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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-15-0000569
19-MAR-2018
08:21 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---
ALBERT BATALONA,
Petitioner and Respondent/Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII,
Respondent and Petitioner/Respondent-Appellee.
SCWC-15-0000569
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-15-0000569; S.P.P. NO. 10-1-0096; CR. NO. 99-1549)
MARCH 19, 2018
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH NAKAYAMA, J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM RECKTENWALD, C.J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
This case arises from a challenge by Albert Batalona
to the order of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit
court) that denied without a hearing Batalona’s post-conviction
petition, which raises twenty-four grounds for relief.
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On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
held that the circuit court erred in denying without a hearing
Batalona’s claims in his petition relating to defense counsel’s
failure to challenge a prospective juror for cause and to secure
at trial the attendance of a co-participant in the robbery whose
out-of-court statement was admitted against Batalona. The ICA
otherwise affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the
petition.
Both the State of Hawaii and Batalona applied to this
court for a writ of certiorari. In his certiorari application,
Batalona contests the ICA’s decision insofar as it affirmed the
circuit court’s order as to the other twenty-two grounds raised
in his petition. The State’s application challenges the ICA’s
determination that defense counsel’s failure to attempt to
obtain the co-participant’s attendance at trial raises a
colorable claim for relief.
First, with regard to Batalona’s certiorari
application, we hold that grounds 8 and 10 of his petition,
which assert that defense counsel’s failure to challenge the
denial of Batalona’s request for a copy of discovery materials
resulted in the impairment of his right to present a complete
defense and adversely affected his waiver of the right to
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testify, raise colorable claims for relief. We otherwise affirm
the ICA’s denial of a hearing with regard to the remaining
grounds set forth in the petition except as to ground 18, which
we dismiss without prejudice.
Second, with respect to the State’s certiorari
application, we affirm the ICA’s determination that ground 20(f)
of Batalona’s petition, which asserts that defense counsel
failed to exercise a good faith effort to obtain the co-
participant’s attendance at trial, raises a colorable claim for
relief.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 12, 1999, Batalona, Sean Matsunaga, and Jacob
Hayme were charged by complaint with bank robbery, in violation
of 18 United States Code § 2113(a), in the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii. Matsunaga and Hayme
were additionally charged with firearm violations. The
complaint against Batalona was subsequently dismissed without
prejudice at the request of the United States Attorney.
On August 11, 1999, a circuit court grand jury
indicted Batalona on seventeen counts under state law, including
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the following: robbery in the first degree in violation of
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-840(1)(b)(ii)1 (count 1);
attempted murder in the first degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-
500,2 707-701(1)(b),3 and 706-6564 (count 2); carrying, using, or
1
A person commits the offense of robbery in the first degree
if, in the course of committing theft:
. . .
(b) The person is armed with a dangerous instrument
and:
. . .
(ii) The person threatens the imminent use of
force against the person of anyone who is present with
intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping
with the property.
HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1998).
2
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if
the person:
(a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as
the person believes them to be; or
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the
circumstances as the person believes them to be,
constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct
intended to culminate in the person’s commission of the
crime.
(2) When causing a particular result is an element of the
crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime
if, acting with the state of mind required to establish
liability with respect to the attendant circumstances
specified in the definition of the crime, the person
intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial
step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such
a result.
(3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step
under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of
the defendant’s criminal intent.
HRS § 705-500 (1993).
3
“A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if
the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of: . . . A peace
(continued . . .)
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threatening to use a firearm in the commission of a separate
felony in violation of HRS § 134-6(a) and (e)5 (count 3); and
possession of a prohibited firearm in violation of HRS § 134-
8(a)6 (count 17). The State thereafter filed a motion for nolle
(. . . continued)
officer, judge, or prosecutor arising out of the performance of official
duties[.]” HRS § 707-701(1)(b) (1993).
4
“Persons convicted of first degree murder or first degree
attempted murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.” HRS § 706-656(1) (1993).
5
HRS § 134-6 (repealed 2006) provided in relevant part as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly
carry on the person or have within the person’s immediate
control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm
while engaged in the commission of a separate felony,
whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable
or not . . . .
. . .
(e) Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall
be guilty of a class A felony. Any person violating this
section by carrying or possessing a loaded firearm or by
carrying or possessing a loaded or unloaded pistol or
revolver without a license issued as provided in section
134-9 shall be guilty of a class B felony. Any person
violating this section by carrying or possessing an
unloaded firearm, other than a pistol or revolver, shall be
guilty of a class C felony.
HRS § 134-6(a), (e).
6
The manufacture, possession, sale, barter, trade, gift,
transfer, or acquisition of any of the following is
prohibited: assault pistols, except as provided by section
134-4(e); automatic firearms; rifles with barrel lengths
less than sixteen inches; shotguns with barrel lengths less
than eighteen inches; cannons; mufflers, silencers, or
devices for deadening or muffling the sound of discharged
firearms; hand grenades, dynamite, blasting caps, bombs, or
bombshells, or other explosives; or any type of ammunition
or any projectile component thereof coated with teflon or
(continued . . .)
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prosequi of counts 4 through 16, which the circuit court
granted.
A. Pretrial Request for Discovery
At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel requested
permission from the circuit court to give Batalona a redacted
copy of the discovery that defense counsel had received.7
Defense counsel indicated that he had been provided
approximately 3,000 pages of discovery and that it was important
for Batalona to receive the discovery because each witness was
going to testify as to events that occurred on the day of the
incident. The circuit court denied defense counsel’s request,
expressing its concern that, if Batalona were permitted to have
a copy of the discovery, then the court will “have every
defendant always asking for information.” The court added that
“there’s very few information that any defendant really needs to
understand in terms of the details of a case” and that defense
(. . . continued)
any other similar coating designed primarily to enhance its
capability to penetrate metal or pierce protective armor;
and any type of ammunition or any projectile component
thereof designed or intended to explode or segment upon
impact with its target.
HRS § 134-8(a) (1993).
7
Counsel informed the court that the discovery materials would be
redacted to remove any personal information of the witnesses.
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counsel “can go to the prison and discuss it with [Batalona].”
Defense counsel responded that it would probably take about one
to two months to review the discovery with Batalona because he
was incarcerated and argued that Batalona was entitled to review
the reports and witness statements against him “word by word.”
The court responded that “[t]here are other ways” and denied
counsel permission to provide a copy of the redacted discovery
to Batalona.
B. Pretrial Motions
Hayme and Matsunaga, who were co-participants in the
robbery, both reached plea agreements with the federal
government. In Matsunaga’s Memorandum of Plea Agreement, he
admitted his involvement in the robbery and identified Batalona
as the person who was responsible for shooting at the officer.
Two days later, Matsunaga provided a recorded statement in which
he implicated himself as the person who shot at the officer.
Hayme also provided a recorded statement, in accordance with his
Memorandum of Plea Agreement, which was both inculpatory and
exculpatory as to his involvement in the charged offenses in
this case.8
8
In their respective plea agreements, Hayme and Matsunaga agreed
to plead guilty to bank robbery and a firearm offense in exchange for the
(continued . . .)
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On July 17, 2000, the State filed a motion in limine
seeking to preclude, inter alia, the admission of Matsunaga’s
recorded statement at trial. In its motion, the State noted
that it did not appear that either Hayme or Matsunaga would be
testifying at trial. Batalona opposed the State’s motion,
arguing, inter alia, that Matsunaga’s recorded statement was
admissible pursuant to the hearsay exceptions regarding public
records and reports and statements against interest.
