IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 144 / 06-1390
Filed January 26, 2007
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
WILLIAM T. MORRISON,
Respondent.
________________________________________________________________________
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
Grievance Commission reports respondent has committed ethical
misconduct and recommends suspension of respondent’s license to
practice law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for
complainant.
William T. Morrison, Mason City, respondent, pro se.
2
STREIT, Justice.
A lawyer had a sexual relationship with a client he was
representing in a dissolution proceeding. Because such conduct may be
harmful to the client’s interest and reflects poorly on the legal profession,
we suspend the attorney’s license for three months.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
William Morrison was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1989. He
presently has a law office in Mason City. In June 2005, Morrison
reported to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board
(“Board”) he “engaged in a sexual relationship with a female client while
representing her in a dissolution proceeding.” Morrison represented this
client from October 2004 through February 2005. They had sex on
several occasions from November 2004 through March 2005. Morrison
did not have a personal relationship with this client prior to November
2004.
The Board filed a complaint against Morrison alleging he violated
the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers1 by engaging in
a sexual relationship with a client. In lieu of an evidentiary hearing
before the Grievance Commission, the Board and Morrison agreed to
submit the matter upon stipulation. The parties stipulated to the facts
above. Morrison acknowledged his conduct was unethical. The Board
noted Morrison cooperated with its investigation. The parties also
included with the stipulation a private admonition Morrison received
from the Board in March 2004. Morrison was admonished for
1Thiscourt adopted the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct effective July 1,
2005. Because Morrison’s alleged misconduct occurred before July 1, 2005, the Iowa
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers governs. In substance, the rules
regarding attorney-client sexual relationships remain unchanged. See Iowa R. of Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.8(j).
3
“solicitation of a dissolution client for a social relationship by reason of
that dissolution client’s ‘attractiveness.’” The parties jointly recommend
Morrison’s conduct warrants suspension of his Iowa law license for sixty
days. The Grievance Commission recommends Morrison’s license to
practice law be suspended for six months and that he enter and complete
a counseling program to address his “boundary issues.” Morrison
reports he has already completed such a counseling program with a
psychologist in addition to marriage counseling.
II. Scope of Review
We review the findings of the Grievance Commission de novo. Iowa
Ct. R. 35.10(1). We give weight to the Commission’s findings but we are
not bound by those findings. Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd.
v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Iowa 2006). The Board has the
burden to prove disciplinary violations by a convincing preponderance of
the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. D’Angelo,
710 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 2006). “This burden is ‘less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard
required in the usual civil case.’” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004)).
III. Merits
Morrison admits he had a sexual relationship with a client. This is
a patent violation of Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
DR 5-101(B) (lawyer shall not engage in sexual relations with a client)
and DR 1-102(A)(1) and (6) (lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule or
engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness to
practice law). “Professional responsibility involves many gray areas, but
sexual relationships between attorney and client is not one of these.
4
Such conduct is clearly improper.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001). Before
determining the appropriate sanction, we review the sound reasons for
prohibiting attorney-client sexual relationships.
First, “[t]he unequal balance of power in the attorney-client
relationship, rooted in the attorney’s special skill and knowledge on the
one hand and the client’s potential vulnerability on the other, may enable
the lawyer to dominate and take unfair advantage.” Iowa Code of Prof’l
Responsibility EC 5-25. This is why the client’s consent is irrelevant.
We have previously stated “the professional relationship renders it
impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting.’”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 540 N.W.2d 43, 44
(Iowa 1995) (Hill II); accord Furlong, 625 N.W.2d at 714.
Second, a sexual relationship between attorney and client may be
harmful to the client’s interest. This is true in any legal representation
but “presents an even greater danger to the client seeking advice in times
of personal crises such as divorce, death of a loved one, or when facing
criminal charges.” Iowa Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 5-25.
Third, an attorney-client sexual relationship may prevent the
attorney from competently representing the client. An attorney must be
able to objectively evaluate the client’s case. The American Bar
Association stated "[t]he roles of lover and lawyer are potentially
conflicting ones as the emotional involvement that is fostered by a sexual
relationship has the potential to undercut the objective detachment that
is often demanded for adequate representation." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).
