IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 93 / 05-1850
Filed October 5, 2007
STEPHEN GRAY and SHELLY
GRAY, Husband and Wife,
Appellants,
vs.
JAMES R. OSBORN, III,
Appellee,
TAMRA RANDALL,
Intervenor-Appellee.
------------------------------------------------
TAMRA RANDALL,
Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN GRAY and
SHELLY GRAY,
Appellants,
JOAN K. PECK and MARJORIE A. THIRKETTLE,
Intervenors-Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, Kristin L.
Hibbs, Judge.
Adjoining land owners seek further review of the decision of the court
of appeals rejecting their claim of an express easement. DECISION OF
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COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Gregory J. Epping of Terpstra, Epping & Willett, Cedar Rapids, for
appellants.
Mark E. Mossman of Mossman & Mossman, L.L.P., Vinton, for
appellees Osborn and Randall.
Vernon P. Squires of Bradley & Riley, PC, Cedar Rapids, for
intervenors-appellees Peck and Thirkettle.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether landowners have an easement
across the property of an adjoining landowner or whether they committed
trespass when they attempted to exercise rights pursuant to the claimed
easement. The district court found that an express easement existed and
dismissed claims for trespass and injunctive relief. The court of appeals
reversed, and we granted further review. For the reasons expressed below,
the decision of the court of appeals is vacated and the decision of the
district court is affirmed.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
The facts in this case are generally undisputed. Tamra Randall
owned undeveloped property in rural Benton County. In September 1996,
Randall recorded the consent and dedication agreement and plat for what is
now known as Maple Ridge Estates I. The plat called for the subdivision of
the land into five lots. The plaintiffs, Stephen and Shelly Gray, currently
own Lot 5.
The plat for Maple Ridge Estates I states that an ingress-egress
easement runs across the northern border of Lot 5. The easement is
indicated by a dotted line running parallel to the northern border of the
property with the phrase “50' ingress egress easement” placed in the middle
of the area between the northern border of Lot 5 and the dotted line. The
easement abuts a public roadway, 59th Street Trail, on its western end.
The eastern end of the easement connects with property that is not
described on the plat. In the words familiar to those experienced in real
estate transactions, the dominant estate was not specifically identified or
described with particularity on the plat.
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The consent and dedication agreement, however, did not explicitly
refer to an ingress-egress easement across Lot 5. The only restriction
concerning building in the subdivision is a setback restriction, requiring all
buildings to be at least fifty feet from any public roadway and no closer than
twenty feet from any side lot line.
These documents also did not mention the existence of a private
gravel road which lay north of the easement and connected 59th Street Trail
to lands to the east. At the time of the September 1996 filings, Randall was
enmeshed in a dispute with her northern neighbors, Kenneth and Marcia
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Rick, regarding the ownership of the gravel road. The Ricks claimed
ownership to the northern two-thirds of the gravel road, and litigation
commenced regarding the precise boundary between the two properties.
Prior to the dispute, Randall had been using the road to access property she
owned to the east of Maple Ridge Estates I.
Randall decided that in light of the boundary dispute, she needed to
designate a fifty-foot easement, on what was indisputably her property,
across the northern boundary of Lot 5. Thus, in the event she was
unsuccessful in her litigation with the Ricks, Randall would continue to
have secure access to her eastern property through the easement. If
unsuccessful, she intended to relocate the road across the fifty-foot
easement reserved in the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I.
In January 1998, Randall prevailed in her litigation with the Ricks.
As a result of her success, Randall could still access her eastern property by
way of the gravel road. She took no action at that time, therefore, to
relocate the gravel road onto the easement.
In early 2000, Randall filed a plat for Maple Ridge Estates II. At the
time she recorded this plat, she was still the owner of Lot 5 in Maple Ridge
Estates I. Maple Ridge Estates II subdivides property located to the east of
Maple Ridge Estates I. The plat for Maple Ridge Estates II shows the same
fifty-foot, ingress-egress easement along the northern border of Lot 5 of
Maple Ridge Estates I. The Maple Ridge Estates II plat does not alter the
location, dimension, or purpose of the easement.
As with the Maple Ridge Estates I plat, Randall also filed covenants
related to Maple Ridge Estates II. The restrictive covenants convey a fifty-
foot easement to the owners of Lots 3 and 4 “over and upon the road shown
on the plat for Maple Ridge Estates II . . . .”
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After these documents related to Maple Ridge Estates I and Maple
Ridge Estates II were recorded, a series of land transactions occurred.
Ultimately, Stephen and Shelly Gray, the plaintiffs in this case, became
owners of Lot 5 in Maple Ridge Estates I. The Grays’ deed specifically noted
that their purchase was subject to all covenants, restrictions, and
easements of record. In adjoining Maple Ridge Estates II, Joan K. Peck and
Marjorie A. Thirkettle became owners of Lot 3 and James R. Osborn III
became owner of Lot 4.
