2018 IL App (3d) 170020
Opinion filed March 14, 2018
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2018
SLOAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
LABORATORIES, LLC, an Illinois ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
Limited Liability Company, ) Peoria County, Illinois.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 3-17-0020
v. ) Circuit No. 16-MR-478
)
ADVANCED BIOMEDICAL )
INCORPORATED, a Delaware )
Corporation, ) The Honorable
) Katherine Gorman Hubler,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Sloan Biotechnology Laboratories, LLC (Sloan), brought a declaratory
judgment action against defendant, Advanced Biomedical Incorporated (ABI), seeking a ruling
from the trial court that Sloan was not in breach of its contract with ABI. Citing a forum
selection clause in the parties’ contract, ABI filed motions to either transfer venue to the state
court in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, or to dismiss the case. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted ABI’s request and transferred venue to the Ohio state court. Sloan filed a motion to
reconsider and asked the trial court to reverse its prior ruling or, in the alternative, to amend its
prior ruling to show that the case had been dismissed rather than transferred. After a hearing, the
trial court granted the motion to reconsider in part, reversed the prior ruling in its entirety, and
entered an order dismissing Sloan’s complaint for declaratory judgment. Sloan appeals. We
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Sloan was an Illinois limited liability company and had its principal place of business in
Peoria, Illinois. ABI was a Delaware corporation and had its principal place of business in
Dublin, Ohio. In March 2015, Sloan entered into an exclusive manufacturing agreement
(manufacturing agreement) with ABI wherein Sloan agreed to manufacture a nonalcohol based
hand sanitizer lotion and derivatives of that product for ABI. The manufacturing agreement
incorporated by reference a prior nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that had been entered into
between the parties in June 2014 (the 2014 NDA was entered into between Sloan and ABI’s
predecessor and was later assigned to ABI). The following year, the parties entered into another
NDA, which was substantially the same as the prior NDA. The manufacturing agreement and the
two NDAs constituted the parties entire agreement (collectively referred to as the contract) for
the purposes of this appeal.
¶4 In June 2016, Sloan filed the instant declaratory judgment action against ABI in the state
trial court in Peoria County, Illinois. In addition to most of the information set forth above, Sloan
alleged in its complaint that (1) it had performed all of its obligations under the parties’ contract
and (2) ABI had delivered to Sloan a demand letter claiming that Sloan had breached the contract
and demanding that Sloan take (or refrain from taking) certain actions. Sloan asked the trial court
to enter a declaration that Sloan had not breached the contract. Copies of the parties’ contract
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(the manufacturing agreement and the two NDAs) and the demand letter were attached to the
declaratory judgment complaint as supporting documents.
¶5 Of relevance to this appeal, the manufacturing agreement contained the following
provisions:
“12. CONFIDENTIALITY.
The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that the information contained
in this Agreement and all exhibits hereto is considered ‘Confidential Information’
as such term is defined in the June 17, 2014 Restatement of Non-Disclosure
Agreement between SLOAN and ABI (the ‘NDA Agreement’) and is governed
by the terms of such NDA Agreement. The parties further acknowledge and agree
that June 17, 2014 Restatement of NDA Agreement remains in full force and
effect and is hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth in this
Agreement.
***
16. GOVERNING LAW.
This Agreement shall be deemed made in Peoria, Illinois, and the validity
and interpretation thereof shall be governed by the laws of the state of Illinois
without regard to its conflict of law principles.”
The manufacturing agreement did not, however, contain a forum selection clause.
¶6 Also of relevance to this appeal, the NDAs contained the following provisions:
“11. Governing Law. The validity, performance, construction and effect
of this Agreement will be governed by the laws of Ohio and the federal laws of
the United States, without regard to conflict of laws. If any international treaties
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or conventions are applicable to this Agreement, then the parties, to the greatest
extent possible, shall opt out of such treaties and conventions being applied to this
Agreement. This Agreement may be enforced in the courts sitting in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, and in other courts and before other bodies to the extent required to
protect the Disclosing Party’s [ABI’s] rights. The prevailing party in any litigation
relating to this Agreement or a party’s performance hereunder shall be entitled to
recovery of its reasonable legal fees and all of its reasonable costs and expenses
incurred in connection with the litigation.