The State’s motion was heard on July 20, 2000, and the
State reiterated that Matsunaga would not testify at trial.9 The
State contended, alternatively, if Matsunaga’s statement was
admitted into evidence, his Memorandum of Plea Agreement, as
well as Hayme’s recorded statement, would also have to be
admitted. In response, Batalona maintained that Matsunaga’s
recorded statement was admissible and additionally noted that it
(. . . continued)
United States’ agreement to dismiss one count of the information, to not
charge them with any additional charges arising from the July 7, 1999 bank
robbery, and, in its discretion, to move the sentencing court to reduce the
sentence based on the assistance provided. Hayme and Matsunaga also agreed
to testify truthfully at any federal or state trials, hearings, or other
proceedings involving codefendants and others. They further agreed not to
assert any privilege to refuse to testify in any federal or state trial
involving or related to the crimes for which they were charged.
9
The Honorable Marie N. Milks presided over all proceedings
related to the trial in this case.
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was the defense’s desire to call Hayme and Matsunaga to
determine whether they would invoke their privilege against
self-incrimination. Batalona argued that he had a
constitutional right to confront witnesses and a constitutional
right to present his defense.
The circuit court ruled that, if Batalona introduced
Matsunaga’s recorded statement, both that statement and
Matsunaga’s Memorandum of Plea Agreement would be admitted as
evidence. As to Hayme’s recorded statement, the court
determined that the introduction of that statement alone--so
long as the statement was inculpatory to Hayme and fell within a
hearsay exception--would be permitted. The court suggested that
both parties should attempt to get live witnesses, to which the
State responded, “We can’t get them.” The court reiterated that
“you should first try that,” and the State responded, “We’ve
tried that.”
On July 24, 2000, the State filed a motion for
redaction of Hayme’s and Matsunaga’s statements, attaching both
statements and requesting that specific pages and lines be
redacted. The following day, Batalona filed a second
supplemental motion in limine, seeking an order precluding any
references to portions of any statement that do not fall within
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an exception to the hearsay rule or that violate Batalona’s
constitutional right to confrontation.
A hearing on both parties’ motions was held on July
31, 2000. The transcript of this portion of the hearing is not
part of the record on appeal.
C. Trial and Appeal
A jury trial took place from July 27, 2000, through
August 11, 2000. At trial, the following evidence was adduced.
On July 7, 1999, Batalona, Hayme, Matsunaga, and Roger Dailey
were involved in an armed robbery of the American Savings Bank
located at 1215 Hunakai Street in Kahala, Hawaii. At
approximately 10:00 a.m., Batalona, Hayme, Matsunaga, and Dailey
entered the bank wearing ski masks and dark clothes; bank
employees and customers were ordered to get on the floor and
keep their eyes on the ground. The four men removed
approximately $120,000 from the cash drawers and the tellers’
cash dispensers and exited the bank. Batalona and Matsunaga
were each carrying an AR-15 military assault rifle, Dailey held
a .357 revolver, and Hayme was armed with an AK-47 military
assault rifle.
At approximately 10:03 a.m. on that day, Honolulu
Police Department (HPD) Officer Frederick Rosskopf--who was on
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duty and in uniform--was dispatched to the American Savings Bank
in Kahala to investigate the activation of the bank’s silent
alarm. Officer Rosskopf parked his car on the side of the
street on which the bank was located and then walked along the
sidewalk toward the bank. As he approached the bank’s parking
lot, Officer Rosskopf saw a male wearing a dark ski mask and
dark clothing, who appeared to be standing behind a vehicle--
“like a roof of a car in front of him.” The masked male had a
rifle to his right shoulder, which was aimed directly at Officer
Rosskopf. The masked male immediately opened fire upon seeing
Officer Rosskopf, causing Officer Rosskopf to dive for cover
behind a white compact car. The rate of fire quickened, pinning
Officer Rosskopf behind the car. Some of the rounds hit the car
that Officer Rosskopf used as cover. Officer Rosskopf returned
fire but took cover again as the masked male continued firing at
him. The rate of fire eventually slowed to a stop. Officer
Rosskopf received some scratches and bruises as a result of the
incident.
Dailey testified that Batalona stood “in the door jamb
on the passenger side” of the vehicle during the exchange of
gunfire, Batalona’s weapon was pointed in the direction of
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Officer Rosskopf’s car, Batalona fired first, and Hayme and
Matsunaga were still in the bank when the shooting started.10
Siosaia Talakai, a friend whom Batalona stayed with
following the robbery, and who was called as a witness by the
State, testified that Batalona told him that he did not intend
to kill Officer Rosskopf and that his main concern was to get
away.
Following the exchange of gunfire, Officer Rosskopf
saw a white Blazer--which was used as a getaway car--exiting the
parking lot of the American Savings Bank driven by a man wearing
a black ski mask and dark clothing. After providing dispatch
with a description of the vehicle and the vehicle’s direction of
travel, Officer Rosskopf proceeded toward the bank parking lot.
Upon reaching a wooden fence, Officer Rosskopf saw another male
wearing a dark ski mask running toward Kahala Mall. Officer
Rosskopf could not tell whether that masked male was the same
person who shot at him.
10
Dailey also reached a plea agreement with the federal government
in which he agreed to plead guilty to bank robbery in exchange for the United
States’ agreement to not charge him with any additional charges arising from
the July 7, 1999 bank robbery, and, in its discretion, to move the sentencing
court to reduce the sentence based on the assistance provided. The other
terms of the plea agreement were similar to Hayme’s and Matsunaga’s plea
agreements. See supra note 8.
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Hiroshi Inouye, a delivery driver for the Makiki Bake
Shop, was delivering bread and other baked goods using the
shop’s van when a man wearing a ski mask came in front of the
vehicle, causing Inouye to stop the van. The masked man, who
was carrying what appeared to be an automatic rifle, opened the
van door, asked for the keys, and ordered Inouye out of the van;
Inouye complied. The masked man then drove off with the van.
The State argued in closing argument that Batalona was the
masked man who shot at Officer Rosskopf and who took the van.
The van was recovered by police and returned to the
owner of the Makiki Bake Shop the day after the robbery.
Approximately two weeks later, a rifle magazine was discovered
in the passenger side door of the van. The magazine, which had
four remaining cartridges, was turned over to police by the Bake
Shop owner and later admitted into evidence at trial.
Pursuant to an investigation conducted by HPD, it was
discovered that two weapons were fired on the day of the
robbery: the AK-47 that was later recovered from Hayme’s home
and one of the AR-15s. In addition, officers learned that,
about two or three weeks prior to the bank robbery, Batalona,
Dailey, Hayme, and Matsunaga went pig hunting at Waiahole Ranch,
where Batalona fired an AR-15 rifle. Police also learned that
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Batalona was a range instructor at the Diamond Head Gun Shop.
HPD recovered, inter alia, twenty-nine cartridge casings and a
magazine containing thirty cartridges from the bank parking lot
and twenty shell casings from Waiahole Ranch. The two AR-15
rifles that were apparently used in the course of the robbery
were not recovered.
Hayme did not testify, but a redacted version of his
recorded statement was offered by the State, admitted into
evidence,11 and played for the jury.12 The recorded statement was
given--as part of his plea agreement with the federal
government--the day after Hayme pled guilty to robbery and a
firearm violation in federal court. In his statement, Hayme
said that all four robbers were on the passenger side of the
Blazer during the exchange of gunfire. Hayme stated that he did
not fire his weapon until after shots were fired. He also
stated that one person was mounted on top of the Blazer; that
11
The redacted version of Hayme’s recorded statement was admitted
into evidence on August 2, 2000. Defense counsel indicated that there was no
objection to its admission into evidence except for whatever had been
discussed previously. The previous discussions regarding Hayme’s statement
appear to relate to the hearings that were held on July 20, 2000 and July 31,
2000.
12
The redacted version of Hayme’s recorded statement that was
admitted into evidence is not included in the record on appeal and is not
available. As a result, the substance of Hayme’s admitted statement is drawn
from the State’s and the defense’s closing arguments.
