IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 35 / 05-0375
Filed November 9, 2007
CHARMAINE HUNTER,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF DES MOINES MUNICIPAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, RUSSELL UNDERWOOD,
THERESA TAYLOR and TANGELA WEISS,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas E.
Staskal, Judge.
Tenant and landlord seek further review in an action involving a
claim and counterclaim for breach of a lease. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Robert A. Wright, Jr. of Wright & Wright, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Michael F. Kelley, Des Moines, for appellees.
2
CADY, Justice.
This appeal is a culmination of a long and complex dispute
between a landlord and a tenant. It began as an eviction action and
eventually returned to district court as a claim and counterclaim for
damages and other relief. The district court granted judgment for the
landlord. The tenant appealed, and we transferred the case to the court
of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district
court and remanded the case for a determination of damages and entry
of judgment for the tenant. On our review, we vacate the decision of the
court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Charmaine Hunter leased a house in Des Moines from the
Des Moines Municipal Housing Agency (DMMHA). The DMMHA is a state
agency that works in conjunction with the federal government to provide
low-income housing for qualifying tenants. The term of the lease was for
thirty days, beginning on November 1, 1988. The lease, however,
automatically renewed for successive one-month terms. Among other
terms, the lease required Hunter to accurately report her income and
family composition each year and did not allow any unauthorized person
to live in the dwelling unit. The DMMHA used this information to
determine the amount of Hunter’s rent and her continued eligibility for
assisted housing, as well as to ensure the size of the dwelling was
appropriate for the number of residents. Based on the information
Hunter submitted, monthly rent was set at $12.
Hunter was permitted under the rental agreement to terminate the
lease with fifteen days’ notice. The DMMHA, however, was only
permitted to terminate or refuse to renew the lease if the tenant
committed a serious or repeated violation of material terms of the lease.
3
Such a violation specifically included willful misstatement or
concealment of information, as well as a failure to furnish accurate
income and family composition information. The DMMHA was required
to give thirty days’ written notice of termination of the lease when based
on grounds other than nonpayment of rent. The lease provided for a
grievance procedure to address disputes between the parties, including
disputes over termination of the lease.
Hunter resided in the dwelling for the next twelve years. She
consistently reported only a modest amount of income to the DMMHA,
largely in the form of public assistance and social security. She did not
report any unauthorized persons living in the dwelling.
In 2001, DMMHA discovered an individual named Leo Clark had
been living in the dwelling occupied by Hunter for numerous years.
Clark was not approved to reside in the house. Moreover, Clark and
Hunter had received substantial gambling winnings from Prairie
Meadows Racetrack and Casino as regular patrons at the casino. None
of this information was disclosed to DMMHA. 1
Armed with this undisclosed information, the DMMHA served
Hunter on April 27, 2001, with a “notice of lease termination” pursuant
to Iowa Code section 562A.34(3). The notice requested Hunter to vacate
the premises on or before May 31, 2001, based on numerous lease
violations, including her alleged failure to accurately report income and
permitting an unauthorized person to live with her.
1In 1996, Hunter filed a civil rights action against a Des Moines police officer. A
trial was held in 2001. Clark testified in deposition and at trial that he had been living
with Hunter since 1996. Hunter also testified at trial that Clark lived at her house.
Additionally, significant gambling winnings were disclosed. For example, records at
Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino for 1999 indicated Clark and Hunter recorded
winnings of over $75,000 each. While both individuals had significant losses as well,
their winnings apparently exceeded their wagers by several thousands of dollars.
4
Hunter pursued her rights under the lease to contest the
termination by requesting a grievance hearing. On May 24, 2001, a
hearing officer upheld the decision by the DMMHA to terminate the lease.
The hearing officer found Clark was living in the dwelling in violation of
the lease, and both Clark and Hunter failed to report income to DMMHA
in violation of the lease.
Hunter refused to vacate the premises and sought judicial review
of the decision of the hearing officer in federal district court. During this
time the DMMHA served Hunter with a three-day notice to quit and
initiated a forcible entry and detainer action in state small claims court.
This proceeding was stayed pending the judicial review proceeding in
federal court.
