IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1258
Filed June 25, 2010
MARTIN L. WATERS and LESLIE WATERS,
Appellees,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Martha L.
Mertz, Judge.
The State appeals from an order by the district court directing the
case to be scheduled for trial. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED AND DISTRICT COURT ORDER AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Richard E. Mull and
Robin G. Formaker, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Dean T. Jennings of Jennings Law Firm, Council Bluffs, and
Jerry W. Katskee of Katskee, Henatsch & Suing, Omaha, Nebraska, for
appellees.
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CADY, Justice.
In this appeal involving an action brought by two plaintiffs against
the State of Iowa and other defendants to recover personal injuries
resulting from a motor vehicle accident, we must decide whether any
claims against the State remained for trial after the district court granted
summary judgment for the State so as to support a subsequent order by
the district court directing the State to proceed to trial. We transferred
the case to the court of appeals, who affirmed the order of the district
court. Upon our review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals
and affirm the order of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A severe winter storm swept across western and central Iowa on
February 8, 2004, including the area where Interstate 80 traverses
Madison County. The storm continued to batter the area into the
evening and early morning hours of the following day, producing surface
ice and substantial amounts of snow and blowing snow. Driving
conditions on Interstate 80 deteriorated to the point where the Iowa State
Patrol issued a ban on towing operations for portions of the interstate,
including the area between mile markers 97 and 100 in Madison County.
Donald Deeds was driving his Jeep Cherokee west on Interstate 80
between mile markers 97 and 100 around 2:30 a.m. on February 9,
when he lost control and slid off the traveled portion of the roadway. The
vehicle landed on its side in the median between the west and eastbound
lanes. Deeds was not hurt. He abandoned his vehicle when a passing
motorist provided him a ride to a nearby motel. Deeds called 911 and
informed the operator of the accident.
Between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. on February 9, Trooper Jody Elliott of
the Iowa State Patrol came upon Deeds’ vehicle while on patrol. He
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stopped to investigate. He determined the Jeep was within the median,
no persons were at the scene, and the vehicle did not present a hazard to
traffic. He left and resumed his patrol.
Around 5:15 a.m., Lance Madsen was driving his Ford Expedition
on Interstate 80. A passenger, Martin Waters, was sleeping in the front
passenger seat. As Madsen approached the area where Deeds had
abandoned his vehicle, he lost control of his vehicle, and it collided with
the Jeep. Waters was injured as a result of the accident.
Waters filed a lawsuit against Deeds, Madsen, and the State of
Iowa for the injuries he sustained in the accident. He separately
included the department of transportation and the department of public
safety as defendants. 1 His wife joined him in the lawsuit, claiming loss of
spousal consortium. Liability against the State was predicated on the
claims that the State failed to remove the Deeds’ vehicle, failed to remove
the snow from the roadway, and failed to warn or otherwise protect
Waters from the hazard created by the snow and the Deeds vehicle. In
their petition, the Waters alleged the following particulars of negligence
against the State and the two departments: (1) failure to timely remove
an obstruction (Deeds’ vehicle) from the highway; (2) failure to timely
remove snow and ice from the highway; (3) failure to protect the traveling
public; (4) failure to warn of an obstruction; (5) failure to warn of a
slippery condition of the roadway; and (6) failure to follow snow, ice, and
obstruction removal policies. The Waters claimed the department of
1Under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, lawsuits are not authorized against a state
agency. Iowa Code § 669.16 (2003). In this case, the State eventually sought to remove
the departments as named defendants, and the district court subsequently ordered the
claims to proceed against the State of Iowa. Notwithstanding, the State’s application for
permission to appeal in advance of final judgment in this case separately named “State
of Iowa, Department of Transportation, and Department of Public Safety” in its caption
as defendants. We nevertheless name only the State of Iowa as the defendant-appellant
in this appeal.
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transportation and the department of public safety had statutory duties
to remove vehicles that obstructed highway travel.