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person--who was not Hayme--was firing at Officer Rosskopf.
Hayme further said that he fired about two rounds “[m]aybe just
in the air” and that he did not shoot at Officer Rosskopf.
The State also presented the testimony of Curtis Kubo
and Charles Davis, experts in firearms and ballistics. The
firearms and ballistics evidence indicated that the magazines
recovered from the bakery van and the bank parking lot were
manufactured to function with either an AR-15 or an M-16 rifle.
In addition, twenty-five of the twenty-nine cartridge casings
recovered from the bank parking lot were fired from an AR-15,
which was the same AR-15 that fired the twenty cases recovered
from the ranch. The AR-15 is also chambered for the type of
ammunition found in the magazine recovered from the bakery van.
Following the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief,
the defense moved for judgment of acquittal, which motion the
court denied. The defense offered a redacted version of the
recorded statement of Matsunaga, who did not testify. The
redacted statement was admitted into evidence and played for the
jury.13 In his statement, Matsunaga said that on the day of the
13
Matsunaga’s redacted statement, as admitted at trial, is also not
included in the record on appeal and is not available. Hence, the substance
of Matsunaga’s recorded statement that was played for the jury is drawn from
the parties’ closing arguments.
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incident he was the last person out of the bank, he had an AR-15
rifle, and he shot at Officer Rosskopf. Matsunaga’s recorded
statement contradicted his version of events as set forth in his
Memorandum of Plea Agreement, in which he stated that Batalona
fired numerous rounds at Officer Rosskopf.14
The circuit court subsequently advised Batalona of his
rights to testify and not to testify; Batalona elected not to
testify, and the defense rested.
The circuit court instructed the jury on the lesser
included offenses of attempted murder in the first degree,
attempted assault in the first and second degree, and reckless
endangering in the first degree. Batalona requested that the
court also instruct the jury on attempted murder in the second
degree, attempted reckless manslaughter, and assault against a
police officer, which instructions the court refused. The
parties then presented closing arguments.
The jury found Batalona guilty as charged on all four
counts. The circuit court sentenced Batalona to the following:
count 1, twenty years imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term
14
During the State’s case-in-chief, Matsunaga’s Memorandum of Plea
Agreement and the proffer letter he received from the United States
Attorney’s Office were stipulated into evidence--subject to Batalona’s prior
objections.
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of fifteen years imprisonment; count 2, life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole; count 3, twenty years
imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years
imprisonment; and count 17, five years imprisonment with a
mandatory minimum term of five years. All of the terms of
imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently unless there were
other sentences for which Batalona was already serving. The
court also imposed restitution in the amount of $6,244.02.
Judgment of conviction and sentence was entered on October 11,
2000, from which Batalona appealed. On October 9, 2003, this
court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence in a
summary disposition order. State v. Batalona, No. 23820, 2003
WL 22311769 (Haw. Oct. 9, 2003) (SDO).
D. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
On December 8, 2010, Batalona--proceeding pro se--
filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Hawaii
Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40 (petition), asserting twenty-
two grounds for relief. Batalona filed a motion to supplement
his petition with ground 23, which the circuit court granted.
Batalona later filed a supplemental ground 24. Of the twenty-
four grounds raised in the petition, nineteen involve
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; three involve
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allegations of illegality in the sentence Batalona received; one
involves an allegation of post-conviction denial of access to
discovery; and one involves an allegation of cumulative errors
and omissions that would preclude instructions on lesser
included offenses in a retrial.
Following a series of ex parte motions by the State to
extend the time to file its response, which were primarily
related to the State’s ongoing efforts to obtain a declaration
from defense counsel, the State filed its answer to the petition
on November 17, 2011.15 Batalona thereafter filed a reply to the
State’s answer.
On January 25, 2012, the State filed a supplemental
answer to the petition, which includes a declaration from
defense counsel (Declaration).16 In his Declaration, defense
counsel stated that any error or omission on his part relating
to Batalona’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as
alleged in grounds 1-6, 8-9, 13-17, 19-21, and 23 of the
petition, did not result in the substantial impairment of a
15
After the State filed its answer to the petition, it moved for
issuance of an order to show cause in order to obtain defense counsel’s
declaration.
16
Batalona’s counsel at trial and on direct appeal was David Klein,
Esq.
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meritorious claim or defense and/or was the result of a
strategic or tactical decision. As to ground 10, which involves
an allegation relating to counsel’s advice that Batalona should
not testify at trial, defense counsel stated that the circuit
court conducted a colloquy with Batalona regarding his right to
testify as required by Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawaii 226, 900
P.2d 1293 (1995), adding that any privileged communications
between Batalona and him would not be disclosed without a court
order indicating the privilege was waived. As to grounds 7, 11-
12, 18, and 22, which involve allegations regarding the
propriety of Batalona’s sentence, post-conviction denial of
access to discovery, and cumulative errors and omissions
relating to a retrial, defense counsel declared that these
allegations did not relate to a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
On July 1, 2015, the circuit court issued its
“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Without a Hearing” (Order).17
The court concluded that Batalona’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in grounds 1-6, 8-10, 13-17, 19-21, and 23
17
The Honorable Colette Y. Garibaldi presided over the post-
conviction proceedings.
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were “patently frivolous and without a trace of support” because
Batalona failed to point to specific errors or omissions by
defense counsel resulting from a lack of skill, judgment, or
diligence.18 The circuit court also concluded that grounds 7,
11, 12, 18, and 22 were patently frivolous and without a trace
of support either in the record or from the evidence submitted
by Batalona. Concluding that Batalona failed to demonstrate the
existence of a colorable claim that would have required a
hearing before the circuit court, the court denied Batalona’s
petition without a hearing.19 Batalona filed a notice of appeal
to the ICA.
II. ICA PROCEEDINGS
In his opening brief, Batalona asserted that the
circuit court erred in denying a hearing on twenty-one of the
twenty-three grounds raised in the petition and in not
addressing ground 24.20 Specifically, with regard to ground 1,
18
The circuit court provided no further explanation for its ruling
on Batalona’s claims relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.
19
The circuit court did not address supplemental ground 24, in
which Batalona argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
call witnesses to show that Batalona was inside the bank when shots were
fired.
20
Batalona did not challenge the circuit court’s denial of a
hearing on grounds 11 and 12. With regard to the other twenty-two grounds,
Batalona’s contentions on appeal parallel those stated in his petition. The
(continued . . .)
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Batalona argued that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance by being compelled to use peremptory challenges--that
Batalona wanted to use to excuse other jurors--on two
prospective jurors who should have been challenged and excused
for cause.
As to ground 20(f), Batalona argued that defense
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to secure the
attendance of Hayme and Matsunaga at trial. Batalona submitted
that Hayme and Matsunaga gave investigators recorded statements
that were both favorable and contrary to Batalona’s interests.
Redacted versions of those statements, Batalona continued, were
admitted into evidence and published to the jury in violation of
his right to confrontation of witnesses.
In its answering brief, the State argued, inter alia,
that Batalona’s claim in ground 1 failed as a matter of fact
because Batalona did not demonstrate that the prospective jurors
who allegedly should have been excused for cause were in fact
selected as jury members in Batalona’s trial. In the
(. . . continued)
ICA’s memorandum opinion individually addressed grounds 1 and 20(f), and
therefore these grounds are summarized here. The remaining grounds in the
petition that were denied without a hearing and that Batalona raised on
appeal and certiorari will be addressed infra.
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alternative, the State contended that Batalona’s claim failed as
a matter of law because Batalona did not show that the
prospective jurors had biases favoring law enforcement.