Prior to the purchase of their interest in Maple Ridge Estates I, Lot 5,
the Grays obtained an abstract of title and a title opinion. The Grays were
further provided with a copy of the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I by their
realtor. The Grays saw the wording related to the easement on the plat, but
professed to have difficulty reading it because of the copy’s poor, fuzzy
quality. The Grays claim to have been told by someone that the easement
was for utility purposes only.
After purchasing the property, the Grays decided to construct a fence
for their horses. Worried about possible restrictions, Stephen Gray
questioned Randall as to the fence’s proper location. At trial, Randall
testified that she told Gray not to construct any type of permanent fence
within the fifty-foot easement. Gray disputed this testimony, claiming that
there was no mention of the easement. In any event, the Grays’ fence
essentially follows the southern line of the fifty-foot easement.
After Osborn constructed his home on Maple Ridge Estates II, Lot 4,
Peck and Thirkettle became concerned about the proximity of their home on
Lot 3, to the driveway used by Osborn to reach his residence. Osborn,
Peck, and Thirkettle were utilizing the gravel road, which lay north of the
easement, to access their property. The end of the road, however, veered
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south and crossed onto the Peck/Thirkettle lot in order to connect to
Osborn’s lot. After considerable discussion, Osborn agreed to change his
manner of access by constructing a driveway “spur” on the Grays’ land,
which he believed was subject to the ingress-egress easement.
No one contacted the Grays before construction began on Osborn’s
new access. From here, the dispute escalated. The Grays built a temporary
and later a permanent fence blocking access to the new driveway. Osborn
reacted by destroying the fence with a skid loader.
Shortly after the destruction of the Grays’ fence, they filed an action
in district court for temporary and permanent injunction, claiming trespass
and seeking damages for the destruction of the fence, cleanup costs, and
the cost to rebuild the fence. Osborn filed a counterclaim for declaratory
relief, seeking a judicial declaration of the existence and validity of a fifty-
foot, ingress-egress easement over Lot 5. Peck and Thirkettle intervened,
claiming an interest in the easement as adjoining landowners. Randall also
intervened as a portion of the claimed easement lays on her property
directly north of the Grays.
In June 2004, the district court denied the application for a
temporary injunction, but ordered Osborn not to expand the spur and
ordered that no one exercise additional use of the easement. At trial, the
Grays claimed Osborn violated the order by using the easement as a
parking lot during his Halloween party and sought monetary damages for
this violation. Osborn, in turn, alleged that the Grays constructed a shed
on the easement in violation of the court’s order.
The matter came to trial on May 9, 2005. On October 10, 2005, the
district court found in favor of Osborn and the other parties aligned with
him. According to the district court, the recorded documents demonstrated
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the existence of an express fifty-foot easement over the northern boundary
of the Grays’ lot. The district court further found that the easement was for
the benefit of Lots 3 and 4 owned by Peck, Thirkettle, and Osborn in Maple
Ridge Estates II. The Grays filed a timely notice of appeal.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
found that the two filed plats were insufficient to create an easement
because they were made at different times and because the language of the
second plat cannot be used to create an easement over the Grays’ land. The
court of appeals reversed the district court order and remanded the case for
consideration of the Grays’ claims for trespass and injunctive relief. We
granted further review.
II. Standard of Review.
The parties do not agree on the appropriate standard of review. The
Grays contend our review is de novo as the determination of easement
rights is equitable. Osborn and aligned parties assert our review is for
errors of law. We agree. The original action was filed by the Grays as a
“petition at law,” while Osborn counterclaimed for declaratory judgment.
Whether a declaratory judgment action is considered legal or equitable in
nature is “determined by the pleadings, the relief sought and the nature of
each case.” Bjork v. Dairyland Ins., 174 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Iowa 1970).
Further, the parties made evidentiary objections during trial, some of which
were sustained, which suggests a trial at law. Because we generally hear a
case in the same manner in which it was tried to the district court, our
review is for errors of law. Johnson v. Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Iowa
2001). “The trial court’s findings carry the force of a special verdict and are
binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. If the findings are
ambiguous they will be construed to uphold, not defeat, the judgment.” Id.
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III. Discussion.
In their review, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether
two successive plats could be read together to create an express easement.
Whether two successively filed documents may be read together to create an
easement appears to be a matter of first impression. We believe, however,
that there is an antecedent legal question that is wholly dispositive. For the
reasons discussed below, we hold that the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I
alone creates an express easement across the Grays’ property in favor of
Osborn and the aligned parties.
An easement is a restriction on another person’s property rights.
Indep. Sch. Dist. of Ionia v. De Wilde, 243 Iowa 685, 692, 53 N.W.2d 256,
261 (1952). Express grant or reservation is one of the ways an easement
may be created. Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Iowa
2004). Because an easement is an interest in real property, any express
easement falls within the statute of frauds and must be in writing. See
Iowa Code § 622.32 (2007).