5
Finally, an attorney initiating a sexual relationship with a client or
attempting to do so may undercut the client’s trust and faith in the
lawyer. “Clients may rightfully expect that confidences vouchsafed to the
lawyer will be solely used to advance the client’s interest, and will not be
used to advance the lawyer’s interest, sexual or otherwise.” Iowa Code of
Prof’l Responsibility EC 5-25.
We now turn to the appropriate sanction. We consider
the nature and extent of the respondent’s ethical infractions,
his fitness to continue practicing law, our obligation to
protect the public from further harm by the respondent, the
need to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar
misconduct, our desire to maintain the reputation of the bar
as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d
161, 164 (Iowa 2003). We give the discipline recommended by the
Grievance Commission its due respect although “‘the matter of sanction
is solely within the authority of this court.’” McGrath, 713 N.W.2d at 703
(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sloan, 692
N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 2005)). Ultimately, we determine the appropriate
discipline based on the unique facts of each case. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 178 (Iowa 2005).
This court does not tolerate attorney-client sexual relationships.
See McGrath, 713 N.W.2d at 703–04 (three-year suspension for
attempting to obtain and extorting sexual favors in exchange for legal
services); Furlong, 625 N.W.2d at 714 (eighteen-month suspension for
engaging in a sexual relationship with one client and encouraging her to
withdraw her complaint with the Board and sexually harassing another
client); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588
N.W.2d 121, 125 (Iowa 1999) (two-year suspension for attorney who took
6
photographs of partially-clothed client under pretext of documenting her
back injury); Hill II, 540 N.W.2d at 45 (twelve-month suspension for
making unwelcome sexual advances toward client); Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 58–59 (Iowa 1989) (Hill I) (three-
month suspension for accepting vulnerable client’s offer to have sex in
exchange for money); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279
N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (Iowa 1979) (reprimand for attorney kissing and
embracing inmate client). In the present case, the Grievance
Commission recommends Morrison’s license to practice law be
suspended for six months and that he be required to complete a
counseling program to address his “boundary issues.” The Board on the
other hand recommends a sixty-day suspension because “this case does
not involve aggravating factors such as forced sexual advances or
commercial exploitation.”
Our review is hindered by a limited record. Based on the parties’
stipulation, Morrison’s conduct does not appear to be particularly
egregious in comparison to our previous cases involving attorney-client
sexual relationships. But even a purely consensual sexual relationship
between attorney and client is clearly prohibited by DR 5-101(B) for the
reasons we have already stated.
Like this case, Hill I involved an attorney representing a client in a
dissolution action. There, we said
A lawyer undertaking a divorce action must recognize
reconciliation is possible and may be in the best interest of
his client. An attorney must be aware that the actions of the
client and attorney may affect negotiations in the dissolution
case, including determination of custody and visitation of
minor children. Sexual intercourse between the lawyer and a
client seeking a dissolution of marriage carries a great
potential of prejudice both to the client and to the minor
children of the marriage.
7
Hill I, 436 N.W.2d at 59. Morrison’s client and her husband had at least
one minor child. We do not know from the record if the relationship
between Morrison and his client prejudiced her in the dissolution action.
Nevertheless, at least the potential for harm existed and exists in any
attorney-client representation. See Steffes, 588 N.W.2d at 123 (sexual
harassment by attorney made client uncomfortable going to attorney’s
office so client did not seek attorney’s advice regarding pending criminal
charges).
Moreover, Morrison has previously been admonished for making a
sexual advance toward another client. He became sexually involved with
the client in this particular case just eight months after the
admonishment. Clearly, Morrison has not learned his lesson. See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d 11,
14 (Iowa 2000) (“The prior disciplinary history of an attorney is a factor
we consider in imposing sanctions.”). A suspension of Morrison’s license
to practice law is necessary and appropriate. We hereby suspend
Morrison’s license to practice law in Iowa for a minimum of three
months.
IV. Conclusion
Morrison is suspended indefinitely from the practice of law with no
possibility of reinstatement for at least three months. This suspension
shall apply to all facets of the practice of law as provided in Iowa Court
Rule 35.12(3) and requires notification of clients as outlined in Iowa
Court Rule 35.21. Upon any application for reinstatement, Morrison
must establish that he has not practiced law during the suspension
period and he has in all ways complied with the requirements of Iowa
8
Court Rule 35.13. Costs are taxed to Morrison pursuant to Iowa Court
Rule 35.25(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.