As to ground 20(f) of Batalona’s petition, the State
asserted that the transcripts and the recordings of Hayme’s and
Matsunaga’s statements were admitted into evidence as defense
exhibits.21 In addition, the State argued that defense counsel
used Hayme’s and Matsunaga’s statements in closing argument to
support the defense theory that Batalona was not the person who
shot at Officer Rosskopf. The State contended that the decision
to call a witness to testify is a tactical one that is typically
within the judgment of defense counsel.
In his reply brief, Batalona contended that the issue
in ground 1 was not whether the prospective jurors actually
served on the jury, but rather, counsel’s expending of
peremptory challenges on prospective jurors whom the circuit
court should have excused for cause had they been so challenged.
Thus, according to Batalona, he was left with no peremptory
challenges to use on other jurors having ties to law enforcement
and who ended up serving on the jury in his case.
21
The transcript indicates that Hayme’s redacted statement was
admitted as State’s Exhibit 160.
22
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As to ground 20(f), Batalona replied that the use of
the recordings and the transcripts of Hayme’s and Matsunaga’s
statements would have been permitted if Hayme and Matsunaga were
unavailable, which they were not. Batalona reiterated that
defense counsel’s failure to secure the attendance of Hayme and
Matsunaga violated his right to confrontation.
In its memorandum opinion, the ICA determined as to
ground 1 that it was unclear whether defense counsel would have
succeeded in having the first of the two prospective jurors
identified by Batalona excused for cause, as the juror showed no
bias in favor of law enforcement. However, the ICA concluded
that the second prospective juror may have demonstrated
sufficient bias against Batalona that defense counsel could have
succeeded in challenging that juror for cause, thus preserving
one of his peremptory challenges to excuse another prospective
juror. Concluding that defense counsel’s basis for not
challenging the second prospective juror for cause was unclear
and that his Declaration did not provide an adequate
explanation, the ICA held that Batalona raised a colorable claim
and that the circuit court therefore erred in denying ground 1
of Batalona’s petition without a hearing.
23
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Turning to ground 20(f), the ICA held that the
admission of Matsunaga’s recorded statement did not violate
Batalona’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because
Batalona himself introduced Matsunaga’s statement at trial. As
to Hayme’s statement, the ICA determined that the statement was
testimonial and that the record was unclear whether Hayme was
really unavailable. The ICA found that, while Hayme apparently
refused to testify, there did not appear to be any evidence that
the State made an effort in good faith to secure Hayme’s
attendance at trial. Had Hayme testified, the ICA continued,
Batalona may have cast reasonable doubt on the State’s theory
that Batalona shot at Officer Rosskopf because, as the State
conceded, Hayme also fired his weapon during the robbery. As a
result, if defense counsel did not subpoena Hayme, the ICA
determined that such a failure may have resulted in the
withdrawal or the substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense. Because defense counsel’s Declaration did
not adequately address his decision not to subpoena Hayme, the
ICA concluded that the circuit court should have held a hearing
on this portion of ground 20(f) of Batalona’s petition.
Accordingly, the ICA vacated the circuit court’s Order
and remanded the case for a hearing on grounds 1 and 20(f). As
24
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to the remaining grounds, the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s
denial of a hearing, concluding--without individually
addressing--that “the other twenty-one separate grounds, as well
as the other subparts of Ground 20 in Batalona’s Rule 40
Petition . . . are patently frivolous and [are] without a trace
of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted
by [Batalona].”
Batalona filed an application for a writ of certiorari
challenging the ICA’s decision that affirmed the circuit court’s
denial of a hearing on the other twenty-one grounds. The State
also filed an application, arguing that the ICA erred in holding
that the circuit court should have held a hearing on ground
20(f) regarding defense counsel’s failure to subpoena Hayme.22
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The question on appeal of a denial of a Rule 40
petition without a hearing is whether the trial record indicates
that Petitioner’s application for relief made such a showing of
a colorable claim as to require a hearing before the lower
court.” Dan v. State, 76 Hawaii 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532
22
The State did not challenge the ICA’s ruling on ground 1 that
defense counsel’s failure to challenge a juror for cause raises a colorable
claim.
25
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(1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Allen, 7 Haw. App.
89, 92-93, 744 P.2d 789, 792-93 (1987)). In determining whether
a Rule 40 petition raises a colorable claim, “the appellate
court steps into the trial court’s position, reviews the same
trial record, and redecides the issue.” Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Batalona’s Application for Writ of Certiorari
1. Colorable Claims for Relief
In his application, Batalona asserts twenty-two of the
twenty-four grounds for relief that are raised in his petition.23
Among those grounds is a claim that defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance at trial for failing to challenge the
circuit court’s denial of Batalona’s request for a copy of
discovery materials. Based on this failure, Batalona
respectively contends in grounds 8 and 10 that his right to
participate in his own defense was impaired and his right to
voluntarily waive the right to testify was affected.
Batalona specifically asserts in ground 8 that defense
counsel erred in asking the court’s permission to release
discovery materials to him when Rule 16(e)(3) of the Hawaii
23
Although the grounds are numbered differently in the petition and
the application, they are identical in substance and will be referenced as
numbered in the petition.
26
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Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) places the burden on the State
to show cause why Batalona should not be provided a copy of the
discovery materials.
Batalona’s counsel, on February 15, 2000, made a
pretrial request to provide Batalona with a redacted copy of the
discovery that had been disclosed by the prosecutor. The
request was denied by the circuit court. At the time of
Batalona’s pretrial request, HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) provided as
follows:
Any material furnished to an attorney pursuant to these
rules shall remain in the attorney’s exclusive custody and
be used only for the purposes of conducting the attorney’s
side of the case, and shall be subject to such other terms
and conditions as the court may provide.
HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) (1993). Hence, HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) stated
that discovery materials were to remain in an attorney’s
exclusive custody but that they “shall be subject to such other
terms and conditions as the court may provide.” Counsel
informed the court that the discovery consisted of approximately
3,000 pages and that it was important for Batalona to receive
the discovery because each witness was going to testify as to
events that occurred on the day of the incident. Defense
counsel also explained that it would probably take about one to
two months to review the discovery with Batalona. In denying
defense counsel’s request, the court stated that, if Batalona’s
27
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request was granted, then every defendant will be asking for a
copy of discovery and that counsel could instead go to the
prison to discuss the discovery materials with Batalona.
Effective July 1, 2000, HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) was amended
to read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any
discovery material furnished to an attorney pursuant to
these rules shall remain in the attorney’s exclusive
custody and be used only for the purposes of conducting the
attorney’s side of the case, and shall be subject to such
other terms and conditions as the court may provide. The
attorney may provide the defendant with a copy of any
discovery material obtained if the attorney gives the
prosecutor written notice of the attorney’s intent to do so
and the prosecutor does not file a motion for protective
order within ten (10) days of the receipt of the notice.
HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). Based on the rule
amendment, an attorney was authorized without court permission
to provide a defendant with a copy of discovery materials, so
long as notice of the intent to do so was communicated to the
prosecutor in writing and the prosecutor did not move for a
protective order within ten days of receiving notice.24
24
The dissent argues that ground 8 of Batalona’s petition relates
only to the pre-2000 version of HRPP Rule 16(e)(3). Dissent at 8. On the
contrary, Batalona contends in ground 8 that HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) “places the
burden on the prosecution to show cause why Batalona should not be provided
with discovery.” (Capitalization omitted.) And indisputably, it was the
2000 amendment to HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) that allowed a defense counsel to
provide a copy of the discovery to the defendant, placing the burden on the
prosecutor to move for a protective order upon receiving notice from a
defense counsel that a copy of the discovery was to be provided to the
defendant. Thus, Batalona’s reliance on the 2000 amendment to HRPP Rule
16(e)(3) is markedly apparent.