An easement created via a plat map is valid under Iowa law. Maddox
v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). Today, no magic
words or terms of art are necessary to create an easement. In determining
the existence of an easement, the intention of the parties is of paramount
importance. Restatement (Third) of Property: Intent to Create a Servitude
§ 2.2 cmt. d (2000).
The recorded plat for Maple Ridge Estates I clearly denotes an
intention to create an easement along the northern border of Lot 5. Not
only is the easement’s location and dimension specifically delineated, the
precise term “EASEMENT” is used. Moreover, the easement’s purpose—
ingress and egress—is explicitly noted. See Iowa Code § 354.6(2)
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(“Easements necessary for the orderly development of the land within the
plat shall be shown and the purpose of the easement shall be clearly
stated.”). The Grays’ reliance on Maddox’s requirement of a detailed
description of the easement’s purpose, therefore, is without merit as ingress
egress is sufficiently comprehensive.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the easement must fail because the
plat does not specifically state which property is to be the easement’s
dominant estate. Where there is a technical deficiency in a land
transaction, however, we have held the ambiguity may be resolved by
resorting to the intention of the parties as gleaned from the instrument itself
and the surrounding circumstances, including subsequent conduct by the
parties. Goss v. Johnson, 243 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 1976) (citing Flynn v.
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 161 N.W.2d 56, 64–65 (Iowa 1968)).
The instrument and the surrounding circumstances clearly show that
the property abutting the east end of the easement is the dominant estate.
First, the plat states that the easement’s purpose is for ingress and egress
and the easement itself connects the eastern property to a public roadway—
59th Street Trail. Thus, on its face, the easement explicitly is designed to
provide access to the public highway. This articulated purpose is
irreconcilable with the Grays’ claim that Lot 5 serves as both the servient
and dominant estate. Lot 5 already has direct access to 59th Street Trail,
so it would glean no benefit from the easement. Moreover, as easements are
extinguished when the dominant and servient estates merge, it would be
both illogical and impossible to create an easement for the benefit of the
same land which the easement burdens. The plat’s obvious import,
therefore, is that the property to the east of Lot 5, unconnected to the
roadway, is the dominant estate.
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Second, Randall testified at trial that her purpose in creating an
easement on Maple Ridge Estate I plat was to benefit the eastern half of her
property. This testimony is consistent with her contemporaneous boundary
dispute with the Ricks. Had Randall not prevailed, she would not have had
access to her property east of Lot 5.
Third, the plat for Maple Ridge Estates II explicitly points to Lots 3
and 4 as the dominant estates. It may be true, as the Grays claim, that
“construing together deeds and mortgages made at different times, by
different parties, with different objects, having nothing in common except
that they refer to some one or more of adjoining lots with which they are
concerned” is ordinarily not sufficient to create an easement. 28A C.J.S.
Easements § 57 at 235–38 (2007). In this case, however, both plats were
filed by a common owner, Randall, prior to her sale of Lot 5, only a few
years apart, and for arguably the same purpose. If nothing else, the second
plat evidences Randall’s intent, as subsequent conduct by the parties, to
create an easement over Lot 5 for the benefit of her eastern property.
Finally, it is clear that the Grays are chargeable with actual notice of
the easement. Stephen Gray testified that at the time of his purchase of
Lot 5 he was provided a copy of the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I. He
stated that although an easement was clearly visible on the plat, he could
not read the words “ingress” and “egress” because their copy was difficult to
read. The Grays mistakenly believed that the easement was for utility
purposes only. This court held long ago, however, that
[o]ne who purchases land with knowledge of facts as would put
a prudent person upon inquiry, which, if prosecuted with
ordinary diligence, would lead to actual notice of rights claimed
adversely by another, is chargeable with the actual notice he
would have received.
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Johnson v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 202 Iowa 1282, 1288–89, 211 N.W. 842,
846 (1927). At the very least, the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I clearly put
the Grays on inquiry notice. Additionally, although Stephen Gray denied
Randall’s testimony that she specifically informed him of the easement
during their telephone conversation, the fact that the Grays ultimately
placed their fence on the southern border of the easement is strongly
suggestive of actual knowledge.
Because we hold that the Maple Ridge Estates I plat established an
express easement, we need not address the question of whether an express
easement is created by two separate documents under the facts and
circumstances presented in this case.
IV. Conclusion.
By specifically providing the location, dimension, and purpose of the
easement, the plat for Maple Ridge Estates I created an express easement
over the plaintiffs’ lot. Any ambiguity, moreover, as to the easement’s
dominant estate is resolved by resort to the intention of the parties. Both
the instrument itself and the surrounding circumstances support a finding
of a valid easement.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.