d at 536.
Even so, one could argue that while there is no requirement that
an agency be named as a “respondent” in the caption, the statute
requires the agency be named as a “respondent” somewhere in the
petition. Iowa Code section 17A.19(4) does state the agency shall be
named as respondent. Although Cooksey’s petition does not use the
term “respondent,” the EAB has been identified as the agency that made
a final decision from which an appeal is sought. While the term
“respondent” was not used, the petition plainly demonstrated the agency
was a respondent as its final order was being contested in an
administrative appeal. See Crowe, 389 S.W.2d at 400 (in haec verba not
required to satisfy jurisdictional requirements).
We conclude, however, that Cooksey has substantially complied
with the statute by identifying the EAB as the agency who entered the
final agency action from which Cooksey sought to appeal. No one was
confused by the lack of use of the term “respondent” when the factual
allegations in the petition demonstrated the EAB was a respondent in the
sense of having entered an order from which an appeal was being taken.
As noted by a federal court years ago and cited in subsequent caption
cases, “courts should not put themselves in the position of failing to
recognize what is apparent to everyone else.” United States v. A.H.
Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947); see Klopfenstein,
177 P.3d at 598 (quoting language from A.H. Fischer Lumber).
Cooksey asserts that the EAB was timely served with the notice,
and this claim has not been challenged on appeal. Consequently, the
EAB cannot demonstrate any prejudice. The case is thus distinguishable
19
from situations where the affected party is not named, and not served,
with the petition. See Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 534 N.W.2d at 459; see also
Ball, 308 N.W.2d at 55–56 (holding the claimant failed to comply with a
“naming” requirement where the claimant failed to name his employer
anywhere in the petition).
We also find this case distinguishable from the situation in which a
party fails to file a petition in a timely manner or files the petition in the
wrong county. See Anderson, 524 N.W.2d at 421; Sioux City Brick & Tile,
449 N.W.2d at 638–39. To adopt a “close enough” approach that would
allow untimely or improperly filed petitions to proceed would amount to a
rewriting of statutory requirements and a substitution of our judgment
for that of the legislature. Here, however, the petition provides the
information required by the statute, and the legislative purpose behind
the “naming” requirement—the provision of timely notice to all parties of
the nature of the action—has been satisfied.
For the above reasons, we conclude that Cooksey’s petition was
sufficient to vest subject matter jurisdiction with the district court.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the petition
in this case. As a result, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED, DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Mansfield, Waterman, and Zager, JJ.,
who dissent.
20
#11–1630, Cooksey v. Cargill
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court and the
court of appeals.
Iowa Code section 17A.19(4) provides, “The petition for review shall
name the agency as respondent.” The word “shall” is normally
considered mandatory. See Iowa Code § 4.1(30) (2011). Cooksey’s
petition for review did not name the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) as
a respondent. Rather, it named Cooksey’s employer, Cargill Meat
Solutions. Nor did the petition even ask for relief against the EAB.
Instead, it requested that “reversal or remand should be entered against
the Employer and benefits awarded.” Given the wording of section
17A.19(4) and our precedent, I would find that Cooksey’s petition was
properly dismissed.2
But there is an even more basic problem. Cooksey failed to
preserve error below. He never argued in the district court that he had
complied, substantially or otherwise, with section 17A.19(4)’s
requirement to name the agency as respondent. Instead, he argued only
two very different points: (1) that the agency was not a proper party; and
(2) that section 17A.19(4) was unconstitutional. I would therefore find
that Cooksey failed to preserve error.
I. Error Preservation.
Cooksey’s petition for judicial review was filed May 3, 2011. Ten
days later, the EAB filed a ten-page motion to dismiss his petition as an
“interested person.” See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.431(1). In multiple paragraphs
(paragraphs 7, 10, and 11), the EAB’s motion made clear that Cooksey
2My colleagues generally characterize this case as one where the EAB was not
named “in the caption.” But it is more than that. The body of the petition does not
indicate that the EAB is a party either. Relief is requested only against the employer.
21
had to substantially comply with the prerequisites for judicial review and
that his failure to name, or even misname, the agency as respondent did
not substantially comply with the statute. In support of its position, the
EAB cited to and quoted from this court’s Department of Transportation
decision, which I discuss further below.
