IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 06–1368
Filed October 9, 2009
IN THE MATTER OF THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDED
TERMINATION OF THE TEACHING CONTRACT OF JOHN
GIANFORTE.
JOHN GIANFORTE,
Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD WHITEHEAD
and COLLEGE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Amanda P.
Potterfield, Judge.
School district and superintendent appeal from district court order
entered in response to report of noncompliance with subpoenas in a
teacher-termination proceeding. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Donald C. Hoskins, Marion, for appellant College Community
School District.
Brian L. Gruhn of Gruhn Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant
Richard Whitehead.
Douglas R. Oelschlaeger and Sarah J. Gayer of Shuttleworth &
Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee John Gianforte.
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David W. Nelmark of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn,
P.C., Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Association of School Boards.
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CADY, Justice.
In this appeal from a district court order issued in response to a
report by a school board of noncompliance by witnesses with subpoenas
issued by the board in a teacher-termination proceeding, we are
presented with two issues of prehearing discovery. First, we consider the
use of a subpoena duces tecum by a teacher to obtain documents from
the superintendent of the school district. Second, we consider whether
the district court may order school board members to answer
interrogatories propounded by the teacher to inquire into claims of
prejudice and bias. On our review, we reverse the decision of the district
court and remand the case for further proceedings before the school
board.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
John Gianforte was a special education teacher employed by the
College Community School District in Cedar Rapids. He taught at Prairie
High School and was the head coach of the boys’ basketball team.
Richard Whitehead is the superintendent of the district.
On April 17, 2006, Gianforte was notified by Whitehead that he
was making a recommendation to the College Community School District
that his teaching contract be terminated. The written notice provided
eight reasons for termination, including poor performance and
inappropriate conduct as a teacher. The reasons did not relate to his
performance as a coach. In addition to the notice, Whitehead provided
Gianforte with a detailed written memorandum prepared by the high
school principal describing the claims of poor teaching performance and
unprofessional conduct. Among other things, the memorandum
described claims that Gianforte did not maintain an appropriate grading
system, made improper statements to students, and failed to properly
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develop and implement individual education plans for his special
education students. Whitehead also provided Gianforte with a lengthy
written evaluation prepared by an associate principal describing the
problems and concerns with Gianforte’s teaching performance. The
evaluation essentially described the teaching performance of Gianforte as
measured against the Iowa teaching standards. The termination was to
be effective at the end of the school year.
Gianforte responded to the notice and recommendation by
requesting a private hearing before the school board. The hearing was
set for May 10, 2006, but was continued on two occasions at Gianforte’s
request to Tuesday, June 6, 2006. Gianforte and Whitehead were at all
relevant times represented by counsel.
On June 1, Whitehead furnished Gianforte the documentation he
intended to present to the school board at the hearing, as well as a list of
persons who would address the board in support of the recommendation
to terminate Gianforte. On June 2, Gianforte requested the board issue
a subpoena to Whitehead directing him to produce a host of documents
identified by seventy-five separate categories. He also requested the
board issue subpoenas for fifty-seven witnesses, including each member
of the school board, to appear at the hearing.
In the afternoon of June 5, Gianforte furnished Whitehead with the
documents he expected to present at the hearing and his list of
witnesses. He also requested that Whitehead produce the documents
subject to the subpoena he had requested from the board. Gianforte
informed Whitehead the documents requested in the subpoena would be
included as documents he expected to present at the hearing. The
president of the school board issued the subpoenas and the subpoena
duces tecum on June 6.
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Whitehead objected to the subpoena duces tecum and to the
method used by Gianforte to provide the documentation he expected to
use at the hearing. The school board also objected to the subpoena of its
members. As a result, the hearing was continued, and the matter was
submitted to the district court without evidence offered by either party.
Many of the requests for documents described in the subpoena
sought documentation dating back five or ten years and included such
general subjects as “all documentation concerning the charges,” as well
as specific subjects such as lists and records of former students and all
individual educational plans prepared by other teachers. Whitehead
claimed most of the documents were not relevant to the grounds for
termination. He also claimed that compliance with the subpoena duces
tecum would require him to examine thousands, if not tens of thousands,
of documents. The district court directed Whitehead to produce fifty-two
of the seventy-five requests for documents. Essentially, the district court
only quashed the subpoena duces tecum relating to the requests for
documents concerning Gianforte’s performance as a basketball coach.
The district court also quashed the subpoenas directed to the
members of the board. Notwithstanding, the district court subsequently
directed the board members to submit an answer to an interrogatory
from Gianforte relating to any prior contacts and communications they
had concerning Gianforte’s teaching.
