In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.D.C. & J.C. (Children) and M.C. (Mother) M.C. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 21 2018, 8:02 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joshua D. Hershberger Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Crain Schuette Attorneys Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination March 21, 2018
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of L.D.C. & J.C. (Children) and 72A01-1709-JT-2204
M.C. (Mother); Appeal from the Scott Circuit
M.C. (Mother), Court
The Honorable Jason Mount,
Appellant-Defendant,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
72C01-1612-JT-15
The Indiana Department of 72C01-1612-JT-16
Child Services,
Appellee-Plaintiff

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 1 of 19
[1] M.C. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to L.D.C. and

J.C. (collectively, “Children”). She challenges a number of the trial court’s

findings and argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusions there

was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal

would not be remedied and termination was in Children’s best interests. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and L.C. (“Father”) 1 are the birth parents of L.D.C. and J.C., born

March 2, 2008, and February 2, 2009, respectively. In September 2013,

Mother, Father, Children, and two older siblings, K.K. 2 and Ja.C., 3 were

traveling in a camper when the camper broke down in Scott County and was

towed to a campground. On September 14, 2013, police were dispatched to the

campground to address domestic violence between Mother and Father. Police

arrested Mother on outstanding warrants in Benton and Jasper counties. Police

arrested Father on the allegation the camper the family was using was stolen.

The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Children and their older

1
Father’s parental rights to Children were terminated in December 2016, and he does not participate in this
appeal.
2
K.K.’s father received custody of K.K. after her removal from Mother’s care, and she lived with him in
California at the time the termination hearing.
3
Ja.C. had been placed in a facility at the time of the termination hearing.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 2 of 19
 siblings from Mother and Father’s care because the family was homeless and

both parents had been arrested.

[3] On September 16, 2013, DCS filed petitions as to L.D.C. and J.C., alleging

each was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). On October 25, 2013,

Mother admitted Children were CHINS based on the family’s homelessness

and her incarceration. On November 25, 2013, the trial court entered a

dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in services, complete a

substance abuse assessment and any recommendations therefrom; submit to

random drug screening; complete a parental assessment and any

recommendations therefrom; complete domestic violence services; maintain

stable housing and income; visit with Children; and refrain from engaging in

criminal activity.

[4] Mother was released from incarceration on May 18, 2014. During the Summer

of 2014, Children were placed with paternal grandmother, where they remained

for the rest of the proceedings. From May 2014 to July 2015, Mother and

Children participated in therapy and visitation. In July 2015, Mother self-

medicated with synthetic marijuana because she could not afford medication to

treat an ulcer. Despite this admission, services and visitation continued with a

goal of reunification.

[5] From November 2015 to May 2016, Mother continued to comply with services

and visit regularly with Children. During that time, Mother tested positive for

synthetic marijuana three times and failed to report for fourteen drug screens.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 3 of 19
 At a May 2016 periodic case review hearing, the trial court ordered Mother to

undergo a hair follicle drug test. Mother did not submit to that test, nor did she

submit to any drug screens between May 2016 and October 2016.

[6] In September 2016, Mother accepted a ride from two strangers who threatened

to beat and rape her. Mother was using heroin during this time, and during an

October 2016 visit with Children, Mother fell asleep while carving a pumpkin

with Children. On October 13, 2016, police arrested Mother for possession of a

syringe. On December 9, 2016, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s

parental rights to Children.

[7] Mother was temporarily released from incarceration on December 20, 2016,

and entered an inpatient rehabilitation program in Chicago. After Mother’s

successful completion of the program, she returned to the Newton County Jail

until her release in February 2017. Between February 2017 and July 2017,

Mother was incarcerated two more times in two other counties. In the same

time period, Mother completed two drug screens, which were negative, but

missed twenty-seven drug screens.

[8] On February 16, 2017, and July 27, 2017, the trial court held hearings on the

termination petitions. Mother presented evidence she started working three

days prior to the July hearing and lived with a friend who had room for the

Children, though a portion of the house was uninhabitable due to a leak in the

roof. The DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and the Court Appointed

Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified to Mother’s drug use, Mother’s lack of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 4 of 19
 stable housing and employment, and Children’s stability in placement with

paternal grandmother. On August 29, 2017, the trial court issued an order

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children.

