NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW KINERSON, No. 15-35622
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00216-JLQ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SPOKANE COUNTY WASHINGTON;
TIMOTHY JONES, Deputy; JEFFREY
THURMAN, Deputy; JUSTIN ELLIOTT,
Corporal,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Justin L. Quackenbush, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: M. SMITH and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,** District
Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Kinerson appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Timothy Jones,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
Jeffrey Thurman, and Justin Elliott on qualified immunity grounds. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s order de novo. See Mattos v. Agarano, 661
F.3d 433, 439 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “Where disputed issues of material fact
exist, we assume the version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving
party. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.
(citation omitted). To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity, we must determine (1) whether the officer’s conduct violated any
constitutional right and (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly established
in light of the specific facts of the case. Id. at 440.
We hold that the officers’ use of force was reasonable in light of the specific
circumstances of this case, and did not violate a clearly established right.
Allegations of excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Whether the force used by an officer is
unconstitutionally excessive is determined by whether the officer’s actions are
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the
officer. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The use of a taser
constitutes an intermediate use of force that must be justified by a strong
governmental interest that compels the use of such force. See Jones v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Meredith v.
2 15-35622
Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).
Based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time
of the incident, their use of intermediate force against Kinerson was reasonable.
While Kinerson was not suspected of any crime, the officers were informed that he
had a handgun, was potentially suicidal, and had made statements indicating that
he was going to harm others. After the officers made contact with Kinerson, they
observed unidentified black objects on his waistband, which they thought could be
weapons. Kinerson was reaching down toward his waistband when Officer Jones
deployed his taser. Kinerson’s insistence that he was reaching down to pull up his
shirt in an attempt to show the officers that he was not armed is irrelevant. The
officers reasonably interpreted his arm movements as reaching toward the
unidentified black objects.
Officer Jones’s second taser application was also reasonable. Officers
Thurman and Elliott were unable to obtain compliance from Kinerson and were
unable to search him for weapons. After the second taser application, the officers
were able to search Kinerson and recover a knife from his waistband. The officers’
conduct was reasonable in these circumstances and did not violate any clearly
established constitutional right. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on the basis of qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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