On July 23, 2001, the federal district court upheld the decision of
the hearing officer. Hunter did not appeal this decision. On August 7,
2001, the small claims court granted judgment for the DMMHA in the
forcible entry and detainer action. Hunter appealed the small claims
decision to district court. On October 2, 2001, the district court reversed
the small claims decision and dismissed the forcible entry and detainer
petition. It held the action was required to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the DMMHA had failed to follow the procedures in
Iowa Code section 562A.27(1), which the district court found required
the DMMHA to provide Hunter with a notice to cure the alleged
violations. 2
2Although Hunter originally did not appeal the federal district court decision
against her, after the state district court ruled a notice to cure was required, Hunter
made several motions in federal court requesting relief from the federal district court’s
decision against her. These attempts, and their appeals, ultimately proved
unsuccessful. See Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468 (8th Cir. 2004).
5
The DMMHA then served Hunter with a “notice of
termination of month-to-month tenancy and nonrenewal of lease term”
on January 16, 2002, pursuant to Iowa Code section 562A.34(2). The
notice informed Hunter the lease would terminate on February 28, 2002,
based on the prior grounds of failing to accurately report her income and
permitting Clark to live in the house. It did not include a notice to cure
under section 562A.27(1), and Hunter again contested the termination
through a grievance hearing. The grievance hearing officer upheld the
DMMHA’s decision to terminate the lease and found the DMMHA did not
have to provide Hunter with a notice to cure because Hunter’s breaches
were not amenable to cure.
Hunter again refused to vacate the house, and the DMHHA served
Hunter with a three-day notice to quit and brought another forcible entry
and detainer action against her. The district court, however, granted
Hunter’s motion to dismiss the action based on the DMMHA’s failure to
give Hunter a notice to cure.
Hunter then filed an action against the DMMHA, and others, for
breach of contract and abuse of process. Hunter sought damages,
injunctive relief, and attorney fees based on the conduct of DMMHA in
terminating the lease and bringing the forcible entry and detainer action
without first providing a notice to cure. DMMHA filed a counterclaim
against Hunter for breach of contract. It sought to recover the amount of
rent Hunter would have been required to pay over the years if she had
disclosed the information as required under the lease.
Hunter and the DMMHA both moved for summary judgment. The
claim for summary judgment by Hunter was largely predicated on her
position that the DMMHA was required to provide her with a notice to
cure before terminating her lease and utilizing the court system to
6
remove her from the premises. She asserted the district court rulings
in the FED actions established her claim that notice to cure was required
as a matter of law, and the parties were precluded from relitigating the
notice-to-cure issue under the doctrine of res judiciata. The DMMHA
claimed it was not required to provide the notice, and the two prior
administrative grievance proceedings between the parties conclusively
established Hunter failed to disclose the required information, resulting
in its damages of $20,294. Hunter submitted an affidavit in which she
denied any gambling income and indicated that Clark was only in her
house as a paid caretaker.
The district court granted summary judgment for the DMMHA and
dismissed Hunter’s claims as a matter of law. It determined Hunter
could not recover on her claim for breach of contract without first
establishing she had performed all the terms under the lease. The
district court determined Hunter could not meet this predicate to
recovery because the prior grievance proceedings between the parties
conclusively established she failed to disclose required information.
Accordingly, the district court found the doctrine of issue preclusion
prohibited relitigation of the issue. Additionally, the district court found
DMMHA was not required to give Hunter a notice to cure under the
statute. 3 This conclusion also supported the determination by the
3The district court rejected Hunter’s claim that the prior FED decisions by the
district court (holding the law required the DMMHA to give a notice to cure) were
binding on the parties in this action under the doctrine of res judicata. The district
court held it was free to revisit rulings by another district court judge. However, the
district court did apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to preclude relitigation of the
factual findings made in the administrative proceedings that Hunter failed to disclose
the required information. The DMMHA never argued issue preclusion also applied to
preclude relitigation of the decision in the second administrative hearing that notice to
cure was not required to be given. Additionally, the DMMHA never raised any such
issue on appeal.
7
district court that Hunter could not establish her abuse-of-process
claim as a matter of law. The district court additionally found Hunter
failed to produce any evidence of an improper purpose by the DMMHA in
pursuing the forcible entry and detainer action.
After the district court ruled on Hunter’s claims, the parties
entered into a stipulation regarding the DMMHA’s breach-of-contract
claim. Among other things, the stipulation stated the DMMHA had
calculated Hunter owed them over $20,000 in past rent. Relying on its
previous findings during summary judgment and on the stipulated facts,
the district court entered judgment for the DMMHA on its counterclaim,
awarding the DMMHA $20,294 in damages.