Whitehead and the board appealed the decision of the district
court. The appeals were consolidated. Gianforte was suspended with
pay pending the outcome of the termination proceeding and is not
currently teaching at the high school.
Whitehead claims on appeal the district court abused its discretion
by enforcing the subpoena duces tecum served on him the day of the
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scheduled hearing. He claims the subpoena duces tecum was untimely
under the statutory scheme governing termination hearings. He also
asserts the subpoena duces tecum was untimely because he did not have
a reasonable time to comply with the production of documents. Finally,
he claims the subpoena duces tecum was unduly burdensome. The
board asserts the district court had no authority to subject its members
to any form of discovery through the use of interrogatories.
II. Standard of Review.
The district court intervenes in a teacher-termination proceeding
only to decide questions pertaining to the refusal of witnesses to comply
with a subpoena. Iowa Code § 279.16(3) (2005). Normally, the district
court is given discretion when deciding disputes that arise over the
issuance of administrative subpoenas. See State ex rel. Miller v.
Publishers Clearing House, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Iowa 2001); Portz
v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 563 N.W.2d 592, 592 (Iowa 1997); see also
Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Iowa 2001).
Accordingly, as a discovery proceeding legally before the district court, we
review the decision reached for an abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion occurs when “the court exercise[s]
[its] discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or
to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Maghee, 573
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997). “A ground or reason is untenable
when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it
is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Graber v.
City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000). In other
words, a court has no discretion to issue a discovery order
that lacks factual support or is in contravention of governing
constitutional or statutory provisions.
Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 796.
III. Overview of Statutory Termination Procedure.
Public school teachers in Iowa work during a school year under a
written contract of employment with the board of directors of the school
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district. Iowa Code § 279.13(1). The term of the contract can cover the
school year and is automatically renewed for subsequent school years,
except when altered by mutual agreement or terminated by the board.
See id. § 279.13(2). The termination of a contract by the board is
governed by rules and regulations established by the legislature in
chapter 279 of the Code. Generally, the process requires the
superintendent of the school district, or a designee, to give the teacher
written notice no later than April 30 of the school year that the
superintendent will recommend to the school board at its next meeting,
held no later than May 15, that the teacher’s contract be terminated at
the end of the current school year. Id. § 279.15(1). The termination
notification and recommendation must contain “a short and plain
statement of the reasons” to support just cause for the recommendation.
Id. § 279.15(2).
Within five days after receipt of the notice, the teacher is permitted
to request a private hearing with the school board. Id. If a request is
made, the hearing must be held within twenty days, but no earlier than
ten days, unless the parties agree to a hearing date outside the statutory
time frame. Id. Prior to the hearing, an “exchange of information” takes
place. Id. At least five days prior to the hearing, the board must furnish
the teacher with any documentation that may be presented at the
hearing, as well as a list of persons who may address the board in
support of the termination recommendation. Id. At least three days
before the hearing, the teacher must likewise provide any documentation
the teacher expects to present, together with the names of any persons
who may address the board on behalf of the teacher. Id. The
information must be exchanged pursuant to this time line, unless
otherwise agreed by the board and the teacher. Id.
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The board must hold the hearing in a manner best suited to
“ascertain and conserve the substantial rights of the parties.” Id.
§ 279.16(4). However, the process and procedure is to be “as summary
as reasonably” possible. Id. The board does not adhere to “technical or
formal rules of procedure” and is not bound by common law or statutory
rules of evidence. Id.
The evidence at the hearing is limited to the “specific reasons”
stated in the termination notice and recommendation. Id. § 279.16(1).
The superintendent presents evidence and argument on the issues
presented. Id. The teacher is also permitted to present evidence and
argument and may cross-examine witnesses. Id. The parties may also
stipulate to evidence. Id.
The presiding officer of the board is authorized to administer oaths
to witnesses and is required to issue subpoenas for witnesses and for the
production of documents as the board or teacher “may designate.” Id.
§ 279.16(2). If a subpoenaed witness refuses to attend the hearing or if
the witness appears and refuses to testify or produce documents
requested by a subpoena duces tecum, the board must report the matter
to the district court. Id. § 279.16(3). On receipt of the report, the district
court is required to resolve the matter as if it occurred in a proceeding
before the court. Id.
IV. Production of Documents.
We first consider the issue of whether or not the district court
abused its discretion by ordering the superintendent to produce the
documents described in fifty-two of the seventy-five categories of
production. We begin our resolution of this issue by examining the
legislature’s intent with regard to a teacher’s ability to compel discovery
of documents and information prior to the hearing. See Ayers v. Straight,
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422 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1988) (stating that “[i]n interpreting statutes,
our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature”). Our goal is to determine whether the legislature intended a
teacher to obtain documents in the course of a termination proceeding in
the manner pursued by Gianforte.