On May 23, 2011, Cooksey filed a “preliminary resistance” to the
EAB’s motion. I quote the resistance verbatim:
1. That the Petitioner preliminarily denies the Board’s
(MOVANTS) paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 10, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, and
23, as the BOARD was and is not a proper, real party
whether below or at present. The real party in interest, and
herein is Cargill Meat Solutions, below and at the District
Court level;
2. That Code Section 17A–19.4 (2011) is unconstitutional on
its face and as Applied to this Petition for Judicial Review;
3. That Code Section 17A (19.4), as Applied to Cooksey and
similar persons, as contrasted, compared to Worker’s
Compensation Law, and Judicial Reviews (86.29) is
inconsistent, unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary, not
uniform, ALL in violation of Iowa Constitution, Article I,
Section 9, Article I, § 1, Article I, § 6.
On July 27, 2011, Cooksey filed an amendment to his prior
resistance. Like the preliminary resistance, this document asserted that
the EAB was “not a proper party to this appeal in the Polk County
District Court,” that EAB had no standing to file its motion to dismiss,
and (at great length) that section 17A.19(4) was unconstitutional.
At the same time, Cooksey also lodged a proposed ruling which
stated (twice) that “the Employment Appeal Board is not a real party in
interest herein.”
In short, in both his original and his amended resistances,
Cooksey made two separate arguments—first, that the EAB was not the
proper party to his appeal and, second, even if it was, then the statute so
22
requiring was unconstitutional. Cooksey never made the third argument
now divined by my colleagues—i.e., that he had substantially complied
with the statutory requirement to name the EAB as respondent.3
My colleagues contend, “Cooksey was plainly asserting that his
failure to specifically name the EAB in the caption was not fatal given the
nature of the EAB’s interest in the appeal of its administrative action and
the fact that the employer was named in the caption.” This sentence
needs to be read with the care with which it was written. Obscured by
this verbiage is the substantial difference between arguing that failure to
name the EAB in the caption was “not fatal” because the proper
respondent was the employer (what Cooksey actually maintained below)
and arguing that failure to name the agency in the caption was “not
fatal” because the agency was effectively named elsewhere (which
Cooksey never claimed).
Thus, substantial compliance or any kind of compliance with the
statutory requirement to name the agency as respondent was not in play
below. The EAB stated that Cooksey had not substantially complied with
the statute, and while Cooksey sought to avoid dismissal on other
grounds, he never contested this point.
On September 1, 2011, the district court ruled as follows:
NOW on the 28th day of July 2011 this matter came
before the Court upon the motion to dismiss filed by the
Iowa Employment Appeal Board and joined by Cargill Meat
Solutions. The parties were present by their respective
counsel. The Court, having reviewed the motion, the
resistance thereto, the entire court file and the arguments of
counsel and, therefore, being duly advised in the premises
finds that for the reasons as stated in the motion to dismiss
the motion should be, and is granted.
3As the EAB puts it, “Cooksey’s argument made to the District Court was that
the statute did not require the Board to be a party and, if the statute did[,] then it was
unconstitutional.”
23
My colleagues think this ruling demonstrates that error was
preserved. I disagree. If the majority is right, then anything a district
court says (or incorporates) in a ruling would become fair game for
appeal, whether the appellant had disputed the point or not. The basic
principle here is fairness to the district court. In an adversary system, a
trial judge should not be reversed for accepting a proposition that both
parties accepted, especially when all the trial judge said was that he was
granting the motion “for the reasons as stated in the motion.” See
DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]t is unfair to allow a
party to choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error,
taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error
on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.” (Citation and
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
The majority says, “Any suggestion that the district court would be
surprised under these circumstances amounts to an attack on the
diligence of the district court that we refuse to entertain.” The district
court can decide for itself whether I am attacking its diligence; I think
clearly not. Rather, I am simply relying on the well-established law that
protects trial courts from having to decide matters sua sponte when one
party takes a position and the other side does not dispute it.
I recognize that Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company allowed a litigant who had not timely resisted a summary
judgment motion nonetheless to argue on appeal that the motion should
have been denied. 696 N.W.2d 24, 27–28 (Iowa 2005). There, we
permitted the appellant to rebut on appeal an assertion in the summary
judgment motion that became incorporated in the district court’s ruling
on the uncontested motion. But that decision was specifically tied to the
requirements for summary judgment motions, where the movant has the
24
burden “to show the district court that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. at 27 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No language in
Otterberg suggests it would apply to administrative appeals, where it is
the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate compliance with the statute. See
Banos v. Shepard, 419 N.W.2d 364, 367 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the
petitioner “must show compliance with the requirements of section
17A.19(1), requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, and section
17A.19(4), specifying the concise requirements of a petition for judicial
review”).