The State moved for summary judgment. It claimed the material
facts of the case were not in dispute, and it was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The State asserted multiple grounds in support of its
motion. It first claimed the department of public safety had no duty to
remove the Deeds vehicle, warn of the presence of the Deeds vehicle, or
otherwise protect the Waters from the Deeds vehicle. It next claimed the
State was immune from claims of negligence relating to the failure to
remove the Deeds vehicle and the failure to properly maintain the
highway and warn of dangers presented by disabled vehicles. In
particular, the State asserted the department of public safety was
immune from liability under the discretionary function doctrine for the
claim of failing to remove the Deeds vehicle. It further asserted the
discretionary function doctrine also immunized the department of
transportation from liability derived from its responsibilities to keep the
highway free of snow and ice. It further claimed the State did not breach
its duty of care because it had no reasonable notice and opportunity to
remove the Deeds vehicle prior to the accident as a matter of law. The
State also claimed the Waters failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing their tort claim against the State, as required by
law. The Waters contested the claims and provided evidence from an
expert witness that the Deeds vehicle was actually located on the
traveled portion of the roadway at the time of the accident.
The district court entered a ruling on the motion for summary
judgment by addressing each ground for summary judgment raised by
the State. It first held the Waters failed to provide notice to the
department of transportation of their negligence claims based on their
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allegations of failure to remove the snow and properly maintain the
highway. It next held the State had no duty to remove the Deeds vehicle
and prevent the accident. The court further held the negligence claims
involving failure to remove the Deeds vehicle, failure to protect the public
by closing the highway, and failing to remove the snow and ice from the
highway involved discretionary acts that did not give rise to liability
against the State under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Additionally, the court
found the claims involving the failure to warn and failure to remove the
ice and snow did not give rise to liability under the statutory exemptions
to the assignment of fault to the state for failing to perform such acts.
See Iowa Code § 668.10(1)–(2) (2003) (providing governmental immunity
for snow removal and traffic control device placement). Finally, the court
concluded a jury question was presented on the State’s claim that it had
no reasonable notice and opportunity to remove the Deeds vehicle prior
to the accident. The district court entered an order granting summary
judgment on all claims raised by the State, but denied summary
judgment on the issue of reasonable notice and opportunity. This order
was entered on January 15, 2008.
Following the order, the Waters sought to mediate a resolution of
the lawsuit with all parties. The State declined to participate in
mediation, asserting no claims were pending against the State following
the order granting summary judgment. The remaining parties proceeded
to mediation.
On July 17, 2008, the Waters filed a motion asking the district
court to clarify the summary judgment order and reschedule the case for
trial. On July 28, the district court entered a calendar order declining to
“change its ruling” and directing a new date be set for trial.
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The State made application for an appeal from the order directing
the case to proceed to trial. We granted permission to appeal and
transferred the case to the court of appeals.
On appeal, the State claims the district court erred in ordering the
State to proceed to trial after granting summary judgment. The Waters
assert the district court only granted partial summary judgment. They
argue its claim of negligence involving a failure to remove the Deeds
vehicle survived summary judgment because it was separated into two
claims, and the summary judgment ruling by the district court only
dismissed one of the two claims. The court of appeals affirmed the order
of the district court and remanded for trial. The State sought, and we
granted, further review.
II. Standard of Review.
This appeal requires us to decide if the district court erred in
ordering the State to trial after granting summary judgment. We do not
review the merits of the underlying summary judgment ruling, but are
tasked with interpreting the judgment to determine whether the order
issued in response to the motion for clarification of the judgment
improperly directed the State to proceed to trial. Consequently, our
review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
III. Resolution of Appeal.
The district court has power to change a judgment it has rendered
by correcting perceived legal or factual errors, or to construe or interpret
the judgment so that the record accurately expresses what was
previously done. 2 See Carroll v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Iowa 2000)
2The power to change a judgment can only be exercised while the district court
has jurisdiction over the case and the parties. Carroll v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857
(Iowa 2000). Additionally, the power should only be exercised with proper notice to the
parties. McVay v. Kenneth E. Montz Implement Co., 287 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Iowa 1980).
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(reiterating district court’s power to correct perceived errors in its own
judgments); see also Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431,
434 (Iowa 2007) (explaining purpose of nunc pro tunc order is to correct
a clerical error so that the judgment reflects what was actually done). In
this case, the district court declined to exercise its power to change or
construe the summary judgment in response to the motion for
clarification. Instead, the district court merely directed the parties to
proceed to trial. The State claims this directive constituted legal error
because the prior summary judgment rendered by the district court
disposed of all claims brought by the Waters against the State. Thus,
our task on appeal is to construe the summary judgment ruling entered
by the district court to determine if any claims against the State survived
the summary judgment. The State’s application for interlocutory appeal
did not challenge the merits of this summary judgment ruling. To the
contrary, the State’s application expressed its belief that the legal effect
of the summary judgment ruling terminated the action brought against it
by the Waters as it requested.