Hunter appealed the decision of the district court, and we
transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for a
determination of damages for Hunter. Although it agreed with the
district court that there was no evidence of an improper purpose to
support the claim for abuse of process, it determined Hunter was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law in the breach-of-contract claim based
upon its holding that the findings made in the prior grievance decisions
involving the parties could not be used in this action to establish that
Hunter failed to perform her obligations under the lease. Consequently,
the court of appeals found the evidence set forth in Hunter’s affidavit was
sufficient to support her breach-of-contract claim. The court of appeals
held the findings from the grievance proceedings that the DMMHA relied
upon to support its claim had no preclusive effect because of the absence
of a notice to cure. It also found that federal law prohibited any
preclusive effect of the grievance hearings, and that the administrative
proceedings could not otherwise support a claim of issue preclusion.
8
Additionally, the court of appeals found the doctrine of issue
preclusion precluded the district court in this action from deciding that
the notice to cure was not required to be given by the DMMHA, after two
previous district court decisions determined the notice was required to be
given. Both parties sought further review.
II. Issues and Standard of Review.
The questions now on further review were initially brought before
the district court on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. We
review rulings on motions for summary judgment for the correction of
errors at law. See Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d 836, 840–
41 (Iowa 2005). Summary judgment is not appropriate unless “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The moving party
has the burden to establish it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Clinkscales, 697 N.W.2d at 841.
III. Hunter’s Breach-of-Contract Claim.
The breach-of-contract claim by Hunter is premised on the
argument that the DMMHA was required to provide a notice to cure
under Iowa Code section 562A.27(1) before terminating the lease. The
district court in this proceeding determined the statute did not require a
notice to cure, while the district court in the prior FED decisions held a
notice to cure was required. The court of appeals determined the prior
FED decisions were res judicata, which precluded the DMMHA from
asserting in this proceeding that it was not required to provide a notice to
cure under section 562A.27(1).
9
Issue preclusion generally applies when four elements are
present:
“(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must
have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the
issue must have been material and relevant to the
disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination
made of the issue in the prior action must have been
necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.”
Grant v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2006)
(citation omitted). The rule serves two important goals of providing
fairness to the successful party in the first case and promoting efficient
use of court resources by prohibiting repeated litigation over the same
issue. State ex rel. Casas v. Fellmar, 521 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Iowa
1994) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct.
645, 649, 58 L.Ed. 552, 559 (1979)). The court of appeals applied this
general rule to conclude that the district court in this action was
precluded from relitigating the prior rule of law enunciated by the district
court in the FED litigation that the DMMHA was required to provide
Hunter with a notice to cure.
Even when the requirements of the general issue preclusion rule
are present, courts are required to consider if special circumstances exist
that make it inequitable or inappropriate to prevent relitigation of the
issue previously determined in the prior action. 4 Nat’l R.R. Passenger
4Basedon the arguments of the parties, the relevant prior order under the issue-
preclusion analysis is the district court ruling in the FED action. Hunter claimed on
appeal that the administrative rulings cannot serve as a basis for issue preclusion, and
the only relevant prior actions for the purposes of applying res judicata to the issue of
notice are the two prior FED proceedings. The DMMHA made no claim on appeal that
the second administrative ruling, holding notice to cure was not required under the
landlord-tenant statute, precluded relitigation in this issue on res judicata grounds.
However, even if both administrative proceedings are considered in the res judicata
analysis (including the second administrative proceeding that decided a notice to cure
was not required to be given), the last district court ruling becomes the important prior
action in the analysis because it was the last prior action to decide the notice-to-cure
issue. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 15. Thus, the fighting issue,
10
Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 2002);
Grant, 722 N.W.2d at 174 (applying third exception to collateral estoppel
doctrine). The exceptions share the same goal of fairness as the general
rule and have been summarized in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 28 (1982). The second of five recognized exceptions
provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a
subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in
the following circumstances:
....
2. The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions
involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account of an
intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise avoid inequitable administration of the laws . . . .
We turn to the first alternative of the second exception that permits
relitigation when “[t]he issue is one of law” and “the two actions involve
claims that are substantially unrelated.” We have not previously
considered the application of this exception. 5
regardless of the path followed to reach the question, is whether special circumstances
exist that make it inequitable or inappropriate to prohibit relitigation of the notice-to-
cure issue.
5We recognize all five exceptions reflect a policy that the doctrine of “issue
preclusion is not so unyielding that it must invariably be applied, even in the face of
strong competing considerations.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. g.