12. Equitable Remedies. The Parties recognize that serious injury
could result to the Disclosing Party [ABI] and its business if the Receiving Party
[Sloan] breaches its obligations under this Agreement. Therefore, Receiving Party
agrees that the Disclosing Party will be entitled to a restraining order, injunction
or other equitable relief, the scope and extent of which shall be determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, sitting in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, if Receiving
Party breaches its obligations under this Agreement, in addition to any other
remedies and damages that would be available at law or equity.
***
16. Miscellaneous. The headings used in this Agreement are for
reference and convenience only and will not enter into the interpretation of this
Agreement. This Agreement shall not be construed against either Party as the
drafter of this Agreement.”
¶7 In July 2016, ABI filed a motion to transfer venue in this case to Cuyahoga County,
Ohio. ABI also filed, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to section 2-615 of
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the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)). In the motions, ABI
alleged that (1) earlier that month, it had filed a lawsuit against Sloan in the state court in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for breach of the manufacturing agreement and the NDAs and for
injunctive relief “inextricably intertwined with the issues raised by Sloan” in the present case; (2)
the terms of the NDAs provided for exclusive venue in Cuyahoga County, Ohio; (3) it was
unclear under Illinois law whether transfer or dismissal was the appropriate remedy, so ABI filed
a motion requesting each remedy in the alternative; and (4) in addition to the forum selection
clause, dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code was also appropriate because Sloan had failed
to state a claim for declaratory relief in its complaint in that it had alleged insufficient facts and
was improperly seeking a declaration of nonliability for past conduct. Attached to the motions as
supporting documents were ABI’s memoranda setting forth its position in greater detail, copies
of the agreements, and a copy of the breach of contract complaint that ABI had filed in the state
court in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
¶8 In September 2016, Sloan filed its responses, opposing ABI’s motions to transfer or
dismiss. Attached to the responses, among other things, was an affidavit of Sloan’s president,
Donald Stephens, in support of Sloan’s claim that all of the relevant events, materials, and
witnesses in this case were in Peoria, Illinois.
¶9 The following month ABI filed replies to Sloan’s responses. Attached to the replies was
an affidavit of ABI’s president, William Fouss, in support of ABI’s claim that the preponderance
of the relevant events, materials, and witnesses in this case were in Ohio.
¶ 10 In October 2016, a hearing was held on ABI’s motions to transfer venue or to dismiss the
case. During the hearing, the parties presented their oral arguments to the trial court. Of
relevance to this appeal, ABI’s attorney stated, among other things:
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“Does the court have a preference in the order? I have two arguments. I
have two motions filed. One is the motion to transfer venue. One is a motion to
dismiss. I’ll just note for the record I think they’re directly related, if for no other
reason, because there’s a procedural question as to how the Court would grant the
relief we’re seeking if it decided to do so. We got one string of Illinois law that
says it must be under the venue statute. We also have Illinois case law that says
the proper procedural matter to address this would be an outright dismissal. I’ll
leave that up to the Court. That’s a primary reason why we brought both
motions.”
¶ 11 In response to a question asked during the hearing, ABI’s attorney told the trial court that
the case that ABI had filed in the state court in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, had been removed to
federal court on Sloan’s motion. After listening to the arguments of the attorneys, the trial court
took the case under advisement.
¶ 12 At a later court date the following month, the trial court announced its decision. As it was
doing so, the following conversation ensued:
“THE COURT: *** And in reviewing all of this, it’s pretty clear to this
Court that both corporations, who are sophisticated, contracted to have their
matters heard in Cuyahoga, Ohio, and Illinois law presumes validity and
enforcement of an expressly agreed-upon forum selection clause, and I find that
the contracts entered into in June of 2014 and October of 2015 do just that.
So I’m gonna find that this should be heard in Ohio. And my inclination—
well, I’ll just ask if there would be an agreement on whether it’s dismissed or
transferred. Does anybody have a real strong preference on—
6
[SLOAN’S ATTORNEY]: None, because I couldn’t figure out what
procedurally is—
THE COURT: Well—
[SLOAN’S ATTORNEY]: I’d say transferred but—
THE COURT: I—it’s not clear to me whether it should be dismissed or
transferred. So in an abundance of caution so that nobody’s prejudice[d]—
[SLOAN’S ATTORNEY]: Prejudice[d]. Yeah.
THE COURT: —as far as how things were done procedurally, I’ll just
transfer it—
[SLOAN’S ATTORNEY]: Okay.
