Com. v. Williams, A.

J-S03044-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
AZAIAH TAHIR WILLIAMS :
: No. 1877 EDA 2017
Appellant

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-64-CR-0000384-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 01, 2018

Appellant Azaiah Tahir Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County after Appellant was

charged as an adult and plead guilty to attempted murder and sexual assault

for crimes he committed at the age of fifteen. Appellant claims the trial court

erred in denying his motion to decertify the case to juvenile court and abused

its discretion in imposing an overly harsh and excessive sentence.

The trial court aptly summarized the factual background of the case as

follows:

In the late afternoon and early evening hours on the twenty-
fourth (24th) day of September, [Appellant] was harassing
residents by knocking on their doors. One of the doors [Appellant]
knocked on belonged to the victim, Dorothy Krasley. Ms. Krasley
was home alone and up until that day managed to care for herself
quite capably. [Appellant] entered Ms. Krasley’s home uninvited
and stabbed the eighty-three (83) year old woman in her neck,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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back, and arm with a steak knife. While Ms. Krasley was lying and
bleeding on the floor of her home, [Appellant] admitted that he
went through her home and took possession of deposit slips and
credit cards. To make an already horrific event worse, [Appellant]
returned to where Ms. Krasley had been lying and according to his
words “removed her clothes and raped her.” He then left the
bleeding Ms. Krasley alone.

When police arrived, they found a bloodied Ms. Krasley
wearing only a white sweater and underpants. Medical personnel
determined that she endured two (2) stab wounds to the back,
one (1) stab wound to the throat, two (2) stab wounds to the
abdomen, and numerous “slice type” wounds to various parts of
her body, including her head, arms, and rib area. While at the
scene, Ms. Krasley managed to inform police that [Appellant]
entered her residence and stabbed her after she told [Appellant]
that he could not use her phonebook or phone. Ms. Krasley made
the same statement to three (3) separate people. Since that day,
however, Ms. Krasley has been so traumatized by the sexual
assault that she will not speak of it. As a result of her injuries,
Ms. Krasley underwent a medically induced coma. Ms. Krasley
suffered two punctured lungs and required surgery to reconstruct
her bowel. When a sexual assault exam was performed, evidence
of [Appellant’s] semen was found in the underpants of Ms.
Krasley. After four (4) weeks in the hospital and extensive
rehabilitation, Ms. Krasley continues to suffer deficits as a result
of the attack and her ability to live alone has been greatly
compromised.

After [Appellant] left Ms. Krasley alone and bloodied, he
returned home to his legal guardians. On the thirtieth (30 th) day
of September, six (6) days after the incident, [Appellant’s] legal
guardians contacted police after finding Ms. Krasley’s credit card
in [Appellant’s] bedroom. [Appellant’s] guardians informed police
about [Appellant’s] history of stealing and arranged to meet at the
PSP barracks for an interview. The legal guardians informed police
that they search [Appellant’s] bedroom daily because of his
history of stealing and found Ms. Krasley’s credit card under
[Appellant’s] mattress and her deposit slips in [Appellant’s]
backpack.

Initially, when asked by police how he came to have Ms.
Krasley’s credit card, [Appellant] informed them that he found it
on a road. [Appellant] further lied to police by informing them

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that he was serving detention at school on the day in question and
did not know Ms. Krasley and that she was assaulted. After
further questioning, [Appellant] said that Ms. Krasley had a knife
in her hand when she answered his knock on the door. [Appellant]
stated that he let himself in and disarmed Ms. Krasley after she
informed him that he could not enter her home. According to
[Appellant], he stabbed Ms. Krasley five (5) times when she tried
to push him out of her home because he was afraid that she would
take the knife from him and stab him. After stabbing Ms. Krasley,
[Appellant] admitted that he went through Ms. Krasley’s home and
took deposit slips and a credit card from her purse before he
removed her clothes and “raped her.” When questioned by a
Probation Officer in regards to his statement that he “raped her,”
[Appellant] stated that he was almost ninety percent (90%)
positive that he didn’t rape her; however, he felt angry and
wanted to desecrate her so he pulled down her pants and
underwear and masturbated over top of her until he ejaculated.
When asked whether he thought Ms. Krasley was dead when he
left her home, [Appellant] replied “no.”

With respect to [Appellant’s] criminal background,
[Appellant] has an extensive juvenile history. [Appellant]
received an informal adjustment for Possession of a Weapon on
School Property, a summary harassment, and an adjudication just
days before the assault in the present case. The informal
adjustment involved [Appellant] bringing a three inch saw blade
to school and rubbing it on a student’s arm. The summary
harassment involved [Appellant] hitting and kicking an autistic
student, taking his glasses and breaking them. The charge which
resulted in an adjudication was an incident where [Appellant]
allegedly entered an apartment and when apprehended was found
to have a hatchet and a small Samurai sword.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/17, at 2-4.