A court decree is construed like any other written instrument.
Local Bd. of Health v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1976). The
determinative factor in construing a court decree is the intent of the
court, which is derived from all parts of the judgment. Id. We strive to
construe a judgment consistent with the language used in the judgment.
Hemmer v. Bonson, 139 Iowa 210, 217, 117 N.W. 257, 259 (1908). If the
meaning of the decree is ambiguous, we resort to the pleadings and other
proceedings to clarify the ambiguity. Sutton v. Schnack, 224 Iowa 251,
________________________
Importantly, a district court cannot use its power to correct a perceived error in a
judgment by exercising its power to construe the judgment. Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2007) (noting a court may not use a nunc pro tunc
order to change the decision by correcting a judicial error).
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257, 275 N.W. 870, 873 (1937). In the end, we seek to give effect to
those matters that are implied as well as express. Rinehart v. State, 234
N.W.2d 649, 656 (Iowa 1975).
The parties agree that most of the legal claims asserted by the
Waters to support liability against the State did not survive summary
judgment. The Waters, however, maintain their allegation of negligence
involving the failure of the department of transportation to remove the
Deeds vehicle was not addressed in the summary judgment. The State
asserts this particular claim was addressed and disposed of in two
separate divisions of the summary judgment ruling. First, it asserts the
district court disposed of the claim when it ruled that the State had no
actionable duty to the Waters to remove the Deeds vehicle under the
public duty doctrine. See Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Iowa
2001) (“We have routinely held that a breach of duty owed to the public
at large is not actionable unless the plaintiff can establish, based on the
unique or particular facts of the case, a special relationship between the
State and the injured plaintiff . . . .” (Emphasis omitted.)). Second, the
State asserts the district court disposed of the claim when it ruled that
the State was immune from any liability based on its failure to remove
the Deeds vehicle under the discretionary function doctrine. See Iowa
Code § 669.14(1) (2003) (providing statutory immunity for State actors
when performing discretionary functions). We resolve both claims by
first considering whether the district court intended to rule that the State
and all its governmental subdivisions and actors had no actionable duty
to the Waters to remove the vehicle.
In determining the intended scope of the district court’s summary
judgment ruling, we begin by looking to the allegations of negligence
contained in the petition filed by the Waters together with the grounds
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asserted by the State to support summary judgment. Importantly, the
grounds for negligence alleged by the Waters in the petition included the
failure of the “department of transportation and department of public
safety” to timely remove the Deeds vehicle from the highway. Clearly, the
State’s motion for summary judgment sought judgment on the claim for
negligence pertaining to the failure to remove the Deeds vehicle, but the
motion did so only on two grounds. The State argued no “special
relationship” existed “between the department of public safety” and the
Waters to support the imposition of an actionable duty for the State to
remove the Deeds vehicle. It further argued “the State did not have a
reasonable opportunity” to remove the vehicle prior to the accident.
The motion for summary judgment reveals the State’s argument,
that it had no duty to the Waters, was based entirely on the department
of public safety’s responsibility, at the direction of the state trooper, to
remove the Deeds vehicle. The State did not additionally argue in the
motion for summary judgment that the department of transportation, a
separate governmental subdivision, also had no duty to the motoring
public to remove disabled vehicles. See Koehler v. State, 263 N.W.2d
760, 765 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing duty of department of transportation
to remove obstructions on highways); see also Iowa Code § 313.36
(“Primary roads shall be maintained by the department [of
transportation] . . . .”); id. § 319.1 (“The department [of transportation]
. . . shall cause all obstructions in highways . . . to be removed.”). 3 In
resisting the motion for summary judgment, the Waters asserted “the
3The legislature repealed chapter 319 in 2006. 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1097, § 19.
The chapter was rewritten and reorganized in chapter 318 of the 2007 Code, and it
remains there currently. See Iowa Code ch. 318 (2009). The amended version grants
immunity to the county board of supervisors and department of transportation for
claims related to removal of highway obstructions. Id. § 4 (codified at Iowa Code
§§ 318.4, 318.5(4) (2009)).
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State” had an actionable duty to remove vehicles from highways because
a special relationship was created with the motoring public pursuant to
section 321.356. See id. § 321.356 (authorizing peace officers to move or
cause to be moved a vehicle standing upon a highway). Consequently,
while the Waters’ claim for negligence for failure to remove the vehicle
targeted both the actions of the department of transportation and the
department of public safety, the summary judgment proceedings
pertaining to this ground of negligence was only directed at the actions of
the department of public safety.