THE COURT: —to Ohio, and then you can sort it out.
[SLOAN’S ATTORNEY]: Okay.
***
[ABI’S ATTORNEY]: To my—my only other question is, I apologize, but
what do you mean when you say ‘you will transfer’? Just entering an order that
says ‘transfer’?
THE COURT: I’m gonna grant a motion to transfer venue as opposed to
dismissing it for improper venue. And the reason I’m doing that is so that nobody
is prejudice[d] because of some things that have been done procedurally and then
you can sort it out in Ohio.
[ABI’S ATTORNEY]: Sure.
THE COURT: Okay?
[ABI’S ATTORNEY]: Okay.”
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¶ 13 After a written order was entered transferring venue in this case to Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, Sloan filed a motion to reconsider that order or, in the alternative, to amend it. In the
motion, Sloan alleged that (1) after the trial court made its ruling in this case, the federal court in
the Ohio case issued an order abstaining from exercising jurisdiction and staying the Ohio case
pursuant to the Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976), abstention doctrine; (2) in this case, the Peoria County trial court’s interpretation of the
forum selection clause contained in the NDAs was incorrect under Ohio law; (3) the trial court in
this case should reconsider its prior ruling; (4) in the alternative, the trial court in this case should
amend its prior ruling and dismiss this case, as opposed to transferring it to Ohio, because
transfer of venue to a foreign court is improper under Illinois law; and (5) dismissal would allow
the parties to retain their appeal rights. Sloan attached to the motion to reconsider a copy of the
federal court’s ruling in the Ohio case.
¶ 14 ABI filed a motion to strike the motion to reconsider. ABI attached to the motion to strike
a notice indicating that the state court in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, had accepted the transfer of
this case from Illinois, had docketed the case, and had assigned the case to a judge. Sloan filed a
response and opposed the motion to strike.
¶ 15 In December 2016, a hearing was held on Sloan’s motion to reconsider or amend and on
ABI’s motion to strike. After some brief discussion with the attorneys, the trial court granted
Sloan’s motion to reconsider or amend, in part, and dismissed this case. In so doing, the trial
court stated:
“Well, as I previously stated, I mean, there’s no question this should all be
happening in Ohio. Period. And the only reason I didn’t rule one way or the other
is because I didn’t want to compromise your rights.
8
So that’s—and—and nobody really—everybody was kinda like, well,
we’re not sure exactly whether it’s transfer or dismiss. So if—given the fact that I
would’ve just dismissed it, we wouldn’t have—we wouldn’t have all these issues.
And no one had a strong position when we were here initially.”
The trial court entered a written order that Sloan had prepared reversing the trial court’s previous
ruling in its entirety and dismissing the case. Sloan filed this appeal to challenge the trial court’s
ruling.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, Sloan argues that the trial court erred in granting ABI’s section 2-615 motion
to dismiss Sloan’s complaint for declaratory judgment. Sloan asserts that the motion to dismiss
should have been denied because the parties’ contract does not require Sloan to litigate this case
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, or prohibit Sloan from bringing this case in Peoria County, Illinois.
In making that assertion, Sloan acknowledges that paragraph 12 of the NDAs contains a
mandatory forum selection clause but denies that it applies in this case. Rather, Sloan maintains
that the mandatory forum selection clause only applies to suits brought by ABI for injunctive or
other equitable relief for breach of the nondisclosure provisions and only for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of any such injunctive relief that may be granted. According to
Sloan, if any forum selection clause applies in this case, it is the permissive forum selection
clause contained in paragraph 11 of the NDAs that allows a lawsuit, such as the one in the
present case, to be brought in any court. In the alternative, Sloan asserts that the mandatory
forum selection clause is unenforceable because the chosen forum is so inconvenient, under the
circumstances of the present case in which almost all of the relevant witnesses, documents, and
materials are in Peoria, that it would, in effect, provide Sloan with no remedy at all. For all of the
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reasons stated, Sloan asks that we reverse the trial court’s dismissal order; that we find that
venue is appropriate in Peoria County, Illinois; and presumably, that we remand this case for
further proceedings.