Moreover, the exceptions share some common considerations, which we have
considered in the past. For example, in Garner v. Hartford Insurance Accident &
Indemnification Co., 659 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Iowa 2003), we considered whether the issue
presented in the second action was foreseeable at the time of the first action in the
context of the fifth exception that permits relitigation when there is a “clear and
convincing need for a new determination of the issue.” See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 28(5). While foreseeability can also be a consideration under the first
alternative of the second exception, we nevertheless have never previously considered
this particular exception. We have considered and applied, however, the second
alternative of the second exception that permits relitigation when “the issue is one of
the law” and “a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an
11
This exception was first discussed by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66, 69
L. Ed. 262 (1924). In that case, the Court observed that the doctrine of
res judicata does not apply to “unmixed questions of law.” Id. at 242, 45
S. Ct. at 67, 69 L. Ed. at 264. That is, when a court has enunciated a
rule of law in deciding a case between two parties, the same parties are
not “estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise,” in a subsequent
action between them. Id. Yet, “a fact, question or right distinctly
adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent
action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous
view or by an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Court has subsequently acknowledged the uncertainty that
can be presented in the application of this exception, but has attempted
to elucidate the exception through a two-step process. United States v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 104 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. Ed. 2d 388
(1984); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, reporter’s note
to cmt. b. (“The distinction suggested in the Moser case, no matter how
formulated, is difficult of application.”). First, a court must determine if
an “issue of fact” or an “issue of law” is sought to be relitigated. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 464 U.S. at 171, 104 S. Ct. at 579, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 393.
Second, a court must decide whether the “issue of law” is presented “in a
successive case that is so unrelated to the prior case that relitigation of
the issue is warranted.” Id. Yet, even if the issue is one of law, estoppel
applies to prevent relitigation “[w]hen the claims in the two separate
actions between the same parties are the same or are closely related.” Id.
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. b)).
intervening change in applicable legal context.” State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d 372,
375 (Iowa 1983).
12
On one hand, this approach signals a rather straightforward
rule that collateral estoppel ordinarily applies when two cases present
the same legal issue. See 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4425, at 658 (1981)
[hereinafter Charles Alan Wright]. On the other hand, the approach
“sounds a note of caution where the issue involved is the choice or
formulation of the governing rule of law.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 288
F.3d at 530. Thus, “[w]here the same legal issue is presented in two
suits but the second suit calls for application of the previously selected
rule of law in a significantly different context, it may be inappropriate to
preclude a party from contending that the governing rule of law applied
in the first was erroneously chosen or formulated.” Id. The rationale for
this rule is explained in comment b to section 28 of Restatement (Second)
of Judgments. When claims between the same parties are closely
related, preclusion applies to issues that were litigated in the first action
because it is unfair to the “winning party and an unnecessary burden on
the courts.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. b. Yet,
if the claims in the two actions are substantially unrelated,
the more flexible principle of stare decisis is sufficient to
protect the parties and the court from unnecessary burdens.
The rule of law declared in an action between two parties
should not be binding on them for all time, especially as to
claims arising after the first proceeding has been concluded,
when other litigants are free to urge that the rule should be
rejected. Such preclusion might unduly delay needed
changes in the law and might deprive a litigant of a right
that the court was prepared to recognize for other litigants in
the same position.
Id.
The decision “[w]hether the context in which the legal issue is
presented in the second suit is sufficiently unrelated to that in the first to
counsel against preclusion . . . should be made with reference to the
13
consequences of preclusions for the precluded party and the
administration of justice.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 288 F.3d at 530.
One reason a different context can preclude relitigation is that it “may
make it more likely that the second suit and the stake there at issue
were not foreseeable at the time of the first suit.” Id.; see Charles Alan
Wright, at 244. 6
Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that the
question whether a statute requires a landlord to give a notice to cure
before terminating a month-to-month tenancy is one of law. The district
court previously decided the issue in the context of whether it had
jurisdiction or authority to hear an FED action. The district court did
not distinctly adjudge a “fact, question or right” between the parties, but
instead enunciated a rule of law in the course of deciding its jurisdiction
to adjudicate the rights of the parties.
In this case, the same legal issue is presented as in the prior case
between the parties, but in an entirely different context. Here, the issue
is presented in the course of deciding whether a tenant is entitled to
damages from a landlord for failing to provide a notice to cure under
claims of abuse of process and breach of contract. These claims are
unrelated to a claim to remove a tenant from leased property.