The preceding overview of the statutory framework governing the
process of terminating the contract of a teacher reveals the legislature
only provided the teacher with two opportunities to formally obtain
documents and information prior to the hearing. First, the teacher’s
complete personnel file of employment with the school district, including
all periodic evaluations, must be made available to the teacher during
the proceeding. Iowa Code § 279.15(2). Second, the teacher is entitled to
receive all documentation expected to be presented to the board by the
superintendent at the hearing in support of the recommendation to
terminate the contract. Id. No statutory provision specifically permits
the teacher to discover or obtain other documents prior to the hearing.
While the documents and information made available under the
statute to a teacher prior to the hearing may generally be adequate for
the teacher to successfully argue against a recommendation of
termination at a private hearing, we have recognized that additional
documents and information may be needed in some cases to enable a
teacher to conduct an adequate defense. See Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 293
N.W.2d 221, 225 (Iowa 1980) (recognizing the legislative purpose of
prehearing disclosure of information described in the statute is to help
facilitate prehearing preparation and enable the parties to better present
their cases). For example, we have held that the evaluations of other
teachers in the school system may be obtained by a teacher so the board
can compare the performance of the teacher with the performances of
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other teachers. In re Gillespie, 348 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Iowa 1984). We
have also held that transcripts of students scheduled to testify against
the teacher may be obtained by the teacher to permit the teacher to
challenge the credibility of the students by suggesting the students were
motivated to testify against the teacher due to low grades given to the
students by the teacher. Id. These examples recognize the statute does
not prohibit production of documents that are reasonably necessary for
the teacher’s defense against a recommendation of termination.
Although the statute does not describe a method for the teacher to
obtain or discover additional documents prior to the hearing, the statute
does allow the teacher to request the board to issue a subpoena to secure
the presence of a witness at the hearing and for the witness to produce
documents designated by the teacher.1 While Gianforte argues the
statutory process to subpoena a witness permits a teacher to request
documents from the superintendent in addition to those described in the
statute, the superintendent generally argues that the legislature could
not have intended for the subpoena process to operate in such a way
because all documents expected to be presented at the hearing are
required to be exchanged under the statute prior to the hearing. At a
minimum, the superintendent argues, the statute does not permit a
teacher to request the issuance of a subpoena for the production of
documents after the three-day deadline for disclosure of documents. The
1The statute does not specifically permit a teacher to use the subpoena power of
the board to obtain documents prior to the hearing. Instead, the statute describes the
use of the subpoena as a means to secure the appearance of witnesses at the hearing
and the production of documents by witnesses. See Iowa Code § 279.16(1) (describing
the participants at a hearing, including “witnesses for the parties”); id. § 279.16(2)
(authorizing the board to administer oaths and cause subpoenas to be issued for “such
witnesses” and for the production of documents); id. § 279.16(3) (describing procedure
when a subpoenaed witness “refuses to attend” or “appears and refuses” to produce
documents).
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superintendent asserts that allowing the teacher to seek additional
documents by subpoena beyond the three-day deadline is inconsistent
with the legislature’s clear language; otherwise, the teacher could easily
circumvent the unequivocally written statutory deadline in any case.
In Smith, we observed the role of the board and the court in
deciding if evidence not included in the prehearing exchange of
information could nevertheless be accepted at the hearing. 293 N.W.2d
at 225. In doing so, we held the board properly accepted testimony from
a rebuttal witness who was not disclosed in the superintendent’s
prehearing list of witnesses. Id. We recognized the exchange-of-
information deadline serves to provide a fair hearing by eliminating
surprise at the hearing and facilitating advance preparation. Yet, we also
observed the deadline should not operate to broadly exclude undisclosed
rebuttal witnesses at the hearing because a party cannot be expected to
disclose information in advance of the hearing that was not known at the
time of the deadline. Id. Thus, we found the legislature only intended
the witness-list requirement to limit testimony presented during a party’s
case in chief, but not rebuttal. Id. Clearly, the pretrial disclosure
deadlines have meaning and may preclude the presentation of
undisclosed witnesses at the hearing. However, Smith reveals the
deadlines must be applied consistent with the statutory goals of a fair
and timely hearing.