¶ 18 ABI argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support of
that argument, ABI asserts first that Sloan has waived its claim of error on appeal by asking the
trial court to dismiss the case in Sloan’s motion to reconsider and by submitting the proposed
dismissal order that the trial court approved and entered. Thus, ABI contends that Sloan invited
or induced the trial court to make the alleged erroneous dismissal and that Sloan cannot now
challenge that dismissal on appeal. Second, ABI asserts that even if Sloan’s claim of error is not
waived, it should still be rejected by this court because the parties’ agreement specifically and
mandatorily provides that venue for cases such as this shall be in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, as the
trial court correctly found. In making that assertion, ABI maintains that the mandatory forum
selection clause is not limited to claims for injunctive relief, as Sloan suggests but, rather, applies
to all cases involving Sloan’s alleged breach of the contract, regardless of the remedy being
sought. ABI maintains further that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the NDAs are not ambiguous or in
conflict and can be easily harmonized in that paragraph 11 addresses the jurisdictions where ABI
can seek to protect its rights (any jurisdiction) and paragraph 12 addresses the locale where the
parties must litigate disputes regarding Sloan’s alleged breach of the contract (the selected Ohio
forum), such as those disputes raised in the present case. In addition, ABI contends that the
mandatory forum selection clause in the present case is valid and enforceable and that Sloan’s
claim as to inconvenience is wholly irrelevant in this context or, at the very least, that it must be
balanced against the inconvenience that would result to ABI if this case was not litigated in the
designated forum. ABI contends further that when an agreement contains both a mandatory and a
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permissive forum selection clause, the mandatory forum selection controls over the permissive
one. Third and finally, ABI asserts that even if the trial court’s reasoning on venue was incorrect,
dismissal was still proper in this case because Sloan’s complaint failed to state a cause of action
for declaratory judgment in that the complaint (1) sought a declaration of nonliability for past
conduct, which is not actionable under Illinois law, and (2) failed to allege sufficient facts under
Illinois pleading standards. For all of the reasons set forth, ABI asks that we affirm the trial
court’s dismissal order.
¶ 19 In reply to ABI’s assertions, Sloan repeats many of the same arguments that it made
initially. Sloan does, however, make some additional assertions about ABI’s waiver argument
and about ABI’s failure-to-state-a-claim argument. First, as to ABI’s waiver argument, Sloan
contends that waiver does not apply here because Sloan’s motion to reconsider was ultimately
requesting that the trial court reverse its previous ruling and deny ABI’s motion to transfer or
dismiss the case. According to Sloan, it requested in the alternative that the trial court amend the
previous order and change it to a dismissal order, rather than a transfer order, because it believed
that the trial court had erred, as a matter of civil procedure, by transferring the case, instead of
dismissing it. Further, Sloan contends it prepared and submitted the proposed order after the trial
court requested that Sloan do so. Second, as to ABI’s failure-to-state-a-claim argument, Sloan
contends that its declaratory judgment complaint was sufficient under the law. Sloan asserts that
in the complaint it was not seeking a declaration of nonliability for past conduct but, rather, was
seeking the right to continue acting in the future, with regard to the contract, as it had acted in the
past and was challenging the current allegations that were being made by ABI. Sloan points out
that the trial court did not rule upon the sufficiency of the complaint and asserts that, if this court
reaches that issue, it should remand the case for the trial court to decide the issue and to allow
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Sloan to file an amended complaint if the need arises. Ultimately, Sloan again asks that we
reverse the trial court’s dismissal order; that we find the venue is appropriate in Peoria County,
Illinois; and presumably, that we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 20 I. Standard of Review
¶ 21 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based
upon defects that are apparent on the face of the complaint. Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515,
531 (2007). In determining whether a complaint is legally sufficient, a court must accept as true
all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Id. The
critical inquiry in deciding a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the
complaint, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted. Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass’n
v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 424 (1999). A cause of action should not be dismissed
pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of
facts that will entitle the plaintiff to relief. Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 531. In reviewing a trial court’s
ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the appellate court applies a de novo standard of
review. Id. at 530-31. When de novo review applies, the appellate court performs the same
analysis that the trial court would perform. Direct Auto Insurance Co. v. Beltran, 2013 IL App
(1st) 121128, ¶ 43. The appellate court may affirm a trial court’s grant of a section 2-615 motion
to dismiss on any basis supported by the record. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. of New
York v. Westhaven Properties Partnership, 386 Ill. App. 3d 201, 220 (2007). In addition, as will
be discussed later in this decision, our ruling on the main issue in this particular case turns on an
interpretation of the parties’ contract. Contract interpretation is a matter that is also subject to
de novo review on appeal. Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 219 (2007).