6We recognize the fifth exception to the general rule of issue preclusion
specifically permits relitigation when there is a “clear and convincing need for a new
determination . . . because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial
action that the issue would arise in the context of the subsequent action.” Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(b); see Garner, 659 N.W.2d at 204. This stand-alone
exception is compatible with the second exception, but the second exception extends
beyond the foreseeability that the issue would be presented in the second action and
focuses on the fairness of precluding a party from challenging a rule of law. Our failure
to apply the fifth exception to permit relitigation in Garner does not impact our analysis
of the application of the second exception to the circumstances of this case.
14
It is unlikely the district court in the first action foresaw
that the rule of law would be applied to a damage claim in a second
lawsuit, and it is equally unlikely a second lawsuit was considered when
an appellate court denied the DMMHA’s request for discretionary review
of the legal ruling. The different contexts of the two cases make it fair to
permit the DMMHA to challenge the legal precept previously established
by the district court in the first case. Significantly, the DMMHA is not
challenging the application of the law to the circumstances of the first
case, but the rule of law itself. The reporter’s notes to the Restatement
exception provide:
Subsection (2) recognizes . . . that a rule of law
declared in a proceeding between two litigants is not binding
on them for all time with respect to all claims that may arise
between them . . . where, for example, a court deciding a
case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a
subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped
from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the
parties are the same in both cases.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, reporter’s note to cmt. b.
Under the circumstances of this case, the DMMHA should not be
“estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise.” Id. The
circumstances fall within the exception and warrant relitigation. The
common question is purely one of law, and the two claims, while
factually related, are based upon different demands. Clearly, the
illustrations and examples provided by the Restatement to support
relitigation under the exception are more closely aligned to the facts of
this case than the provided examples of situations that fall outside of the
exception. See generally id. cmt. b & rptrs. ns.
As a result, the findings by the district court in the prior FED
actions are not binding on this proceeding. Moreover, there is nothing
15
else that prohibits us on further review from determining whether a
notice to cure was required to be given. The issue has been argued and
appealed throughout these proceedings. Therefore, we proceed to
analyze whether the DMMHA was required to provide a notice to cure
under section 562A.27(1) of the Iowa Code.
We begin by recognizing the termination of the lease in this case
was governed by multiple sources—not just the Iowa Code. The rental
agreement, federal law, and our state law all address the subject of
termination of the lease. Hunter’s claim in this case, of course, is that
the DMMHA breached the lease by failing to provide a notice to cure
pursuant to section 562A.27(1) of Iowa’s Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (IURLTA). See generally Russell E. Lovell II, The Iowa
Uniform Residential Landlord & Tenant Act & the Iowa Mobile Home Parks
Residential Landlord & Tenant Act, 31 Drake L. Rev. 253 (1981)
[hereinafter Lovell]. While the IURLTA was not specifically enacted to
govern federally subsidized low-income housing, it does not exclude such
leases from its reach. See Iowa Code § 562A.5 (stating the scope and
jurisdiction of chapter 562A). Instead, the IURLTA was made applicable
“to rental agreements entered . . . after January 1, 1979.” Id. § 562A.37.
Consequently, the lease between the DMMHA and Hunter must comply
with the IURLTA’s provisions. As a result, the DMMHA would be
required to give a notice if required under the IURLTA.
The IURLTA imposes certain requirements for the termination of a
residential lease, generally depending on the type of tenancy and the
reasons and timing of the termination. See Lovell, 31 Drake L. Rev. at
329–37 (discussing termination under the IURLTA). One set of rules
requires written notice of termination for periodic tenancies. For
example, if the tenancy is month-to-month, the landlord or tenant is
16
required to give written notice to the other at least thirty days prior
to the end of the monthly tenancy. Iowa Code § 562.34(2).
A separate set of rules govern the termination of a lease by a
landlord prior to the termination date in the lease agreement for
noncompliance with the lease terms. See id. §§ 562A.27–.27A; see also
id. § 562A.21 (stating the general and similar rules tenants must follow
when terminating a lease because of landlord noncompliance). Section
562A.27(1) is one of these rules. It allows the landlord to terminate the
lease agreement before its stated termination date when there “is a
material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement.” Id.