This is not a case where the appellant pressed an argument below
and we decided to accept that argument, in part, on appeal. See State v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 607, 613–15 (Iowa 2013). But see id. at 618–
19 (Appel, J., dissenting) (asserting that error was not preserved). Nor is
this a case where the appellant clearly made the argument below and the
only issue was whether the court had ruled on it. See Lamasters v.
State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862–65 (Iowa 2012). But see id. at 872–73
(Wiggins, J., joined by Appel, J., specially concurring) (asserting that
error was not preserved).4
4The majority also cites State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 2009), State v.
Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2009), and State v. Chrisman, 514 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa
1994). All are readily distinguishable. In Paredes, a case involving a declaration
against interest, we held the defendant had preserved error below by arguing the
admissibility of the statement, without specifically stating that it was a declaration
against interest, when it was “obvious” he was relying on that ground. 775 N.W.2d at
561. Here, it is far from “obvious” that Cooksey was arguing he had substantially
complied with a requirement to name the agency as respondent. In Brooks, we allowed
the appellee (not the appellant) to raise a ground for affirmance that had been “squarely
ruled on” by the district court although not raised below by either side. 760 N.W.2d at
202. However, we distinguished Brooks from a case where one party had taken a
position and the other “acquiesced” in it—the situation we have here. See id. at 202–
03. In Chrisman, the state only disputed error preservation on appeal to the extent the
defendant had failed to ask for a “specific ruling” on the lawfulness of the seizure. 514
25
Cooksey never claimed below he had complied with a requirement
to name the agency. In short, the EAB is right on target that this is a
“newfound argument” on appeal.
II. Merits.
We previously interpreted the relevant language of section
17A.19(4) in Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa District Court,
534 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1995). There we wrote:
We conclude that Schumacher’s application did not
meet the statutory prerequisites for judicial review. The
primary deficiency in the application is that it did not name
the DOT as the respondent as required by Iowa Code section
17A.19(4) (1993) (“The petition for review shall name the
agency as respondent . . . .”). Although we have found
substantial compliance with this requirement where the
agency was simply misnamed, Frost v. S.S. Kresge Co., 299
N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa 1980), and where a related
department and the executive officer of the agency were
named rather than the agency, Buchholtz v. Iowa Department
of Public Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 792–93 (Iowa 1982),
we cannot find substantial compliance here. Only the
parties to the criminal case were named in the caption of
Schumacher’s application. No employee of the DOT or a
related entity was named as a respondent so as to alert the
DOT that the application sought relief from agency action.
To find substantial compliance here would effectively nullify
the requirement that the agency be named as a respondent.
Therefore, we hold that Schumacher did not substantially
comply with section 17A.19(4).
Id. at 459.
I believe this decision controls here. Based on our precedent in
Department of Transportation, a petition that does not name the agency
or an alias of the agency as respondent fails to comply with the judicial
review statute.
My colleagues omit the foregoing language from their discussion of
Department of Transportation. Instead, in a brief paragraph, they
N.W.2d at 60. We found that a specific ruling had been made by the trial court so this
objection was groundless. Id.
26
attribute the outcome in Department of Transportation to the specific
facts (“unique circumstances”) of the case. But if only facts and not legal
holdings mattered, we would not put legal analysis in our decisions. A
fair reading of the foregoing language from Department of Transportation
is that a petition which fails to name the agency or a stand-in for the
agency as respondent does not satisfy section 17A.19(4). My colleagues
rely on the earlier case of Green v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 299
N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1980). But that case involved a different statute that
required the employer to be “named in the petition.” Id. at 654. This
case, like Department of Transportation, involves a statute which requires
the agency to be “name[d] . . . as respondent.” See Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(4).
In lieu of following our precedent, the majority emphasizes that the
EAB received “timely notice” of the appeal, a point I do not dispute.
However, we have previously indicated, I believe correctly, that “[n]otice
pleading . . . is not sufficient in an appellate review proceeding under
chapter 17A.” Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Klebs, 539 N.W.2d 178, 180
(Iowa 1995). “[C]ompliance with statutory conditions and procedures [is]
required to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction to hear an
administrative appeal.” Anderson v. W. Hodgeman & Sons, Inc., 524
N.W.2d 418, 420 n.1 (Iowa 1994).
My colleagues also cite a variety of cases from other jurisdictions.
In my view, their out-of-state cases are of marginal relevance because
either the facts or the statutory schemes were different. In Associated
Grocers’ Co. of St. Louis v. Crowe, the members of the respondent
commission were specifically named in the caption and identified as
members of the commission, although the commission itself was not
named. 389 S.W.2d 395, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). This was a misnomer
27
case and under our precedents would amount to substantial compliance.