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¶ 22 II. ABI’s Assertion of Waiver
¶ 23 Before we reach the merits of the parties’ arguments on appeal, we must first address
ABI’s assertion that Sloan waived its claim of error by asking the trial court to enter the
dismissal order in Sloan’s motion to reconsider and by preparing and submitting the dismissal
order that the trial court eventually entered. It is well settled that a party may not complain on
appeal about an error that it invited or induced the trial court to make. McMath v. Katholi, 191
Ill. 2d 251, 255 (2000); Stephens v. Taylor, 207 Ill. 2d 216, 222-24 (2003). When a party invites
or induces the trial court to commit error, we do not inquire into the party’s motivations for
doing so. See Stephens, 207 Ill. 2d at 222-24. The party’s motivations for inviting or inducing the
trial court to commit error are irrelevant. Id. That being said, under the circumstances of the
present case, we cannot agree with ABI’s claim that Sloan invited or induced the trial court to
enter the allegedly erroneous dismissal order. It was ABI, and not Sloan, who initially moved for
transfer or dismissal. Because of the uncertainty on this issue under Illinois law, neither the
parties nor the trial court was sure of the appropriate remedy to award ABI. However, when
Sloan learned that under the case law, a transfer to a foreign jurisdiction was not allowed, it
appropriately informed the trial court that it had entered the wrong remedy under the law. We
find, therefore, that Sloan did not waive its claim of error under the circumstances of this
particular case.
¶ 24 III. Validity of the Mandatory Forum Selection
Clause Contained in Paragraph 12 of the NDAs
¶ 25 Having determined that there was no waiver in this case, we turn to the merits of the
parties’ arguments on appeal and must first decide whether the mandatory forum selection clause
contained in paragraph 12 of the NDAs was valid and enforceable. Pursuant to the provisions of
the NDAs, we are required to apply Ohio law in answering that question.
13
¶ 26 Ohio law recognizes that parties to a contract may agree to submit their disputes to a
particular court by placing a forum selection clause to that effect in their contract. See Salehpour
v. Just A Buck Licensing, Inc., 2013-Ohio-4436, ¶ 10. There are generally two types of forum
selection clauses: permissive and mandatory. State ex rel. Cordray v. Makedonija Tabak 2000,
189 Ohio App. 3d 73, 2010-Ohio-2903, 937 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 15. A permissive forum selection
clause allows the parties to submit their dispute to a designated forum but does not prohibit
litigation elsewhere. Id. A mandatory forum selection clause, on the other hand, provides an
exclusive forum for litigation under the agreement as the only place where the parties are
allowed to submit their dispute. See id. Use of the words “may” or “should” in a forum selection
clause indicates that the parties intended the clause in question to be permissive in nature. Id.
¶ 16. Whereas, use of the word “shall” tends to signify that the parties intended the forum
selection clause to be mandatory. See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Brescia, 126 N.E. 51, 52 (Ohio
1919). For a forum selection clause to be considered mandatory, however, the clause must
clearly display the intent of the contracting parties to choose a particular forum to the exclusion
of all others. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-2903, ¶ 15.
¶ 27 In the present case, there is no dispute between the parties that paragraph 11 of the NDAs
contains a permissive forum selection clause and that paragraph 12 of the NDAs contains a
mandatory forum selection clause. Instead, the dispute between the parties in this appeal centers
on how the forum selection clauses are to be interpreted, how the forum selection clauses are to
be applied, and whether the forum selection clauses should be enforced. Again, we turn to Ohio
law to resolve those questions.
¶ 28 Under Ohio law, a forum selection clause contained in a commercial contract between
two business entities (commercial forum selection clause) is prima facie valid, as long as it was
14
bargained for freely. Kennecorp Mortgage Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Hospital,
Inc., 610 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ohio 1993). A commercial forum selection clause, therefore, will
generally be enforced, absent a strong showing that it should be set aside. Id. Enforcement of a
commercial forum selection clause will be rejected, however, where either one of the two
following conditions is clearly present: (1) where the clause was the product of fraud or
overreaching; or (2) where enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable and unjust in that it
would essentially deprive the opposing party of its day in court or would be against public
policy. See id.; Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power Engineering Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 429,
2007-Ohio-257, 860 N.E.2d 741, ¶ 17.
