MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 32
Docket: Cum-17-424
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2018
Decided: March 6, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF ERIC K.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Eric K. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Portland,
Duddy, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(A)(1) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1 He challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the judgment and the court’s discretionary
determination of the child’s best interest. Because the evidence supports the
court’s findings and discretionary determination, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the father is unwilling or unable to protect the
child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a
time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and that the father
is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time
1 The court (Duddy, J.) also terminated the mother’s parental rights on September 15, 2017. The
mother did not appeal.
2
reasonably calculated to meet her needs. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The court also found that termination of the father’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(B)(2)(a);
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199. The court based its findings
of parental unfitness and its determination of the child’s best interest on the
following findings of fact:
[The father] has a lengthy history of substance abuse and
criminal activity. As a young man, [he] was convicted of a federal
trafficking charge, and spent nearly 20 years in federal prison. . . .
[The father] did not see or meet [the child] until late
October 2015, or early November 2015. At the time he was not
sure [she] was his child . . . . [He] has never lived with [the child] in
his household.
In October 2015, shortly after his release from prison, [the
father] violated his probation by using crack cocaine. In June 2016,
[he] again violated his probation by testing positive for illegal
drugs. . . . [I]n July 2016, [he] agreed to the Court’s Jeopardy Order.
. . . .
For well over a year, [the father] has failed to secure
adequate housing for himself and his daughter. . . .
. . . .
[The father] has a new girlfriend [who] is a homeless person
whom [he] met at a local homeless shelter three months ago. . . .
[He] readily admits that he does not know much about [her]. . . .
. . . .
3
[The father] has never parented his daughter, and has
demonstrated that he does not have parenting skills to do so. As
part of the Rehabilitation/Reunification Plan, [he] was given
visitation with [the child] beginning in September 2016. [He]
attended visits for a period of time, but also had several no-shows
and cancelations. In response to [the child’s] challenging behaviors
during visits, [he] refused to engage with her . . . . [He] last visited
[the child] on April 6, 2017, and stopped visiting [her]. The
Department reached out to [him and he] refused to respond [for
several months]. . . . [He] showed little understanding that abruptly
stopping visits with his daughter for a period of five months
demonstrated poor parenting skills.
. . . .
When asked how he would parent [the child, the father]
testified that his plan was to have his new girlfriend . . . become [the
child’s] primary caregiver. [The new girlfriend] has never met [the
child], and is completely unaware of [the child’s] challenging
behaviors. . . .
. . . .
[The father] has failed to take the steps required of him to
eliminate jeopardy. He has failed to demonstrate that he can
remain sober and drug free, failed to comply with the conditions of
his probation, failed to provide or make arrangements for safe
housing for him and [the child], and failed to demonstrate
age-appropriate parenting skills with [the child]. [His] plan to use
his new girlfriend[,] a homeless person of whom he knows next to
nothing, as [the child’s] primary caregiver, demonstrates a
profound lack of understanding of what it takes to resolve jeopardy
in this matter.
[The child] entered the custody of the Department on
May 2, 2016. She has now been in foster care for over half her
young life. During that period of time she has experienced a
4
number of different placements. She is beginning to make progress
in her current therapeutic foster placement, but she still has
substantial behavioral challenges. More than anything, [the child]
needs to quickly form a consistent and reliable attachment to a
loving, stable, and capable caregiver. . . .
. . . .
[The child] is only two and a half years old, and is still young
enough to form a solid attachment to [an adoptive family]. . . .
[¶3] The father contends that the court erred because the record
indicates that he “was working hard to redress the circumstances of jeopardy”
and could find adequate housing “within a relatively short period of time.”
These arguments fail to recognize, however, that “the time frame which the
court is gauging must be seen from the child’s perspective” and, although the
inquiry concerning parental unfitness “is prospective, the evidence to be
considered is retrospective.” In re Charles G., 2001 ME 3, ¶ 7, 763 A.2d 1163
(quotation marks omitted). After considering the father’s inability to comply
with his rehabilitation and reunification plan over the past year, the court found
that the father—despite his efforts and initial progress—remains incapable of
alleviating jeopardy or providing adequate care for the child in a time
reasonably calculated to meet her needs. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, ¶ 18, 716 A.2d 222.
As the court aptly explained, “it is unreasonable to ask or expect [the child] to
5
wait for some unspecified additional period of months or years for her [father]
to resolve jeopardy.”
[¶4] Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact,
all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did
not err in its unfitness determination nor did it err or abuse its discretion in
concluding that termination of the father’s parental rights, with a permanency
plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest. See In re Thomas H.,
2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Andrew S. Edwards, Esq., Northland Legal Solutions, LLC, PA, Portland, for
appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Portland District Court docket number PC-2016-36
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY