In the Interest of: C.L., a Minor

J-A04035-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: R.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 914 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 9, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2017-21

IN THE INTEREST OF: O.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: R.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 915 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 9, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2017-18

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2018

R.L. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees dated and entered on May

9, 2017, granting the petitions filed by the York County Children and Youth

Services (“CYS” or the “Agency”), to involuntarily terminate her parental

rights to her children, O.L.R., born in September of 2012; and C.L., born in

____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A04035-18

September of 2013 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.

The trial court has set forth the relevant factual and procedural history

of this case in its adjudication and termination orders of May 9, 2017, which

we adopt for purposes of this appeal as well as further appellate review.

See In Re Adoption of O.L.R., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order,

5/9/2017, at 1-35; In Re Adoption of C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and

Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 1-36. Significantly, on January 20, 2015,

the Agency filed an application for emergency protective custody of the

Children following Mother’s suicide attempt and departure from the hospital

against medical advice, admitted use of drugs, and several mental health

diagnoses. Over the next two years, Mother was unable to resolve the

unsuitable nature of her home or satisfactorily address her mental health.

On January 25, 2017, the Agency filed petitions to involuntarily

terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and to change their

permanency goal to adoption. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on
____________________________________________

1 O.L.R and C.L. have different fathers. See In Re Adoption of O.L.R., A
Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 2; In Re Adoption
of C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 2. On
May 9, 2017, the trial court entered a decree involuntarily terminating each
father’s parental rights to their child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). See In Re Adoption of O.L.R., A Minor, Adjudication
and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 50-51; In Re Adoption of C.L., A Minor,
Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 53-56. Neither father has
filed an appeal from the voluntary termination decrees, nor is either a party
to the instant appeal.

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March 20, 2017, and on March 28, 2017. On May 9, 2017, the trial court

terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children under 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

On June 8, 2017, Mother filed notices of appeal, along with concise

statements of errors complained of on appeal. On June 13, 2017, the trial

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement in the matter of each child,

suggesting that Mother had waived all claims for lack of specificity but

directing our attention to its prior opinions entered on May 9, 2017. Trial

Court Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) Statement, In Re Adoption of

O.L.R., A Minor; Trial Court Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) Statement,

In Re Adoption of C.L., A Minor, 6/13/2017. This Court, acting sua sponte,

consolidated Mother’s appeals on July 5, 2017.

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises the following issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the York County
Office of Children, Youth and Family's petition for involuntary
termination of parental rights of [R.L.] where the agency failed
to meet its burden of proving the elements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511
and termination would not be in the best interest of the children.

Mother’s Brief, at 4.2

____________________________________________

2 Mother raised a single, identical issue in the appeal of each child.
Additionally, Mother has waived any challenge to the change in the
Children’s permanency goal to adoption under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 by failing
to raise the issue in her concise statement and Statement of Questions
Involved in her brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of
Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-A04035-18

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [36
A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal and the Statement of Questions Involved in
his brief on appeal). However, we decline the trial court’s invitation to find
waiver of Mother’s single issue in the interest of judicial economy.

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J-A04035-18

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some formatting

added).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the decision to terminate parental rights if we

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a) and its

decision as to section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc). The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

to the children under section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide, in

relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:

***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence

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J-A04035-18

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We will focus on Section

2511(a)(2), and adopt the trial court’s discussion in its adjudication and

termination orders as this Court’s own.

The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as

follows.

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds
for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent,
can seldom be more difficult than when termination is
based upon parental incapacity. The legislature,
however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded
that a parent who is incapable of performing parental
duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to
perform the duties.

In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986) (quoting
In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (some formatting added).

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness

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regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected

as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

With regard to section 2511(a)(2), Mother argues that the trial court

erred when it concluded that the Agency presented clear and convincing

evidence in support of its petitions for termination for parental rights.

Mother’s Brief at 9. Mother asserts that she has remedied the conditions

that brought the Children into care and that she is capable of parenting them

at this time. Id. at 12-13. Additionally, Mother suggests that her sustained

participation in various resources over the years undermines the evidence

presented by the Agency. Id.

The trial court assessed in depth the evidence regarding Mother’s

repeated incapacity to parent Children, and her inability to remedy the

conditions and causes of her incapacity to parent Children, which we adopt

herein. See In Re Adoption of O.L.R., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination

Order, 5/9/2017; In Re Adoption of C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and

Termination Order, 5/9/2017. The trial court found that Mother’s mental

health conditions remain an ongoing concern, and her inability to properly

guide the children or improve home conditions could not be remedied with

prompting and assistance from service providers. Id. at 42-44. Moreover,

the trial court specifically noted that the environmental conditions that led to

the removal of the children were not beyond Mother’s control, and the

conditions remained the same, if not worse, in May 2017. In Re Adoption of

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C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 44-45, 48,

52.

After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of

Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section

2511(a)(2), as the evidence showed that Mother will be unable to remedy

the conditions that led to the removal of the Children within a reasonable

period of time, if ever. As there is competent evidence in the record that

supports the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, we discern

no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights

to the Children under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d

at 826-27.

Next, this Court has stated that the focus of our inquiry in terminating

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child

pursuant to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999,

1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of

termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as

follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare
of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and

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child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

In the present matter, the trial court considered the needs and welfare

of the Children and provided an explanation of why its termination decision

was not based on matters that were outside of Mother’s control. We adopt

the trial court's discussion herein. See In Re Adoption of O.L.R., A Minor,

Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 46-50; In Re Adoption of

C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 49-53. The

trial court properly considered the best interests of the Children in rendering

its decision that although there was evidence of a bond between the Children

and Mother, it was in their best interests to sever that bond for their safety

and security needs. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268–69.

After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of

Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section

2511(b), as the evidence showed that the Children’s developmental, physical

and emotional needs and welfare will best be met by the termination of

Mother’s parental rights. Further, the evidence showed that the bond

between Mother and Children has weakened over time, and the effect of

severing the bond does not seem to be severe. See In Re Adoption of

O.L.R., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at 48; In Re

Adoption of C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017, at

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J-A04035-18

51. Moreover, the trial court concluded that the unaddressed safety

concerns outweigh the bond between Children and Mother.

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations omitted).

The court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. See In re

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary termination of parental

rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would

be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right

to the custody and rearing of ... her child is converted, upon the failure to

fulfill ... her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and

fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe

environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-

being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,

956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of

parenting.”)).

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The trial court found that Mother “does love her children and is able to

provide minimal comfort, but is not able to provide security and stability.

Mother has not been able to adequately perform her parental duties, has not

adequately addressed her mental health, continues to use marijuana, and

remains in a relationship that involved domestic violence.” See In Re

Adoption of O.L.R., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order, 5/9/2017,

at 48; In Re Adoption of C.L., A Minor, Adjudication and Termination Order,

5/9/2017, at 51. As we stated in In re Z.P., the Children’s lives “simply

cannot be put on hold” in the hope that Mother will summon the ability to

handle the responsibilities of parenting. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125.

Here, Mother’s right to the custody and rearing of her Children was

converted to the Children’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of

their potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. In re B., N.M.,

856 A.2d at 856.

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial

court’s findings and credibility determinations, we would find no abuse of the

trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children

under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We,

therefore, affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s parental

rights to the Children.

Decrees affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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J-A04035-18

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2018

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 Circulated 03/05/2018 01:27 PM

1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Adoption of '1
C.L.·, No. 2otf-12
A Minor Termination of Parental Rights

APPEARANCES:

Wanda Neuhaus, Esquire Daniel Worley, Esquire
Onice of Children, Youth & Families Guardian Ad Li1e111

Peter Vaughn, Esquire Andrew Lee Raver,
Counsel for Mother Pro Se.
FILED
Thomas Gregory, Esquire
Counsel [or C. L. Mo. 5_ DA'ro 4_ YEAR, ,
AD,JUDICATION ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION

Presently before the Court is the Petition for Involuntary Termination or Parental
Rights of Andrew Lee Raver and Rebecca Lynch to C.L. filed by York County

Children, Youth, and family (hereinafter "Agency") on January 25, 2017. J\11 cvidcntiary

hearing was originally scheduled for, and was conducted on, March 20, 2017. At the hearing

on March 20, 2017, a continued hearing was scheduled for M arch 28. 2017, due lo

insufficient time to present evidence. At the time of the hearing, the Guardian Ad I.item

advocated for the children. The Supreme Court recently reminded us in /11 re Adoption of

L.B. M., 84 MAP 2016, 2017 WL 1 162209 (Pa. March 28, 20 I 7) that the chi Id is erui tied to

counsel pursuant to §23 l 3(a). Therefore, the Court appointed legal counsel for the child.

afforded counsel the opportunity to meet with his client, review the record and request

additional proceedings if he deemed it warranted to protect the legal interest of' the child.
Counsel recommended the child not be returned home but instead, should remain with the

foster family.

Based upon the evidence presented at the hearings, and upon consideration of the

record. the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of Mother mid Father to

C.L. is GRANTED for the reasons outlined herein.

FrNmNGS OF FACT

1. The record docketed al CP-67-DP-12-2015 with the Clerk of Courts in the Court of

Common Pleas in York County was incorporated into the Orphans' Court record docketed

as above with no objection.

2. Rebecca Lynch (hereinafter "Mother") rs the natural mother of C. t_.
(hereinafter "C.L.'l

3. Mother currently resides at 729 Poplar Street, l '1 Floor, York PA l 7402.

� father of C.. L.
4. Andrew Lee Raver (hereinafter "Father") is the leual

5. Father currently resides at 348 Lexington Street, York PA 17403.

6. A Certification of Acknowledgment or Paternity was filed on January 25, 2017, indicating
there is not a claim or Acknowledgment of Paternity on lile with BCSE for C.L. Father

was declared the legal fathcroCC.L. as the result of a DRS action.

7. C.L. has three half-siblings, (hereinafter "0.L.R.") and J: C�
(hereinafter '·J.C.''). whose hearings and reviews were conducted

simultaneously with hearings that pertained to C.L., as well as another half-sibling, who

has not been the subject of any court proceedings.

2
8. The York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (hereinafter .. Agency") filed an

application for emergency protective custody on January 20, 2015. The contents of the

application are incorporated herein. Allegations presented in the application included:

a. The Agency had extensive involvement with the family due to environmental

concerns and mother's mental health issues.

b. The family was accepted for services in 2014 to assist Mother in caring for the

children, obtaining appropriate and stable housing, and providing the mother with

community resources and services.

c. Services were subsequently terminated when Mother signed guardianship of the

children over to Deborah Mclvlillan (hereinafter "Maternal Grandmother").

cl. Mother was residing with Maternal Grandmother.

e. Mother was on probation for assault.

f. On January 9, 2015, the Agency received a referral due to Mother's hospitalization

as a result of a suicide attempt on January 8, 2015. Mother indicated the suicide

attempt was made because the "baby dad denies their son",

g. Mother tested positive for marijuana at the time of her admission into the hospital.

She admitted to using marijuana and marijuana laced with Heroin.

h. Mother was diagnosed with Bi-Polar Disorder, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity

Disorder, Depression. and Borderline Personality. Mother also has n history of

cutting behaviors.

.3
 1. Mother alleged she was the victim of domestic violence in her relationship with

her then paramour.

1. Father of the child was unknown.

k. On January 13, 2015, Mother left the hospital against medical advice and refused

to comply with counseling and other services.

I. Maternal Grandmother agreed Lo continue Lo care for the children and was advised

Mother could not live in the home.

9. A sheller care hearing was held on January 22, 2015. The Court at that Lime made the

following findings, inter alia:

a. Return of C. L. to Mother or Father was not in the best interest of the chi l.. 901 A.}d

516. 520 (Pa.Super. 2006). Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. � 25 l 1 (b):

The court in terminating the rights ct' a parent shall give
primary considcratiou to the developmental. physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights or a
parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis or
environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care i r found Lo
be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any
petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l ). (6). or (8), the
�(1
 court shal I not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy
the conditions described therein which arc first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. � 2511 (b)

"Intangibles such as love, comfort, security and stability are involved when inquiring

about the needs and welfare of the child." in re C.P.. supra. Neither Mother's nor Father's

own feelings of love and affection for the children prevent termination or their parental rights.

See In re Z. P., 994 A.2ci l I 08, l 111 ( Pa.Super. 20 I 0) (imerna 1 ci rations omitted).

"The court must also discern the nature and slaws or the parent-child bond, paying

close attention to the effect 011 the chi lei o f permanently scveri ng the bond." In re C. P.. supra.

Neither expert testimony nor a lonual bonding assessment is required for consideration under

this subsection of the Adoption AcL Sci! In re N.A. M.. 33 A.3d 95, I 03 (Pa.Super, 20 l l ). The

Court can consider the testimony that was presented by caseworkers and other witnesses in

making the determination whether termination would bes! suit the children's developmental.

physical. and emotional wel fore. Id. As recently indicated by tile Superior Court, the court is

not required to ignore safety concerns simply because a bond exists between the child and a

parent. See In re M.M., 106 A.3d l 14 (Pa.Super, 2014).

··A parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of... her chi Id is

converted, upon the parent' s foil me to Cul Ii 11. .. her parental dut ics. to the child's right to have

proper parenting and fulfillment or his or her potential in a permanent, hculrhy, sak

environment." In re A dopl ion of R..J.S., 90 I A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super. 1006) (internal citations

omi tted). A chi Id has tile right to care in a permanent, heal thy. sale en vi ronmcnt. Sec /11 re
'17
K.M., 53 .A..2d 781, 792 (Pu.Super. 2012) (citing In re Adoption of R . .I.S., 901 A.2