In fact, on the facts presented here, the Missouri courts would agree with
me, not my colleagues. See State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n
v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 706 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that merely alleging the Division of Employment Security
made a decision unsupported by competent and substantial evidence in
the body of the petition, but omitting any reference to the division in the
caption or the prayer was not substantial compliance with the legal
requirement that the division be made a party).
Nigbor v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
involved a misnaming of the agency, rather than a failure to name an
agency. See 355 N.W.2d 532, 535–36 (Wis. 1984). Further: “Even
though DILHR rather than the Commission was named in the caption,
the body of Mrs. Nigbor’s complaint clearly showed that her grievance
was against the Commission.” Id. at 536. Here, by contrast, Cooksey
asked for relief from the employer, not the EAB.
Hopper v. Industrial Commission was a workers’ compensation case
where the court applied general principles applicable to appeals in
Arizona, not as here a specific administrative review statute. 558 P.2d
927, 931–32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). In D.C. Department of Administrative
Services v. International Board of Police Officers, the court had before it a
misnaming of the agency, rather than a failure to name an agency, and
was interpreting superior court rules designed “to facilitate a proper
decision on the merits,” as opposed to a jurisdictional statute. 680 A.2d
434, 437–38 (D.C. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Klopfenstein v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services, the
agency was not named in the caption but “clearly was named as a party
in the body of the petition,” having been listed as a party under the
28
subtitle, “Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue.” 177 P.3d 594, 597–98 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2008). Under our precedents, this would qualify as substantial
compliance with any requirement that the agency be named as a party.
In Skagit Surveyors & Engineers, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County,
the statute in question simply required the petition for review to identify
the persons who were parties below, not to name them as parties. See
958 P.2d 962, 969 (Wash. 1998); see also Wash. Rev. Code 34.05.546(5)
(West, Westlaw current with 2013 legislation effective April 17, 2013)
(stating that a “petition for review must set forth . . . [i]dentification of
persons who were parties in any adjudicative proceedings that led to the
agency action”). The court held it was sufficient that the petitioners had
attached and incorporated the administrative order to its petition that
identified all the parties below. Skagit Surveyors & Eng’rs, 958 P.2d at
969.
On the other hand, Alabama has the same statutory language as
Iowa (i.e., “The petition for review shall name the agency as respondent
. . . .”). Compare Ala. Code § 41-22-20(h) (Westlaw current through 2013
Reg. Sess.), with Iowa Code § 17A.19(4). The Alabama Supreme Court
has held that even a misnomer (as opposed to a nonnomer) of the
relevant agency “acts [as] a waiver of [the petitioner’s] right to a review.”
Ex Parte Sutley, 86 So. 3d 997, 1000 (Ala. 2011).
Certain federal caselaw is more helpful to Cooksey. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 15(a) requires that a petition for review of an agency
order “name the agency as a respondent.” See Fed. R. App. P. 15(a)(2)(B).
Some federal appellate courts have found sufficient compliance with that
Rule even when the agency was not actually named as a respondent.
See Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 410 F. App’x 332, 333 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the document does identify the agency and the ITC
29
received notice of the appeal because Lincoln served a copy on the ITC,
the failure to include the agency again in the caption of the appeal
appears harmless and is not a jurisdictional deficiency.”); Rhine v.
Stevedoring Servs. of America, 596 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
OWCP does not appear in the petition, but it was served and appeared as
a respondent on the day the petition was filed. . . . Because petitioner
provided notice to the OWCP and the OWCP subsequently appeared as a
respondent, the court in effect found that Rhine had complied with Rule
15(a)(2)(B).”).
Considering the matter as a whole, I agree with the EAB that if we
find substantial compliance here, we have effectively read “shall” out of
the statute. We have also thereby collapsed two separate requirements—
that the agency be named and that it be served, see Iowa Code §§
17A.19(4), .19(2)—into one—that the agency be served. The naming
requirement serves a distinctive and valuable purpose because it
specifically alerts the agency that the papers it has received are papers to
which it must affirmatively respond. Under the circumstances presented
here and the majority’s holding, it appears the EAB would have been
better off had it ignored Cooksey’s defective petition for review. It should
not be penalized for having taken a proactive approach.
I recognize there are reasonable arguments on both sides of the
merits of this dispute. I generally favor the view that cases should not be
decided on technicalities. But lawyers (and Cooksey had one) know what
it means to “name” an agency as a “respondent.” By no stretch did
Cooksey’s attorney do so here. And if the matter still remained in doubt,
I would adhere to stare decisis and our eighteen-year-old precedent in
Department of Transportation.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.
Jeremie J. Cooksey v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation
Combined Opinion