In connection with his assault of Ms. Krasley, Appellant was charged as

an adult with attempted homicide, rape (forcible compulsion), burglary

(overnight accommodations, person present), robbery (inflict serious bodily

injury), aggravated assault, and sexual assault. Appellant filed a Petition for

Decertification to the juvenile court. The defense presented the report of Dr.

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Frank M. Dattilio, Ph.D., ABPP, who offered expert opinion in support of

decertification. In response, the Commonwealth presented the report of Dr.

John O’Brien, M.D., J.D., who offered expert opinion against decertification.

After a hearing at which both experts testified, the lower court denied the

defense’s motion for decertification.

On December 19, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to attempted

homicide and sexual assault. On April 13, 2017, the lower court imposed an

aggregate term of twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment in a State

Correctional Institution. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were

subsequently denied. This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with

the lower court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court, sitting as the decertification court,
committed a gross abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s
Motion for Decertification?

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretionary sentencing
powers in sentencing a 17 year old juvenile with a zero Prior
Record Score to 25 to 50 years imprisonment constituting
an overly harsh and excessive sentence and abusing its
sentencing discretion?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

First, we review Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his

request to decertify the case to juvenile court. As an initial matter, we note

that Appellant did not waive his right to challenge the trial court's decision to

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deny his decertification request when he entered a guilty plea. Our Supreme

Court has further explained:

Absent unusual circumstances, a guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of any non-jurisdictional defects or defenses. However,
since one of the prime purposes of the Juvenile Act is to spare
from adult punishment certain youths whose behavior would
necessarily render them guilty of adult crimes ... and since the
decision to, or not to transfer is interlocutory and thus only
appealable after sentencing[,] we find the instant challenge to be
properly preserved.

Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 617, 342 A.2d 101, 103 n. 4 (1975)

(citations omitted).

In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for decertification, this

Court has provided the following:

The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., is designed to
effectuate the protection of the public by providing children who
commit ‘delinquent acts’ with supervision, rehabilitation, and care
while promoting responsibility and the ability to become a
productive member of the community. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6301(b)(2). The Juvenile Act defines a ‘child’ as a person who is
under eighteen years of age. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. Typically,
most crimes involving juveniles are tried in the juvenile court of
the Court of Common Pleas.

Our legislature, however, has deemed some crimes so heinous
that they are excluded from the definition of ‘a delinquent act.’
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a) and § 6355(e), when a
juvenile is charged with a crime, including murder or any of the
other offenses excluded from the definition of ‘delinquent act’ in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common
Pleas is vested with jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.[1]
____________________________________________

1Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act excludes rape, aggravated assault, robbery,
and attempted murder from the definition of a “delinquent act” where a deadly

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When a case involving a juvenile goes directly to the criminal
division, the juvenile can request treatment within the juvenile
system through a transfer process called ‘decertification.’ To
obtain decertification, it is the juvenile's burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that transfer to the juvenile court
system best serves the public interest. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a).

Pursuant to § 6322(a), the decertification court shall
consider the factors contained in § 6355(a)(4)(iii) in
determining whether the child has established that the
transfer will serve the public interest. These factors are as
follows:

(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or
victims;

(B) the impact of the offense on the community;

(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any
individual posed by the child;

(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense
allegedly committed by the child;

(E) the degree of the child's culpability;

(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional
alternatives available under this chapter and in
the adult criminal justice system; and

(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by
considering the following factors:

(I) age;
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weapon was used during the commission of the offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302,
“Delinquent Act” (2)(ii)(A), (2)(ii)(C), (2)(ii)(D), and (2)(ii)(I). As a result,
pursuant to Section 6322, it was proper to commence prosecution of
Appellant's offenses in the court of common pleas criminal division rather than
in juvenile court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 6322(a).

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(II) mental capacity;

(III) maturity;

(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the child;

(V) previous records, if any;

(VI) the nature and extent of any prior
delinquent history, including the success or
failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile
court to rehabilitate the child;

(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court
jurisdiction;

(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;

(IX) any other relevant factors.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii).

While the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court
consider all of these factors, it is silent as to the weight assessed
to each by the court. However, when a juvenile seeks to have his
case transferred from the criminal division to the juvenile division,
he must show that he is in need of and amenable to treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation in the juvenile system. If the
evidence presented fails to establish that the youth would benefit
from the special features and programs of the juvenile system and
there is no special reason for sparing the youth from adult
prosecution, the petition must be denied and jurisdiction remains
with the criminal division.