28
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Trial in this case did not commence until July 27,
2000. Following the amendment to HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) on July 1,
2000, defense counsel could have notified the prosecutor in
writing that he was going to provide Batalona with a copy of the
obtained discovery while also requesting the circuit court to
modify its prior ruling in light of the amended rule. Notice to
the prosecutor would have allowed the State ten days to file a
motion for a protective order. If the prosecutor had objected,
the circuit court would have decided, based upon a showing of
cause, whether to deny, limit, or postpone Batalona’s access to
the discovery, or “make such other order as is appropriate.”
HRPP Rule 16(e)(4) (2000).25 However, nothing in the record
indicates that defense counsel gave the prosecutor written
notice of an intent to provide Batalona with copies of the
discovery, renewed Batalona’s request for discovery after HRPP
Rule 16(e)(3) was amended, or requested that the circuit court
modify its previous ruling.
25
HRPP Rule 16(e)(4) provides in relevant part as follows:
Upon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order
that specified disclosures or investigatory procedures be
denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate, provided that all material and
information to which a party is entitled shall be disclosed
in time to permit counsel to make beneficial use thereof.
29
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“The constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
in a criminal case . . . is satisfied only when such assistance
is ‘effective.’” State v. Kahalewai, 54 Haw. 28, 30, 501 P.2d
977, 979 (1972) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932)). This court has recognized that “effective” counsel
means “counsel whose assistance is ‘within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Id.
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “A
primary requirement is that counsel must conduct careful factual
and legal investigations and inquiries with a view to developing
matters of defense in order that he [or she] may make informed
decisions on [the] client’s behalf, . . . both at pretrial
proceedings . . . and at trial.” State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54,
70, 837 P.2d 1298, 1307 (1992) (third and fourth alterations in
original) (quoting Kahalewai, 54 Haw. at 30-31, 501 P.2d at 979-
80). In a similar fashion, Standard 4-1.2(b) of the American
Bar Association (ABA) Defense Function Standards for Criminal
Justice (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA Defense Function
Standards] provides that the basic duty of defense counsel is
“to render effective, quality representation.”
Additionally, to fulfill their duty as advocates,
“lawyers must take pains to guarantee that . . . their knowledge
30
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[is] up-to-date.” ABA Defense Function Standards § 4-1.2 cmt.
at 123. Defense counsel in this case thus had a duty in the
course of representing Batalona to keep apprised of rules and
amendments that were in place at the time of Batalona’s trial
and to act accordingly. See ABA Defense Function Standards § 4-
1.2 cmt. at 123.
The record does not support a finding that defense
counsel acted in response to the amendment to HRPP Rule
16(e)(3), which related critically to the ability of Batalona
and counsel to prepare for trial upon a charge that carried a
sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole upon
conviction. Batalona contends that the denial of access to
discovery violated his right to present a complete defense and
also adversely impacted his waiver of the right to testify.26
26
The dissent maintains that the 2000 amendment to HRPP Rule
16(e)(3) “permitted, but did not require, defense counsel to provide the
defendant with copies of discovery materials.” Dissent at 9 (emphases
omitted). In this case, there were approximately 3,000 pages of discovery,
which included reports and statements of witnesses adverse to Batalona who
would testify at trial regarding the incident. Defense counsel underscored
to the court the importance for Batalona to review these reports and
statements “word by word” and contended that Batalona was entitled to review
the discovery materials. The circuit court summarily rejected counsel’s
reasons, stating that “there’s very few information that any defendant really
needs to understand in terms of the details of a case.” But it was
Batalona’s inability to review the discovery that he asserts later played a
pivotal role in the trial. Batalona states in ground 10 of his petition that
although he wanted to testify, defense counsel told him that his testimony
would jeopardize defense counsel’s trial strategy because “Batalona was
prohibited from having any discovery.” Thus, while HRPP Rule 16(e)(3) may
(continued . . .)
31
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i. Right to Present a Complete Defense
“Central to the protections of due process is the
right to be accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.” State v. Tetu, 139 Hawaii 207, 219, 386 P.3d
844, 856 (2016) (quoting State v. Kaulia, 128 Hawaii 479, 487,
291 P.3d 377, 385 (2013)). This court has recognized “the well-
established principle that ‘all defendants must be provided with
the basic tool[s] of an adequate defense.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Scott, 131 Hawaii 333, 352, 319 P.3d
252, 271 (2013)).
Batalona contends in ground 8 that the discovery
materials consisted of crucial evidence, including witness
statements, indicating that he was not the shooter and that all
four robbers carried rifles. Batalona states that because he
was denied access to copies of discovery materials, he had no
knowledge of the extent of the State’s evidence against him.
Without the discovery materials, Batalona asserts that he was
unable to exercise his right to defend himself with the
(. . . continued)
not “require” a defense counsel to provide a copy of discovery to a defendant
in every case, it was plainly imperative under the circumstances of this case
for Batalona’s counsel to have taken the necessary steps to provide the
discovery to Batalona, particularly when Batalona was charged with an offense
carrying a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
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effective assistance of counsel. Batalona submits that, had he
been provided access to discovery, he could have used the
knowledge gained to guide defense counsel toward viable defense
options, including the presentation of factual evidence that
would disprove that he was the shooter.
As counsel for Batalona failed to act in response to
the amendment to HRPP Rule 16(e)(3), ground 8 presents a
colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “because if
the facts therein were taken as true, they could change the
verdict” given the crucial information described by Batalona to
be in the discovery materials, of which he was not aware. See
Wilton v. State, 116 Hawaii 106, 122, 170 P.3d 357, 373 (2007)
(citing Barnett v. State, 91 Hawaii 20, 26, 979 P.2d 1046, 1052
(1999)). Defense counsel’s Declaration did not address
Batalona’s contentions in ground 8 except to state that any
omission on his part “did not substantially impair a meritorious
claim or defense, and/or resulted from a strategic or tactical
decision.” Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying
without a hearing ground 8 of Batalona’s petition.
ii. Waiver of the Right to Testify
Batalona asserts in ground 10 that he wanted to
testify but defense counsel repeatedly urged him not to do so.
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According to Batalona, defense counsel told him that his
testimony “would jeopardize [counsel’s] trial strategy” because
“Batalona was prohibited from having any discovery.” Batalona
contends that defense counsel told him “the state will cut you
to pieces – just let me do my job.” “But for counsel’s repeated
urging of Batalona not to testify,” Batalona continues, he would
not have waived his right to testify and his testimony could
have established a defense that he was not the shooter.27
It is a fundamental constitutional guarantee that a
defendant in a criminal trial has a right to testify and a right
not to testify. State v. Monteil, 134 Hawaii 361, 369, 341 P.3d
567, 575 (2014) (citing Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawaii 226, 900
P.2d 1293 (1995)). Consistent with these rights, this court has
recognized that a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Tachibana, 79
Hawaii at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303 (citation omitted). The
decision whether to relinquish the right to testify “must . . .
not [be] the product of coercion or undue influence.” State v.
27
Batalona states that counsel never informed him about the “many”
eyewitness accounts indicating that all four robbers had rifles. According
to Batalona, he told counsel prior to trial that he modified an AR-15 rifle
for Dailey in exchange for proceeds from the robbery and that the modified
AR-15 rifle was used by Dailey at Waiahole Ranch and during the robbery.
34
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Silva, 78 Hawaii 115, 123, 890 P.2d 702, 710 (App. 1995)
(citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Tachibana, 79
Hawaii 226, 900 P.2d 1293.
Batalona contends that defense counsel repeatedly
urged him not to testify because he had not been provided any of
the discovery materials and, as a result, counsel’s trial
strategy would be jeopardized. If taken as true, the alleged
facts in ground 10 of the petition indicate that Batalona’s
waiver of the right to testify may not have been voluntary.