The approach we took in Smith in response to undisclosed
witnesses is compatible with allowing a party to present undisclosed
documents not included in the prehearing exchange of information. As
with undisclosed witnesses, undisclosed documents may be accepted at
the hearing when doing so does not offend the purposes of the
requirement for the documents to be exchanged. Accordingly, we reject
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the superintendent’s argument that the statutory exchange-of-
information process precludes a teacher from seeking undisclosed
documents from a superintendent by means of a subpoena. Instead,
when the board issues a subpoena to a superintendent to produce
undisclosed documents designated by the teacher, the superintendent is
given the choice to comply with the subpoena or refuse to comply.
Compliance will allow the hearing to proceed as scheduled, yet permit
the superintendent to ask the board to reject the documents if the
purposes of the requirements for pretrial disclosure are adversely
impacted. Refusal to produce the documents transfers the matter to the
district court and will likely delay the hearing until the dispute is
resolved by the court.2
The district court intervenes in a termination proceeding only when
the subpoenaed witness fails to attend the hearing or, as in this case,
refuses to produce the designated documents. Iowa Code § 279.16(3).
When a subpoenaed witness refuses to produce the designated
document, the issue turns to the reasons for the refusal, including
noncompliance with the statutory disclosure deadlines. Consistent with
our approach in Smith, the district court must not only consider a
teacher’s need for the documents and the reasonableness of the request,
but also the ability of the board or the superintendent to timely produce
the documents. A subpoena for the production of documents not
included in the pretrial exchange of information is compatible with the
2Nothing in the statute prevents the parties from engaging in voluntary discovery
in a reasonable manner to enable the statute to operate to provide a fair and prompt
private hearing. The process of adjudicating disputes between parties in a fair manner
is best served when the parties voluntarily pursue discovery in a reasonable,
cooperative manner. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.517(5) (recognizing requirement of parties in
civil litigation to make a good-faith effort to resolve discovery disputes). This approach
is especially appropriate in teacher-termination proceedings, where the stakes can be
high, but the time to prepare for the hearing is very limited.
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statutory framework when the documents requested are necessary for
the teacher to defend against the termination recommendation and are
otherwise discoverable, but only if the board or the superintendent can
comply with the subpoena consistent with the statutory goal of a prompt
hearing.
In this case, the superintendent argues the directive in the
subpoena to produce the seventy-five categories of documents was overly
burdensome. He also argues he was not provided a reasonable time for
compliance. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1701(4)(d)(1) (requiring court to quash
a subpoena failing to allow a reasonable time for compliance).
In ordering the superintendent to produce the bulk of the
requested documents, the district court focused narrowly on the reasons
the teacher wanted to examine each category of documents and basically
ordered the production of those documents that could potentially be
helpful to the teacher in the preparation of his case. While the
prehearing production of documents must be consistent with the goal of
providing a teacher with a fair opportunity to challenge the termination
recommendation and present a defense, this goal cannot be pursued to
the exclusion of the other legislative goal of a prompt, informal and
summary hearing. The termination process must not become mired in
discovery expeditions, or otherwise slowed by the parties’ prehearing
conduct, inconsistent with the intended objectives of the legislature.
We conclude the district court abused its discretion in this case to
order production of documents by failing to balance the legislative
directive for a prompt, informal and summary hearing with the teacher’s
right to a fair hearing. Gianforte clearly failed to show he was attempting
to obtain undisclosed documents while simultaneously respecting the
statutory intent for a prompt, informal, and summary hearing. Even
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though some of the requests for documents may have related to relevant
information, the timing and volume of the request, as well as the
inclusion of requests for irrelevant documents, revealed the request was
inconsistent with the statutory timeline for a hearing. This conclusion is
supported by the circumstances presented in this case.
Gianforte was provided approximately six weeks to prepare for his
hearing. He was timely provided with the documents and information
required under the statute to prepare for the hearing. Yet, he did not
engage in any informal discovery of additional documents during the
course of the proceedings. He made no claim the superintendent refused
to voluntarily produce the specific documents he needed to prepare for
the hearing.
Instead, Gianforte essentially waited until the eve of the
rescheduled hearing to request thousands of additional documents as
part of a broad, sweeping discovery expedition. The production request
left the superintendent with little or no opportunity to timely produce the
documents, to sort through the specific requests with counsel to
determine the nature and scope of the documents requested, or to
formulate objections and other responses. The last minute production
request virtually assured Gianforte of another delay in the hearing.
In the end, Gianforte effectively hijacked the termination process
and imposed delays unrelated to the need to defend against the
recommendation. Considering these circumstances, we conclude the
district court abused its discretion to order the production of additional
documents. The district court should have quashed the subpoena
issued to the superintendent by the presiding officer of the board.