The pleadings and summary judgment proceedings are important
in our search for intent because they put the language of the summary
judgment ruling in context. This context, in turn, reveals the district
court only intended to address the existence of a duty imposed on the
State through the department of public safety when it concluded the law
did not impose a duty on the State to remove the Deeds vehicle.
Moreover, the summary judgment ruling contained no directive
expressing an intent to expand its judgment beyond the context of the
pleadings.
Similarly, we reject the State’s argument that the Waters’ claim for
negligence predicated on failing to remove the Deeds vehicle did not
survive summary judgment under the district court’s alternative finding
that the State was immune from any liability derived from its decision to
refrain from towing or removing the Deeds vehicle. In its motion for
summary judgment, the State argued it was immune from liability based
on claims involving the exercise of discretionary immunity on the part of
the department of public safety and its employees, as well as the
department of transportation and its employees. However, the claim of
immunity urged by the State pertaining to the department of
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transportation’s exercise of discretionary functions was argued solely in
the context of the department of transportation’s decision to refrain from
removing snow and ice from the highway and refraining from closing the
highway to motorists. The State did not additionally argue it was
immune from liability for claims involving the department of
transportation’s decision not to tow or remove the Deeds vehicle.
Moreover, the district court did not use any language in its ruling to
extend the grant of summary judgment based on immunity to the
decision by the department of transportation to refrain from towing or
removing the Deeds vehicle. Thus, both the context of the summary
judgment proceedings and the language of the district court ruling
revealed the district court did not intend to include the Waters’
negligence claim based on the department of transportation’s failure to
remove the Deeds vehicle.
All the language in the district court ruling concerning the absence
of an actionable duty of care on the State to support negligence and the
existence of immunity for the State, while sounding as a grant of
complete summary judgment, did not apply to the Waters’ specific claim
for negligence based on the failure of the department of transportation to
remove the Deeds vehicle when placed in its proper context.
Additionally, the district court did not otherwise expressly or impliedly
declare the claim was included in the judgment. 4 Under such
4The Waters assert the district court’s intent to exclude the claim for negligence
involving the department of transportation’s failure to remove the Deeds vehicle from
the summary judgment was further revealed when the district court rejected the State’s
argument that it had no reasonable opportunity to remove the Deeds vehicle. The
Waters argue the district court would not have addressed the issue without impliedly
recognizing an underlying duty of the department of transportation to remove the
vehicle. While such a deduction could be made, it is equally likely that the district
court could have simply ruled on each alternative ground to make a full and complete
ruling for the purposes of appeal.
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circumstances, we cannot find any intent for the district court to have
granted complete summary judgment.
Nevertheless, the State asserts the Waters failed to argue and
identify the presence of a separate claim for liability based on the
department of transportation’s failure to remove the Deeds vehicle during
the proceedings before the district court, which now precludes them from
asserting the presence of such a claim on appeal to affirm the decision of
the district court. We recognize our preservation-of-error rule that
appellate courts will not consider a matter raised for the first time on
appeal, even if it is the only basis to uphold the ruling of the district
court. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002). Yet, we are
construing a court decree in this case, not deciding the merits of the
ruling. Moreover, there was no reason for the Waters to identify their
separate claim of liability based on the department of transportation’s
failure to remove the Deeds vehicle in resisting the motion for summary
judgment when the State never attacked this claim as grounds for
summary judgment.
Finally, the State argues the law does not recognize a duty for the
department of transportation to remove disabled vehicles from a highway
during a snowstorm of the magnitude experienced at the time of the
accident that gave rise to the proceedings in this case. It asserts that
any thoughtful analysis of the law and the undisputed facts about the
paralyzing weather conditions at the time of the accident would lead to
the conclusion that no State agency responsible for the maintenance of
highways was negligent for failing to remove the Deeds vehicle prior to
the accident. The State’s argument addresses a judgment on the merits
that has not yet been rendered by the district court. Our role in this
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appeal is not to rule on claims not presented to the district court, but to
construe the judgment entered by the district court.
IV. Conclusion.
We have considered all claims raised by the State. We vacate the
decision of the court of appeals and affirm the calendar entry order
entered by the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED AND DISTRICT
COURT ORDER AFFIRMED.