Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau

                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                 Fifth Circuit
                                                              F I L E D
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   May 3, 2006

                                                          Charles R. Fulbruge III
                                                                  Clerk
                            No. 03-30523



     PELTS & SKINS, LLC

                               Plaintiff - Appellee,


                                 v.


     WILLIAM DWIGHT LANDRENEAU, Secretary for the Department of
     Wildlife and Fisheries,

                               Defendant - Appellant.



            Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Middle District of Louisiana



      ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Before KING, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, CIRCUIT JUDGE:

     Our previous opinion in this case held that Louisiana’s

alligator marketing program created an unconstitutional compelled

subsidy for private speech.   Since then, the United States Supreme

Court issued an opinion clarifying when marketing programs like the

one at issue are government speech exempt from First Amendment

scrutiny.   See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg., Assoc., 544 U.S. 550,

__; 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2063 (2005).       Johanns held that the key
inquiry is the “degree of governmental control over the message.”

Id.   Speech constitutes government speech when it is “effectively

controlled” by the government.    Id. at 2062.

      Neither this Court, the district court, nor the parties had

the benefit of this now-governing standard.       At this time, we

cannot apply the new standard, given that the record does not

contain   sufficient   evidence   of   control   or   lack   thereof.

Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND for the district court to allow

the parties to develop and present evidence with respect to the new

standard and to allow the district court to assess in the first

instance the extent of governmental control over the speech at

issue.




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