15‐1777
Chauca v. Abraham
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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August Term, 2016
(Argued: September 9, 2016 Certified: November 1, 2016
Final Submission: November 20, 2017 Decided: March 16, 2018)
Docket Nos. 15‐1720 (L), 15‐1777 (XAP)1
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VERONIKA CHAUCA,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
– v. –
JAMIL ABRAHAM, individually, PARK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, a.k.a. Park
Health Center, ANN MARIE GARRIQUES, individually,
Defendants‐Appellees.
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B e f o r e:
KATZMANN, Chief Judge, SACK and HALL, Circuit Judges.
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1 15‐1720 was closed by an order filed on 10/6/15.
Appeal from a decision of the district court denying plaintiff’s request for a
jury instruction concerning punitive damages for pregnancy discrimination
claims arising under the New York City Human Rights Law. Having certified to
the New York Court of Appeals the question of the appropriate standard for
determining whether a defendant may be liable for damages under the New
York City Human Rights Law, we now conclude that the district court erred in
applying the test for whether punitive damages are available under substantive
federal law. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and
we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Chester, NY (Anne
Donnelly Bush, Law Offices of Anne Donnelly Bush,
Hastings‐on‐Hudson, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff‐Appellant.
ARTHUR H. FORMAN, Forest Hills, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.
Joshua Friedman, Friedman & Houlding, LLP, Mamaroneck, NY, for
Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers
Association/New York.
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PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff‐Appellant Veronika Chauca appeals from a judgment of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.)
following a jury verdict in her favor. We assume familiarity with our earlier
opinion in this matter, as amended on November 8, 2016. Chauca v. Abraham, 841
F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Before Chauca’s claims were submitted to the jury, the district court
denied Chauca’s request to provide a jury instruction concerning the availability
of punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).
It declined to do so because there was “no showing of malice, reckless
indifference [or] that there was an intent to violate the law,” App. 411, the
standard for an award of punitive damages under the corresponding provisions
of federal law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, see Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 529‐30 (1999) (“Punitive damages are limited . . . to cases in
which the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so
‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1))).
In our prior opinion, we concluded that New York case law does not
clearly resolve the issue raised by this case, and we thus certified the following
question to the New York Court of Appeals: “What is the standard for finding a
defendant liable for punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights
Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8‐502?” Chauca, 841 F.3d at 95. The Court of Appeals
recently resolved the certified question by holding that “the standard for
determining damages under the NYCHRL is whether the wrongdoer has
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engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or
a ‘conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount
to such disregard.’” Chauca v. Abraham, 89 N.E.3d 475, 481 (N.Y. 2017) (quoting
Home Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 934 (N.Y. 1990)).
In doing so, it expressly rejected the application of the federal standard for
punitive damages, explaining that the NYCHRL “requires neither a showing of
malice nor awareness of the violation of a protected right” because
“implementing a lower degree of culpability and eschewing the knowledge
requirement . . . adheres to the [New York] City Council’s liberal construction
mandate” that “‘[t]he provisions of [the NYCHRL] shall be construed liberally
. . . regardless of whether federal or New York state civil and human rights laws
. . . have been so construed.’” Id. at 480 (alterations in original, quoting N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8‐130(a)). We thus hold that the district court did not apply the
proper standard in declining to submit the question of punitive damages to the
jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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