§ 562A.27(1). In order to pursue this special remedy, the landlord must
follow the statutory procedure. This procedure requires the landlord to
“deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omission
constituting the breach” and additionally provide the tenant with a notice
to cure, which must allow the tenant seven days to cure the breach. Id.
If the breach is not cured by that date, the lease terminates as stated in
the notice. Id. The lease does not terminate if the breach is cured within
seven days. Id. However, if a similar breach recurs within six months,
then the landlord may terminate the lease with seven days’ notice. Id.
Thus, the law creates a special remedy because it permits the landlord to
terminate a tenancy before the end of the period of possession agreed
under the lease or established by operation of law. At the same time, the
law permits the tenant to ameliorate the harshness of the landlord’s
remedial action by allowing the tenant to stop the termination by curing
the breach that gave rise to the exercise of the remedy by the landlord.
In addition to the statutory rules for terminating a lease, the
IURLTA permits the landlord and tenant to impose their own terms if not
prohibited by the IURLTA or any other law. Id. § 562A.9(1). Thus, the
17
terms of a lease must also be examined to determine if the
landlord and tenant have agreed to terms in addition to those provided
by law. We begin by first examining whether the IURLTA required the
DMMHA to give a notice to cure.
The IURLTA rules governing the termination of a month-to-month
tenancy at the end of the tenancy do not include a notice to cure. Unlike
the termination of a lease prior to the end of the tenancy, the tenant has
nothing to cure when a landlord decides to end a month-to-month
tenancy at the conclusion of the tenancy period. A notice to cure is only
required to be given by the landlord in order to terminate a tenancy prior
to the end of the period of occupancy, when a tenant violates a term of
the lease, to give the tenant an opportunity to remain in the dwelling
until the end of the tenancy period by remedying the breach. See id.
§ 562A.27(1) (tenancy does not terminate if tenant adequately remedies
breach before time established by landlord). A notice to cure is not
required under the IURLTA when a landlord seeks to terminate a tenancy
at the end of a tenancy period. In this case, the DMMHA would only
need to invoke the special self-help termination remedy and include the
notice to cure found in section 562A.27(1) if it sought to terminate
Hunter’s lease prior to the termination date without thirty days’ notice,
or the notice was otherwise required under the terms of the lease. 7 See
Lovell, 31 Drake L. Rev. at 330 (“The basic self-help termination remedy
[found in Iowa Code section 562A.21 (for tenants) and section 562A.27
(for landlords)] will seldom be of importance to the tenant who has a
month-to-month tenancy, the most common situation for the residential
7The Iowa legislature recently amended section 562A.27 to permit a municipal
housing agency to terminate a lease with thirty days’ notice when the tenant has
violated federal law without serving a notice to cure. See Iowa Code § 562A.27(5)
(2007).
18
low-income tenant, as he [or the landlord] can always terminate
without cause by giving thirty days notice.”).
The lease agreement in this case clearly created a month-to-month
tenancy. 8 The original term of the lease was thirty days, and the tenancy
automatically renewed for successive monthly terms under the lease
agreement. Consequently, as a month-to-month tenancy, the IURLTA
did not require a notice to cure in the event the landlord desired to
terminate the lease at the end of the tenancy. The IURLTA only required
thirty days’ written notice of termination. Thus, we turn to consider
whether the lease terms imposed a notice-to-cure requirement.
The terms of the lease permitted the DMMHA to terminate the
lease at the end of the tenancy only if the tenant engaged in “serious or
repeated violations of material terms” of the lease. Of course, under the
IURLTA, the parties were permitted to agree to this additional
requirement of termination because it was not prohibited by law. See
Iowa Code § 562A.9(1).
The notices of termination sent by the DMMHA informed Hunter
her lease would terminate thirty days after the current month’s term
ended. The DMMHA’s second notice of termination was specifically
entitled “Notice of Termination of Month to Month Tenancy and
Nonrenewal of Lease Term.” The DMMHA was not attempting to
terminate the lease before the end of the lease period. Moreover, these
notices complied with the IURLTA, as well as with the terms of the lease.
They stated Hunter had violated certain lease terms, which permitted the
8Current federal law states “[t]he lease shall have a twelve month term,” and “the
lease term must be automatically renewed for the same period.” 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(a)(2)(i) (2006). Prior to 2000, however, federal law simply required the lease to
“set forth . . . [t]he term of the lease and provisions for renewal, if any.” 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(a)(1) (1999).