Defense counsel’s Declaration did not specifically address
Batalona’s contentions in ground 10 except to say that the court
conducted a colloquy pursuant to Tachibana and that any
privileged communications between counsel and Batalona would not
be disclosed without an order from the court. Hence, ground 10
raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
as Batalona’s waiver of the right to testify may have been “the
product of coercion or undue influence” because he had not been
provided a copy of the discovery due to defense counsel’s
failure to act in response to the amendment to HRPP Rule
16(e)(3). See Silva, 78 Hawaii at 123, 890 P.2d at 710, see
Barnett v. State, 91 Hawaii 20, 26, 979 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1999)
35
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(citing HRPP Rule 40(f)). Therefore, the circuit court erred in
denying without a hearing ground 10 of Batalona’s petition.
2. Batalona’s Other Claims for Relief
In ground 19 of his petition, Batalona asserts that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance on appeal by
failing to raise a claim that the circuit court erred in not
instructing the jury on the included offense of assault against
a police officer. Batalona contends that there was ample
evidence at trial to permit a jury instruction on this offense.
At trial, Batalona orally requested that the circuit
court instruct the jury on the offense of assault against a
police officer.28 The court denied the requested instruction on
the basis that the offense was not supported by the evidence.
28
The requested instruction read as follows:
If and only if you find the defendant not guilty of
Assault in the Second Degree, or are unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to this offense, then you must
determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of
the included offense of Assault against a Police Officer.
A person commits the offense of Assault against a
Police Officer if he intentionally engages in conduct which
is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or
known to cause bodily injury to a police officer who is
engaged in the performance of duty.
There are 4 material elements of this offense each of
which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
These 4 elements are:
1. That, on or about the 7th day of July, 1999, in
the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, the
Defendant intentionally engaged in conduct; and
(continued . . .)
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HRS § 701-109(5) provides that the court is not
obligated to instruct the jury on an included offense “unless
there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
the defendant of the included offense.” HRS § 701-109(5)
(1993).29 As applied in this case, the circuit court was
required to consider whether there was a rational basis in the
evidence that Batalona “[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or
(. . . continued)
2. That the Defendant’s conduct was a substantial
step in a course of conduct intended or known by the
Defendant to cause bodily injury to Frederick Rosskopf, a
police officer; and
3. That the Defendant was aware, at the time, that
Frederick Rosskopf was a police officer; and
4. That the Defendant acted intentionally or
knowingly to cause bodily injury to Frederick Rosskopf
because of the police officer’s performance of official
duties.
While Batalona orally requested an instruction for “assault against a police
officer,” the instruction included language both for the substantive offense
and for the attempt offense.
29
Assault against a police officer is an included offense of
attempted murder in the first degree pursuant to HRS § 701-109(4) (1993).
Under HRS § 701-109(4), an offense is included in another when
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged;
(b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged
or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same
person, property, or public interest or a different state
of mind indicating lesser degree of culpability suffices to
establish its commission.
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recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [Officer Rosskopf] who
[wa]s engaged in the performance of duty” and that the statutory
requirements for attempted murder in the first degree were not
met. HRS § 707-712.5(1)(a) (1993); HRS § 701-109(5).
Batalona argued that the evidence showed that the jury
could reasonably find that he did not intend to shoot at Officer
Rosskopf but that his firing in Officer Rosskopf’s direction
recklessly placed the officer at risk of bodily injury. The
evidence adduced at trial showed that Officer Rosskopf had
received abrasions as a result of the shooting that had occurred
outside of the bank. In addition, Batalona was a range
instructor who taught shooting and thus, Batalona argued, a jury
could reasonably infer that he may have deliberatively shot in
the direction of, but not directly at, the officer. Further,
according to the State’s witness, Talakai, Batalona informed him
that he was just trying to get away. Thus, there was a rational
basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting Batalona of
attempted murder in the first degree and convicting Batalona of
assault against a police officer. See HRS § 701-109(5).
On direct appeal, defense counsel did not challenge
the circuit court’s refusal to instruct on the offense of
assault against a police officer. To determine whether defense
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counsel rendered ineffective assistance on appeal, a petitioner
must show that counsel did not raise an “appealable issue,”
which is an error or omission by counsel that results in the
withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense. Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 465-66, 848
P.2d 966, 977 (1993). If an appealable issue is omitted, the
question becomes whether, “in light of the entire record, the
status of the law, and the space and time limitations inherent
in the appellate process, a reasonably competent, informed and
diligent criminal attorney would not have omitted that issue.”
Domingo v. State, 76 Hawaii 237, 242, 873 P.2d 775, 780 (1994)
(citing Briones, 74 Haw. at 466-67, 848 P.2d at 977-78).
In this case, there was a rational basis in the
evidence for the circuit court to instruct the jury on the
included offense of assault against a police officer. The
failure by the court to submit this instruction to the jury was
an “appealable issue” in Batalona’s appeal. However, in 2001,
while Batalona’s case was on direct appeal, this court held that
a trial court’s error in failing to give an appropriate
instruction on an included offense was harmless when the
defendant was convicted of the greater offense. State v.
Haanio, 94 Hawaii 405, 415, 16 P.3d 246, 256 (2001), overruled
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by State v. Flores, 131 Hawaii 43, 314 P.3d 120 (2013). The
decision in Haanio overruled State v. Kupau, 76 Hawaii 387, 879
P.2d 492 (1994), as to the effect of a trial court’s error in
not instructing on an included offense having a rational basis
in the evidence. As applied to Batalona’s case, Haanio would
thus hold that the circuit court’s error in not instructing the
jury on assault against a police officer was harmless, given
that the jury convicted Batalona of attempted murder in the
first degree.30 Because Haanio was controlling law that was
recently established at the time of Batalona’s direct appeal,
Batalona has not shown a colorable claim that defense counsel’s
failure to challenge the circuit court’s refusal to instruct on
assault against a police officer constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.31 Accordingly, the circuit court did not
err in denying ground 19 without a hearing.
30
The record reveals that counsel for Batalona was aware of Haanio
at the time he filed the direct appeal, as he questioned the harmless error
holding of Haanio in challenging the circuit court’s refusal to instruct on
two other offenses.
31
As set forth in the State’s answering brief, “Haanio was in turn
overruled by State v. Flores, 131 Hawaii 43, 314 P.3d 120 (2013).” The
Flores decision was issued after Batalona filed his petition, and thus we do
not address this decision in our consideration of the petition.
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The remaining grounds for relief that are asserted in
the petition, which Batalona restates in his application, fall
into five groups. First, in grounds 2, 4, and 20(c), Batalona
raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.32
Second, in grounds 3, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, and supplemental grounds
23 and 24, Batalona raises claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial as it relates to his state and federal
prosecution and the evidence at trial.33 Third, Batalona
challenges in grounds 5, 16, 17, and 21 counsel’s failure to
32
Ground 2 challenges the circuit court’s purported delay in
responding to a jury communication; however, the record lacks any showing of
prejudice. Ground 4 maintains that Batalona could not have been convicted of
count 17 because it is an included offense of counts 1 and 3; however, this
assertion is incorrect, see HRS § 701-109(4). Ground 20(c) submits that
counsel wasted space on a frivolous issue in the opening brief on appeal, but
Batalona does not indicate in this ground specific issues that should have
been argued instead.
33
Batalona’s allegation in ground 3 of improper dismissal of
federal charges is not properly before this court, and his prosecution in
federal and state court is not barred by HRS § 701-112 (1993). Ground 6
incorrectly contends that count 3 improperly joined two offenses in a single
count. Grounds 9 and 13 maintain that counsel failed to argue selective
prosecution; however, these grounds fail to assert a factual basis for a
showing of selective prosecution, see State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62
Haw. 222, 225-27, 615 P.2d 730, 734-35 (1980). Ground 14 contends, without
requisite factual allegations, that counsel failed to challenge the State’s
use of Dailey’s testimony, which counsel purportedly knew to contain false
statements. Ground 15 also fails to present factual allegations in support
of Batalona’s contention regarding counsel’s failure to move to suppress the
AR-15 rifle magazine recovered from the bake shop van. Supplemental grounds
23 and 24 relate to the calling of witnesses and the presentation of evidence
at trial, but the grounds do not identify who counsel should have called and
how such witnesses’ testimonies would have helped the defense.