The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial
as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertification court.
This Court will not overturn a decision to grant or deny
decertification absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the
misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a

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manifestly unreasonable judgment based upon partiality,
prejudice or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 67 A.3d 838, 841–43 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 491–493

(Pa.Super.2011)) (quotation marks and footnote omitted). Further, our

Supreme Court has clarified that “[a] juvenile court must consider all of the

factors set forth in Section 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address,

seriatim, the applicability and importance of each factor and fact in reaching

its final determination.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 555 Pa. 37, 46, 722

A.2d 1030, 1034 (1999).

In this case, Appellant admits that the trial court did address each of

the factors set forth in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) in its opinion supporting its

decision to deny decertification. However, Appellant argues that the trial court

unfairly emphasized the severity of the crime and did not give sufficient weight

to his “age, intellect, upbringing, lack of family, lack of criminal sophistication,

unremarkable criminal history, potential rehabilitation, amenability to

treatment, mental health, and substance abuse.” Appellant’s Brief, at 21.

Appellant also suggests that the trial court dismissed the testimony of defense

expert Dr. Dattilio and unfairly favored the expert opinion of Commonwealth

expert Dr. O’Brien.

In this case, the trial court’s November 22, 2016 opinion thoroughly and

thoughtfully addresses its considerations of the factors set forth in Section

6355 that it made in reaching its decision to deny Appellant’s request for

decertification. As we find the trial court did not commit a gross abuse of

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discretion in reaching its conclusion, which is supported by the record, we find

Appellant’s challenge to be meritless.

Second, we review Appellant’s claim that the lower court abused its

discretion in imposing an “overly harsh and excessive sentence.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 7. While Appellant concedes that all of his sentences fall within the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines, Appellant specifically argues that

“the consecutive nature of the sentences and the resulting aggregate sentence

are excessive even in light of [Appellant’s] loathsome and abhorrent criminal

conduct.” Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

Appellant has raised a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. It is well established that:

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging
the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's
jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally
waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a
motion to modify the sentence imposed.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 137 A.3d 611, 618 (Pa.Super. 2016)

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Upon review of the record, we note that Appellant failed to preserve his

challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences in the lower court at

sentencing or in his post-sentence motion. See Taylor, supra. Rather,

Appellant claimed that the lower court abused its discretion in (1) failing to

consider various mitigating factors, such as his troubled upbringing and his

lack of a criminal record, and (2) in improperly considering facts related to

charged offenses to which Appellant did not enter a guilty plea. Post Sentence

Motion, 4/21/17, at 2.2 Therefore, Appellant has waived his challenge to the

consecutive nature of his sentences by failing to properly preserve it before

the trial court.

Moreover, Appellant also failed to include his specific challenge to the

consecutive nature of his sentences in his statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). The trial court’s order filed June 15, 2017 informed Appellant that

“any issue not properly included in the [Rule 1925(b)] Statement timely filed

and served shall be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues

not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). As Appellant did not include

this particular sentencing challenge in his Rule 1925(b) statement, his claim

is waived on this basis as well.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
____________________________________________

2Appellant does not raise or develop these claims on appeal. As a result, we
need not review them further.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/1/18

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 Circulated 02/09/2018 10:11 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF WAYNE

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :

vs.
AZAIAH TAHIR WILLIAMS,
Defendant NO. 384-CRIMINAL-2015

OPINION

In the above captioned case, Defendant is charged with Rape by Forcible Compulsion (Fl);

Burglary- Overnight Accommodation, Person Present (Fl); Robbery with Serious Bodily Injury

to Another (Fl); Attempted Criminal Homicide (Fl); Aggravated Assault-Deadly Weapon (F2);

and Aggravated Assault - Serious Bodily Injury (Fl). Defendant was sixteen (16) days away from

his sixteenth (161h) birthday when the alleged crimes were committed. On December 31, 2015,

Defendant filed a Motion for Decertification. This Court held a Decertification Hearing on October

19, 2016. Defendant's Motion was denied at the conclusion of said hearing. This Court issues the

following written opinion in support of its October 19, 2016 Decision.

Decertification

Pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6322(a), when a juvenile has committed a crime, which

includes murder, or any of the other offenses listed under paragraph 2(ii) or (iii) of the definition

of "delinquent act" in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas

is vested with jurisdiction. Likewise, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6355(e) explains that charges of murder, or

any of the other offenses listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of "delinquent act"

in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302, requir� I� tjj� offense be prosecuted in the criminal division. When a
.
'