Accordingly, we quash the subpoena and remand the case to the school
board to proceed with a prompt hearing. On remand, the teacher shall
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not be precluded from requesting a new subpoena for the production of
documents in a manner consistent with this opinion.
V. Interrogatories to School Board Members.
We next turn to the issue of whether the district court abused its
discretion by ordering the board members to answer an interrogatory
propounded by the teacher. The district court is only authorized to
intervene in a teacher termination proceeding when a witness fails to
comply with a subpoena. Iowa Code § 279.16(3). There is no additional
authority for the district court to order a witness to respond to
interrogatories. See id. Furthermore, the district court’s authority to
resolve disputes over the refusal of a witness to comply with a subpoena
does not imply authority to order discovery through interrogatories. See
In re Melodie L., 591 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1999) (holding that, when a court
exercises judicial authority pursuant to a statute, such authority “must
be expressly provided or exist by plain implication. . . . [The exercised
authority] must be necessary and essential to carry out the purposes of
the statute.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the district court abused
its discretion to resolve witness disputes by ordering discovery not
permitted under the statute. See Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 796. Yet, this
conclusion does not mean a teacher in a termination proceeding is not
protected from claims of bias or prejudice.
Our law establishes a presumption that board members acting as
adjudicators are objective. Bd. of Dirs. v. Justmann, 476 N.W.2d 335,
340 (Iowa 1991). This general presumption of objectivity prevails against
assertions of bias and prejudice absent “direct, compelling evidence to
the contrary.” Id. The presumption may be overcome by evidence that a
fair hearing before the board is not possible due to such circumstances
as prejudgment voting or when board members act as investigators in
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the absence of a subsequent evidentiary hearing. See Wedergren v. Bd.
of Dirs., 307 N.W.2d 12, 17–18 (Iowa 1981); Keith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 262
N.W.2d 249, 258–61 (Iowa 1978).
Although chapter 279 does not provide a procedure by which a
teacher may raise claims of bias or prejudice, school board members are
quasi-judicial officers when exercising their statutory duty to adjudicate
teacher-termination proceedings. Courtright v. Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
203 Iowa 26, 30, 212 N.W. 368, 370 (1927). Generally, presiding judges
and judicial officers are immune from testifying. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.605
(prohibiting presiding judges from testifying as witnesses); see also State
v. Gardner, 661 N.W.2d 116, 117–18 (Iowa 2003) (“This rule [prohibiting
judges from testifying] is violated whenever the judge functions as a
witness, even though the judge may not actually take the stand to
testify.”). By analogy, the same rule of quasi-judicial immunity would
apply to written questions propounded to board members acting as
quasi-judicial officers: as with testimony, interrogatories involve answers
to questions under oath. Board members, like judges, must generally be
immune from providing any form of testimony at hearings.
Nevertheless, this immunity does not prevent claims of board
member bias or prejudice from being raised and addressed. Board
members are subject to “ ‘the common-law rule of disqualification
applicable to judges.’ ” Keith, 262 N.W.2d at 261 (quoting 1 Am. Jur. 2d
Administrative Law § 63 (now substantially found at 2 Am. Jur. 2d
Administrative Law § 38 (2004))) (further holding common-law rule
“ ‘extends to every tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions’ ”). We have generally described this rule as follows:
Any board member who harbors prejudice or predilection
should recuse himself or herself. Board members possessing
personal knowledge must place it aside or, if they are unable
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to do so, themselves step aside. The board must be mindful
that the decision turns on its own finding of the presence or
absence of qualifications and not on the recommendation of
an administrator or prior employer—although these may of
course be received and considered.
Bishop v. Keystone Area Educ. Agency No. 1, 275 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa
1979). As with judges, recusal by board members will depend on the
remoteness of the interest and the extent or degree of the interest. See
State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Iowa 1994). Yet, the process does
not rest entirely with the adjudicator. In the event board members do
not disqualify themselves on their own, a party is permitted to raise the
issue by motion on the record. See State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324
(Iowa 1976). This record provides a means for judicial review of the claim
of bias or prejudice.
The recusal and disqualification process reveals teachers are
adequately protected from fears of bias or prejudice by board members
just as litigants in civil proceedings are protected from fears of judicial
bias or prejudice. These procedures justify the school board’s general
immunity from testifying or answering interrogatories, protect teachers
from bias and prejudice, and support the limited role of the district court
when intervening in termination proceedings.
VI. Conclusion.
We reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case
to the school board to proceed with the termination hearing without
further delay and without the production of additional documents
pursuant to the subpoena issued to the superintendent.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who takes no part.