UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-7698
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL W. MCBRIDE,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:12-hc-02316-H; 5:15-hc-02234-
H)
Submitted: February 28, 2018 Decided: March 16, 2018
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jaclyn L. DiLauro, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Matthew L.
Fesak, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael W. McBride appeals the district court’s order finding him to be a sexually
dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the
“Adam Walsh Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247-4248 (2012), and civilly committing him to the
custody of the Attorney General. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district
court’s order.
Under the Adam Walsh Act, an individual is subject to civil commitment if the
government establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual
(1) previously engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct
or child molestation (the prior conduct prong); (2) currently suffers from a
serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder (the serious mental illness
prong); and (3) as a result of that mental condition, the individual would
have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
molestation if released (the volitional control prong).
United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the court’s
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
McBride first contends that the district court erred in failing to give preclusive
effect to its previous dismissal of two petitions filed by the Government seeking to have
him civilly committed. “[T]here is no statutory limitation on the number of times the
government may certify an individual or requirement that successive commitment efforts
rely on new or different facts or legal theories.” Springer, 715 F.3d at 543. However,
“[t]he preclusive effect of the district court’s judgment, affirmed on appeal, prevents the
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government from attempting to commit [an individual] based on nothing more than the
same evidence originally found inadequate by the district court.” Id. at 544.
We conclude that the district court correctly applied our decision in Springer. The
district court recognized that it had previously concluded that McBride did not meet the
criteria for civil commitment. The court then assessed whether the events that occurred
after the previous hearing warranted a different conclusion. Moreover, to the extent that
the district court considered allegations that McBride sexually abused his former
girlfriend’s daughter, the district court did not previously rule that McBride did or did not
commit the alleged abuse, and the district court correctly considered these allegations in
analyzing whether the events that occurred after the previous hearing warranted
committing McBride. See United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 458 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“When the question is whether an inmate suffering from pedophilia will have serious
difficulty refraining from re-offending if released, consideration of the nature of his prior
crimes provides a critical part of the answer.”).
Next, McBride contends that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he
would have serious difficulty refraining from engaging in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation. Under clear error review, we “may not reverse a lower court’s finding
of fact simply because [we] would have decided the case differently. Rather, [we] must
ask whether, on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 451 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, as long as “the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it even though convinced
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that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence
differently.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, when a district court’s
findings of fact are based on credibility determinations, we accord “even greater
deference to the trial court’s findings.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, we are “especially reluctant to set aside a finding based on the
trial court’s evaluation of conflicting expert testimony.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that McBride
would have serious difficulty refraining from child molestation. The Government
established by clear and convincing evidence that McBride possessed child pornography.
The Government presented credible testimony that McBride received a laptop computer
with access to the Internet and used the Internet at a nearby hotel. McBride admitted
setting up a Google account connected to 500 images of child pornography.
Additionally, the use of McBride’s former girlfriend’s daughter’s name and birthdate as a
password to access the child pornography clearly links McBride to the pornography.
McBride’s possession of child pornography, when considered in the context of his
past offenses, is enough to establish that he presents a serious risk of engaging in future
acts of child molestation. See United States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 215 (4th Cir.
2013) (affirming district court’s commitment order because possession of child
pornography “support[s] a finding that [appellant] would have serious difficulty
refraining from acts of child molestation if he was released because of his pedophilia”).
McBride’s possession of child pornography demonstrates that he still experiences sexual
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attraction to children. Once the district court concluded that McBride possessed the
pornography, it reasonably accepted the expert testimony that the possession of the
pornography demonstrated a lack of volitional control and rejected McBride’s expert
testimony recommending against commitment based on the assumption he had not
possessed the pornography.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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