19
landlord to terminate the tenancy with thirty days’ notice. Yet, this
notice was not required under the IURLTA and did not transform the
proceeding into a special remedy under section 562A.27(1). This notice
was derived only from the terms of the lease, and those terms did not
further require a notice to cure.
Thus, under the lease the DMMHA was required to prove
noncompliance in order to terminate Hunter’s lease, even if the DMMHA
simply did not want to renew Hunter’s lease for another month. Yet, the
lease imposed no additional notice-to-cure requirement. Moreover, all
the IURLTA required was for the DMMHA to provide thirty days’ notice of
termination. Id. § 562A.34(2). The notices clearly met these
requirements, and there is nothing to indicate the notice of termination
otherwise breached the lease or was contrary to any federal or state law.
See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l). As a result, Hunter’s claim for breach of
contract must fail. The district court properly granted the DMMHA’s
motion for summary judgment on Hunter’s breach-of-contract claim.
IV. The DMMHA’s Breach-of-Contract Claim.
We next consider the DMMHA’s motion for summary judgment
concerning its breach-of-contract claim. It sought summary judgment
based on factual findings made in the grievance proceedings by two
administrative hearing officers. In these proceedings, Hunter was found
to have violated the terms of the lease agreement. The DMMHA contends
these findings are res judicata and affirmatively establish that Hunter
violated the lease. Hunter claims the doctrine of issue preclusion does
not apply to these findings for several reasons. Chief among her reasons
is the DMMHA failed to provide a notice to cure, and its failure to do so
divested all adjudicative bodies of subject matter jurisdiction so that
their findings are void.
20
Generally, a defect in the notice requirements under section
562A.27(1) “deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear a forcible entry
and detainer action to recover possession of the leased property.” Liberty
Manor v. Rinnels, 487 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1992). Yet, this principle
does not impact this case because the DMMHA was not required to
provide the notice to cure under section 562A.27(1). Thus, even if we
presume this principle applies to the prior administrative and federal
proceedings, the adjudicative bodies in these proceedings had
jurisdiction to hear the issues presented.
Hunter also argues, as the court of appeals determined, that an
exception to the issue-preclusion doctrine applies in this case under our
holding in Grant. 722 N.W.2d at 175. In other words, Hunter argues we
cannot give res judicata effect to the grievance hearing decisions because
the grievance hearing proceedings were not the type of administrative
hearings recognized in Iowa to justify res judicata. Such a conclusion,
however, misinterprets our holding in Grant.
In Grant we were presented with the issue whether the department
of human services could adjudicate a request to correct an assessment of
child abuse after a district court had determined in a prior parallel
proceeding that the child abuse occurred. We recognized an exception to
the application of issue preclusion when “ ‘[a] new determination of the
issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the
allocation of jurisdiction between them,’ ” id. (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 28(3), at 273), and ultimately held that the
department of human services could correct its own assessment.
However, the justification for permitting relitigation under the exception
was based on the clear legislative scheme allocating jurisdiction of the
21
issue to the department of human services. The ruling was narrow
and largely predicated on the special statutory process in place.
Importantly, the decision was not based on “differences in the quality or
extensiveness of the procedures.” Thus, because Hunter relies on “the
differences in the quality and extensiveness” between the procedures of
the prior grievance proceedings and the district court proceeding to
support her claim for relitigation, Grant provides little support.
Our review of procedures available to tenants under a grievance
process reveals they comport with due process and afford a tenant a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the factual issues. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.56. These procedures include the right to be represented by
counsel, the right to present evidence and arguments in support of a
tenant’s complaint, and the right to examine witnesses. See id.
§ 966.56(b). The procedures largely resemble those normally provided in
a court proceeding. Moreover, the decision of a grievance officer is, and
was in this case, subject to review in federal court.
Nevertheless, Hunter points out that the grievance procedure
requires a tenant to first make a showing of entitlement to relief before
the housing agency has the burden to justify its actions. See id.