¶ 29 In the present case, Sloan does not allege fraud or overreaching and has made no showing
that enforcement of the mandatory forum selection clause contained in paragraph 12 would
essentially deprive it of its day in court or would be against public policy. See Kennecorp
Mortgage Brokers, Inc., 610 N.E.2d at 989. Sloan merely alleges, in effect, that having to litigate
this breach of contract case in Ohio would be inconvenient. Such an allegation is not sufficient,
however, to negate the application of the mandatory forum selection clause. See id. at 988-89 (a
minimum-contacts analysis, as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945), and its progeny, does not apply in determining the validity of a commercial forum
selection clause). Thus, the mandatory forum selection clause is valid and enforceable. The only
question that remains to be resolved is how that forum selection clause should be interpreted.
That question is one of contract interpretation.
¶ 30 IV. Interpretation of the Mandatory Forum Selection Clause
¶ 31 The rules of contract interpretation under Ohio law are well established and are similar to
the rules of contract interpretation under Illinois law. Compare, e.g., In re All Kelley & Ferraro
15
Asbestos Cases, 104 Ohio St. 3d 605, 2004-Ohio-7104, 821 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 29 (setting forth some
of the rules of contract interpretation under Ohio law), with Gallagher, 226 Ill. 2d at 232-33
(setting forth some of the rules of contract interpretation under Illinois law). The main goal of
contract interpretation under Ohio law is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties,
which a court presumes rests in the language that the parties chose to use in their contract. All
Kelley, 2004-Ohio-7104, ¶ 29. In determining the parties’ intent, a court must read the contract
as a whole and must attempt to give effect to, and harmonize, every part of the contract. See id.;
Ford Motor Co. v. John L. Frazier & Sons Co., 196 N.E.2d 335, 337-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
Common words in a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity
results or unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall contents of the
contract itself, and technical words will be given their technical meaning unless a different
intention is clearly expressed. Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority, 678 N.E.2d 519, 526 (Ohio 1997). When the terms of a contract are clear
and unambiguous, the trial court need not go beyond the plain language of the contract to
determine the rights and obligations of the parties. All Kelley, 2004-Ohio-7104, ¶ 29. “However,
if a term cannot be determined from the four corners of a contract, factual determination of intent
or reasonableness may be necessary to supply the missing term.” Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v.
Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ohio 1984) (applying that rule
of contract interpretation in the context of a summary judgment proceeding). That being said, it
must be remembered that it is not the role of the court to alter a contract by construction or to
make a new contract for the parties; rather, it is the court’s duty to interpret the contract that the
parties have made for themselves. See In re All Kelley & Ferraro Asbestos Cases, 153 Ohio
16
App. 3d 458, 2003-Ohio-3936, 794 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 57, rev’d on other grounds, 2004-Ohio-7104,
¶ 42.
¶ 32 Applying the Ohio rules of contract interpretation in the present case, we find that the
forum selection clause contained in paragraph 12 of the NDAs, while mandatory, is not nearly as
broad as ABI suggests. To give paragraph 12 such a meaning would negate the permissive forum
selection clause contained in paragraph 11. The only way to harmonize the two forum selection
clauses (paragraph 11 and paragraph 12) is to interpret the mandatory forum selection clause
very narrowly, as indeed it is so worded. We conclude, therefore, that the mandatory forum
selection clause only applies to cases brought by ABI for breach of the nondisclosure provisions
and only for the purpose of determining the scope of any restraining order, injunctive relief, or
equitable relief that may be awarded in such a case. As Sloan correctly points out, that is not the
situation before the court in the present case. Thus, we agree with Sloan that there is no provision
in the manufacturing agreement or in the NDAs that prohibits Sloan from bringing the instant
declaratory judgment action in the Peoria County trial court. The trial court erred in ruling to the
contrary.
¶ 33 Having made that determination, we will not reach the other main assertion set forth by
ABI—that its motion to dismiss should be granted because Sloan failed to state a claim for
declaratory relief in its complaint. The trial court did not rule upon that particular argument and
will undoubtedly face a motion to amend the complaint by Sloan if the trial court determines that
the complaint is insufficient. We, therefore, remand this case for the trial court to decide that
issue and any other matters that may arise.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
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¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County
and remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 36 Reversed and remanded.
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