41
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contest the adequacy of several jury instructions.34 Fourth, in
grounds 20(a), 20(b), 20(d), 20(e), and 20(g), Batalona claims
that counsel failed to raise matters that were of “critical
importance” to his defense.35 And fifth, in grounds 7, 18, and
22, Batalona challenges matters relating to post-conviction, his
sentence of life imprisonment without parole, and a potential
retrial.36 Inasmuch as the aforementioned grounds do not raise a
34
Ground 5 contends that the circuit court failed to instruct the
jury that Batalona cannot be convicted of both count 1 and count 2; however,
Batalona was charged with count 1 under HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(ii), not HRS §
708-840(1)(b)(i). See State v. Ah Choy, 70 Haw. 618, 622, 780 P.2d 1097,
1100-01 (1989). Grounds 16, 17, and 21 challenge the jury instructions on
attempted murder in the first degree, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
criminal attempt; however, when read and considered as a whole, the
instructions were not prejudicially erroneous or insufficient.
35
Ground 20(a) incorrectly contends that the AK-47 rifle should not
have been taken inside the jury room during deliberations. See State v.
Robinson, 79 Hawaii 468, 473, 903 P.2d 1289, 1294 (1995). Ground 20(b) lacks
factual support for its assertion that the State did not have a good faith
basis for its PowerPoint presentation. Ground 20(d) asserts error in
counsel’s failure to call a ballistics expert without identifying who counsel
should have called and how that expert’s testimony would have been favorable
to Batalona’s defense. Ground 20(e) pertains to the sufficiency of the
evidence on the attempted first-degree murder conviction, upon which this
court has previously ruled. See State v. Batalona, No. 23820, 2003 WL
22311769, at *2 (Haw. Oct. 9, 2003) (SDO). Ground 20(g) erroneously
maintains that counsel failed to challenge the State’s ballistics evidence.
36
Ground 7 relates to Batalona’s inability to timely file a federal
habeas corpus petition, which is not properly before this court. Ground 18
maintains that Batalona’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole is
unlawful because the commutation provision is injudiciously applied and the
sentence is cruel and unusual. We do not address ground 18 at this time in
light of the remand for a hearing; therefore, ground 18 is dismissed without
prejudice. Finally, ground 22 incorrectly asserts that cumulative errors and
omissions would preclude instructions on lesser included offenses in a
retrial.
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colorable claim for relief, the circuit court did not err in
denying a hearing on these grounds.
B. State’s Application for Writ of Certiorari
In its application, the State contends that the ICA
erred in holding that the circuit court should have held a
hearing on ground 20(f) of Batalona’s petition on the basis that
there was a colorable claim that defense counsel was ineffective
for not attempting to secure the attendance of Hayme at trial.
At trial, the circuit court admitted as evidence the redacted
statement of Hayme, a co-participant in the robbery who was not
present to testify. Hayme’s statement had the extremely
prejudicial effect of implicating Batalona in the offense of
attempted murder in the first degree while exculpating himself
as to involvement in that offense. See infra.
Under the Hawaii Rules of Evidence, hearsay is
generally inadmissible at trial unless it qualifies as an
exception to the hearsay rule.37 Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE)
Rule 802 (1993). Hayme’s redacted statement was admitted as a
37
Pursuant to Rule 802 (1993) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence
(HRE), “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Hawaii supreme court, or by statute.” As
defined, “‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” HRE Rule 801 (1993).
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statement against interest. An out-of-court statement may
potentially be admitted as a statement against interest under
HRE Rule 804(b)(3) (1993) if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. “Unavailability as a witness” includes, in relevant
part, situations in which the declarant “[i]s exempted by ruling
of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement.”
HRE Rule 804(a)(1) (1993).
To demonstrate a declarant’s unavailability, a showing
must be made that good faith efforts were expended to locate and
produce the declarant. State v. Moore, 82 Hawaii 202, 223, 921
P.2d 122, 143 (1996) (citing State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 363,
845 P.2d 547, 556-57 (1993)). In establishing good faith
efforts, the party “must confirm on the record at the time of
trial both the declarant’s unavailability and that vigorous and
appropriate steps were taken to procure the declarant’s presence
at trial.”38 Id. (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 363, 845 P.2d at
556-57).
38
While the caselaw in this jurisdiction has focused on the
prosecution as the party having the burden to locate and produce a declarant,
under the circumstances of this case, counsel’s duty to provide effective
representation included, as the ICA held, efforts to secure Hayme’s presence
at trial to allow Batalona to cross-examine him regarding his account of the
(continued . . .)
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The admission of Hayme’s recorded statement was the
subject of some discussion at a hearing on the State’s first
motion in limine. At that hearing, counsel for Batalona
informed the court that the defense wanted to call Hayme as a
witness to determine whether he would invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination. Counsel’s duty to render effective
representation in this case included attempting to secure
Hayme’s attendance at trial so as to prevent the admission of
Hayme’s statement without the opportunity to cross-examine him.
The record indicates that counsel was aware that the court had
determined in the pretrial hearing to admit Hayme’s statement,
as counsel responded at trial that there was no objection to the
statement’s introduction into evidence except for what had been
discussed previously. However, there is no indication that
defense counsel took any steps to procure Hayme’s attendance at
trial, whether by process or by other reasonable means. Nor did
counsel establish on the record that he made a good faith
attempt to secure the presence of Hayme at trial. Counsel’s
(. . . continued)
incident. Because Hayme did not appear, his recorded statement was admitted
at trial.
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Declaration did not explain why he took no steps to obtain
Hayme’s presence at trial.
The State argues that Hayme was unavailable to testify
at trial because he had personally invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination at the hearing that was held on July 31, 2000
and that the circuit court indicated as much at that hearing.
However, the transcript of the July 31, 2000 hearing is not part
of the record on appeal. Therefore, it is unclear whether Hayme
was unavailable to testify at trial, as the ICA observed.
Even assuming that Hayme invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination at the hearing and the court declared him
unavailable to testify, it was imperative for defense counsel to
undertake all feasible measures to secure Hayme’s live testimony
two days later at trial in order to cross-examine him. Hayme as
part of his plea agreement with the federal government had
agreed to testify truthfully at any hearing or trial if called
to do so. Additionally, Batalona contends that Hayme was in
federal custody during the course of his trial. There is no
indication in the record, however, that defense counsel
exercised a good faith attempt to subpoena or otherwise procure
Hayme’s attendance at trial. Engaging in such effort was
critical to Batalona’s defense, given that Hayme’s absence at
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trial allowed for the admission of Hayme’s recorded statement,
which was immensely prejudicial to Batalona. See infra.
Defense counsel should not have assumed that because Hayme had
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination two days prior
to the admission of his statement, he would again invoke the
privilege if called to testify. This assumption is even more
problematic in light of Hayme’s plea agreement that required him
to testify at any hearing or trial if called to do so and his
express agreement not to assert any privilege to refuse to
testify in a state trial involving a co-participant.
The State cites to State v. McGriff, 76 Hawaii 148,
871 P.2d 782 (1994), in support of its argument that Hayme was
unavailable to testify, maintaining that, like the co-defendant
in McGriff, Hayme invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. However, in McGriff, the State served a
trial subpoena on the co-defendant, which the co-defendant’s
attorney moved to quash. 76 Hawaii at 153, 871 P.2d at 787.