966.56(e). The requirement for the tenant to make a preliminary
showing does not alter our conviction that any difference in the quality or
extensiveness of the procedures in the grievance proceedings and in the
underlying district court proceeding are not significant. We have not
required identical procedures in determining whether to permit
relitigation of issues, but primarily look to those procedural differences
“likely to cause a different result” or differences that otherwise deprive a
litigant of an opportunity to fully litigate the issues. See Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d 866, 873 (Iowa
22
1996); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4) (relitigation not
precluded if party had a “significantly heavier burden”). There is nothing
in the record in this case to suggest the applicable procedures would
“likely cause a different result” or play any significant role in the
outcome. In fact, the hearing officer in the grievance proceedings in this
case specifically found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
DMMHA established Hunter violated the two provisions in the lease that
are the basis for the DMMHA’s breach-of-contract claim. Thus, the
burden-shifting procedure used in the grievance process ultimately
placed the burden on the DMMHA to establish the violations. As a
result, we see no reason why the grievance decisions should not be
afforded the effect of res judicata. See Pinkerton v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 588
N.W.2d 679, 680 (Iowa 1998) (“A final adjudicatory decision of an
administrative agency is regarded res judicata the same as if it were a
judgment of the court.”).
Finally, Hunter claims federal law does not permit grievance
decisions to be used to affect other court proceedings, such as her
contract action for damages. Federal regulations provide
[a] decision by the hearing officer . . . in favor of the
[DMMHA] or which denies the relief requested by the
complainant in whole or in part shall not constitute a waiver
of, nor affect in any manner whatever, any rights the
complainant may have to a trial de novo or judicial review in
any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in
the matter.
24 C.F.R. § 966.57(c) (emphasis added). While there is very little judicial
authority on the application of this regulation, we question whether it
prohibits a grievance decision from being used to preclude relitigation of
the issues decided. A breach-of-contract action for damages by the
23
DMMHA is not a judicial proceeding “thereafter . . . brought
in the matter.” It is a separate matter.
More importantly, however, even if we assume the federal
regulation intended to preclude any res judicata effect of grievance
decisions, this state is not obligated to follow the pronouncement. It is
our task to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in our courts to administrative decisions or particular types of
administrative decisions, 9 and we are satisfied the doctrine is properly
applied in this case.
We conclude the DMMHA was entitled to summary judgment on its
counterclaim. Hunter violated the lease, and the DMMHA performed the
terms and conditions for termination. The parties stipulated to the
damages, and Hunter provided no evidence to the contrary. We reject all
claims made by Hunter in opposition to summary judgment.
V. Hunter’s Abuse-of-Process Claim.
To prevail on an abuse-of-process claim Hunter must prove, among
other things, the DMMHA used the legal process in an improper or
unauthorized manner. See Wilson v. Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa
1990) (noting the plaintiff must prove three elements to recover on an
abuse-of-process claim). Hunter attempts to do so by emphasizing the
DMMHA’s failure to comply with the holdings of the district court in the
FED actions that required the DMMHA to include a notice to cure in its
notice of termination. We, however, have already concluded these
holdings were not res judicata and the DMMHA did not have to provide
9
Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Iowa 2002) (“The ‘concept of
federalism assumes power, and duty, of independence in interpreting our own organic
law.’ ” (quoting Pool v. Super. Ct., 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984))).
24
the notice to cure under these circumstances. Therefore,
Hunter’s claim does not support this element of abuse of process.
In addition, even if the DMMHA was required to provide the notice
to cure, Hunter must “prove that the [DMMHA] used the legal process
primarily for an impermissible or illegal motive.” Id. Hunter sought to
establish a primary impermissible or illegal motive by evidence that the
DMMHA filed the second FED action without providing a notice to cure
after the district court ruled a notice to cure was required and by
evidence the DMMHA lobbied for legislation during the pendency of the
proceedings to eliminate any notice-to-cure requirement.
We conclude this evidence is insufficient to support the legal
requirement that the DMMHA use the FED process primarily for an
improper or illegal purpose. Without more, a legal dispute over the
correct procedure to follow in pursuing an FED action does little to
establish an improper motive in using the legal system. Even though the
DMMHA was aware of the ruling by the district court that it was required
to include the notice to cure when it sent the second notice of
termination, the DMMHA relied on a different statutory provision for
terminating the lease. Compare Iowa Code § 562A.34(2) (landlord may
terminate month-to-month tenancy by giving thirty days’ written notice)
with Iowa Code § 562A.34(3) (landlord may bring action for possession if
tenant remains in possession after expiration of the lease term).
Therefore, the DMMHA did not act with disregard for the district court’s
decision by replicating its prior action. Similarly, a desire to lobby for a
legislative change or clarification in the legal requirements to use the
court system does not establish a primary illegal motive for using the
legal system. As a result, we find the district court properly granted the
25
DMMHA’s motion for summary judgment regarding Hunter’s
abuse-of-process claim.
VI. Conclusion.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and affirm the
judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.