The court denied the motion to quash, and the co-defendant
appeared at trial. Id. Upon being called as the State’s next
witness, the co-defendant took the stand and thereafter invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Unlike the co-defendant in
McGriff, Hayme was not served with a subpoena requiring his
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attendance at trial, and Hayme did not appear at trial to invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege.
A failure to subpoena Hayme may have substantially
impaired a potentially meritorious defense in this case. The
State conceded and the evidence showed that Hayme fired his
weapon during the robbery, and as the ICA concluded, if Hayme
had testified, Batalona may have cast reasonable doubt on the
State’s theory that it was Batalona who shot at Officer
Rosskopf. Accordingly, Batalona’s contention in ground 20(f) of
his petition that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
secure Hayme’s attendance at trial raises a colorable claim for
relief.
In addition to the unavailability prong that must be
satisfied before Hayme’s statement could have been admitted at
trial, the statement must qualify as a “statement against
interest.” A statement against interest is one
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless the declarant believed it to be true.
HRE Rule 804(b)(3) (emphases added). In Williamson v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court held that the statement
against interest exception to the hearsay rule “does not allow
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admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are
made within a broader narrative that is generally self-
inculpatory.” 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994). Thus, each
statement within the broader narrative must be carefully
examined to determine if it is against the declarant’s interest.
Id. at 600-04. If an individual declaration is not a statement
against the declarant’s interest, then that particular
declaration is not admissible. Id.
As noted, the record does not contain Hayme’s redacted
statement that was admitted at trial. However, the parties’
closing arguments indicate that portions of Hayme’s statement
were not truly inculpatory.39 For example, Hayme’s statement
recounted that he did not shoot at Officer Rosskopf. Hayme also
said in his statement that the person who was shooting at
Officer Rosskopf was mounted on top of the Blazer. These
declarations implicated Batalona given Dailey’s testimony that
Batalona stood “in the door jamb on the passenger side of the
Blazer,” that Batalona’s weapon was pointed in the direction of
Officer Rosskopf’s car, and that Hayme and Matsunaga were the
last to exit the bank. Additionally, Hayme stated that he did
39
We do not address the circumstances under which the recorded
statement was elicited with respect to its inculpatory nature.
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not fire his weapon until after shots were fired. Hayme also
stated that he fired maybe two rounds “just in the air,” which
would have excluded him as the person shooting at Officer
Rosskopf. Unquestionably, each of these statements within
Hayme’s narrative did not implicate Hayme as the person who
fired multiple rounds at Officer Rosskopf. Rather, many of
Hayme’s statements in his broader account--whether standing
alone or in conjunction with other evidence introduced by the
State--directly implicated Batalona and were “non-self-
inculpatory statements.” Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01.
Therefore, the admission of Hayme’s statement as a statement
against interest under HRE Rule 804(b)(3) raises a colorable
claim for relief.40
The receiving into evidence of Hayme’s recorded
statement may also have violated the federal and state
constitutions. Batalona contends in ground 20(f) that he had
state and federal rights to confront Hayme at trial and that
40
HRE Rule 804(b)(3) is identical with Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) Rule 804(b)(3). The Advisory Committee Notes of FRE Rule 804(b)(3)
warn that “a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made
while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the
authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest.” Hayme’s recorded
statement was provided to investigators in the presence of the Assistant
United States Attorney who was prosecuting him in federal court. The
statement was provided the day after Hayme reached a plea agreement with the
United States Attorney’s Office.
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confrontation of Hayme would have allowed the jury to assess
Hayme’s truthfulness. This court has recognized that the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution “guarantee criminal
defendants the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.” State v. Haili, 103 Hawaii 89, 103, 79 P.3d 1263,
1277 (2003) (citing Moore, 82 Hawaii at 222, 921 P.2d at 142).
“The right of confrontation affords the accused both the
opportunity to challenge the credibility and veracity of the
prosecution’s witnesses and an occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of those witnesses.” State v. Sua, 92 Hawaii 61,
70, 987 P.2d 959, 968 (1999) (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 360, 845
P.2d at 555). Thus, the right to cross-examine one’s accuser is
chief among the interests secured by the confrontation clause.
McGriff, 76 Hawaii at 155, 871 P.2d at 789 (citing Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
For testimonial hearsay to be admissible, the
confrontation clause demands a showing that the declarant is
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unavailable.41 State v. Fields, 115 Hawaii 503, 513, 168 P.3d
955, 965 (2007) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59
(2004)). The discussion set forth supra regarding
unavailability is fully pertinent here. To reiterate, the
record fails to establish that defense counsel made a good faith
attempt to obtain Hayme’s attendance at trial. Nor did defense
counsel confirm on the record at trial that Hayme was
unavailable or that vigorous steps had been taken to procure his
attendance at trial. And, as the ICA found, the record also
does not indicate that the State made a good faith attempt to
secure Hayme’s attendance at trial.
The confrontation clause restricts the admission of
testimonial hearsay in a second way. At the time of Batalona’s
trial, the standard pursuant to Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, was as
follows: “[u]pon demonstrating that a witness is unavailable,”
the party must show that the statement to be admitted “bear[s]
adequate indicia of reliability.” Sua, 92 Hawaii at 71, 987
P.2d at 969. Reliability may be inferred if the statement falls
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, or it “may
41
Statements provided as a result of police interrogations are
testimonial under the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
68 (2004).
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be demonstrated ‘upon a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.’” Id. (quoting Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d
at 556). In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held in
Crawford that for testimonial hearsay to be admissible the
confrontation clause demands a showing of unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 68. Thus,
under the second part of the confrontation analysis, instead of
determining whether an unavailable declarant’s statement bears
“adequate indicia of reliability,” the analysis is whether the
defendant had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant about the statement.42 See id.
If the Roberts test is applied to Batalona’s case, the
circumstances under which Hayme’s statement was made and the
non-self-inculpatory statements within its general narrative may
raise a question as to the reliability of Hayme’s statement. If
the Crawford test is applicable, the record does not indicate
that Batalona had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Hayme
about his statement. Thus, under either test, Batalona has
raised a colorable claim for relief.
42
This court has not addressed the applicability of the Crawford
rule to cases in which the underlying conviction was already final at the
time the Crawford decision was rendered.
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In sum, the record does not indicate that defense
counsel exercised a good faith attempt to procure Hayme’s
attendance at trial, which was critical to Batalona’s defense.
If counsel failed to do so, such failure may have resulted in
the substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense
because, if Hayme had testified, Batalona may have cast
reasonable doubt on the State’s theory that Batalona was the
person who fired multiple rounds at Officer Rosskopf. In
addition, as a result of Hayme’s absence at trial, his recorded
statement--although only partly self-inculpatory and at the same
time extremely prejudicial to Batalona--was admitted as a
“statement against interest,” and it may also have been admitted
in violation of Batalona’s right to confrontation. Counsel’s
Declaration did not adequately respond to Batalona’s claims
regarding the failure to obtain Hayme’s presence at trial.
Therefore, the ICA correctly concluded that the portion of
ground 20(f) of Batalona’s petition regarding Hayme’s statement
raises a colorable claim for relief that warrants a hearing
before the circuit court.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal
insofar as it held that grounds 1 and 20(f) of Batalona’s
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petition raise colorable claims for relief. We vacate the ICA’s
Judgment on Appeal in its affirmance of the circuit court’s
Order denying the petition with regard to the following grounds:
as to grounds 8 and 10, Batalona has raised colorable claims for
relief such that he is entitled to a hearing, and as to ground
18 it is dismissed without prejudice. We otherwise affirm the
ICA Judgment on Appeal to the extent that it denied a hearing on
the remaining grounds in the petition. This case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Albert Batalona /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
pro se
/s/ Richard W. Pollack
Brandon H. Ito
for respondent /s/ Michael D. Wilson
55
Batalona v. State.
Combined Opinion