Discussion and Decision
[9] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S.,

& B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh

evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the

juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a

judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied

534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

[10] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children, however, when

evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d

at 837. The right to raise one’s own children should not be terminated solely

because there is a better home available for the children, id., but parental rights

may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet parental

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 5 of 19
 Finding Regarding Dismissal of the Petition
[11] As part of the findings in the order for termination 4 of Mother’s parental rights,

the trial court stated, “There exist no factors in I.C. 31-24-2-4.5(d) 5 that would

require or be the basis for a dismissal of the petition.” (App. Vol. II at 15)

(footnote added). Mother argues this finding is clearly erroneous because it

“omits the fact that [Children] have, since the summer of 2014, been in the care

of their paternal grandmother, a ‘relative’ under IC. 31-9-2-107(c). Therefore,

this factor could be the basis for the dismissal of this petition.” (Br. of

Appellant at 23.) We disagree.

[12] Regarding DCS’s requirements when filing a petition to terminate parental

rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(3) dictates:

If the department intends to file a motion to dismiss under
section 4.5 of this chapter, the petition must indicate whether at
least one (1) of the factors listed in section 4.5(d)(1) through 4.5
(d)(3) of this chapter applies and specify each factor that would
apply as the basis for filing a motion to dismiss the petition.

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d) states, relevant to this case:

4
The trial court entered one order for both Children.
5
This citation is a scrivener’s error, as it should read, I.C. 31-35-2-4.5(d), which is the correct citation for the
statute regarding dismissal of a termination petition.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 6 of 19
 A person described in section 4(a) of this chapter 6 may file a
motion to dismiss the petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship if any of the following circumstances apply:

(1) That the current case plan prepared by or under the
supervision of the department or the probation department
under IC 31-34-15, IC 31-37-19-1.5, or IC 31-37-22-4.5 has
documented a compelling reason, based on facts and
circumstances stated in the petition or motion, for
concluding that filing, or proceeding to a final
determination of, a petition to terminate the parent-child
relationship is not in the best interests of the child. A
compelling reason may include the fact that the child is
being cared for by a custodian who is a relative (as defined
in IC 31-9-2-107(c)).

(footnote added).

[13] “DCS is not required as a matter of law to dismiss a petition to terminate

where the child is placed with a relative.” In re G.H., 906 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2009). Additionally, we have held it harmless error when DCS does

not file a motion to dismiss based on the fact the child is in relative placement

when other factors support termination of the parent’s rights to the child. In re

Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236,

241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As we will discuss infra, DCS presented sufficient

evidence to support the findings and the findings supported the conclusions

6
A person described in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(a) is one or more of the following: “(1) The attorney
for the department. (2) The child’s court appointed special advocate. (3) The child’s guardian ad litem.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 7 of 19
 used by the trial court to terminate Mother’s rights to Children. Thus, any error

in declaring there existed no factors that could justify dismissal of the petition

under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d) was, at most, harmless. See Matter of

A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 573-4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Trial court’s erroneous

finding including language regarding father’s sale of illegal drugs was “harmless

when considered in conjunction with the other evidence presented.”). DCS

was not required to dismiss the petition. See G.H., 906 N.E.2d at 252.

Evidence, Findings, and Conclusions Regarding Termination
[14] To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 8 of 19
 Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof

of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g

denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must

terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

[15] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the

evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

Reasonable Probability Conditions Would Not Be Remedied

[16] The trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of

the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment to

address parenting issues and to cooperate with services “demonstrates the

requisite reasonable probability” that the conditions will not change. Lang v.

Starke Cnty. OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[17] When assessing a parent’s fitness to care for a child, the trial court should view

the parents as of the time of the termination hearing and take into account the

changes that have occurred during the proceedings. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 9 of 19
 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also

“evaluat[e] the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the

probability of future neglect or deprivation of [a] child.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d

509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[18] Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that “she failed to appear or was

unavailable for 27 tests for controlled substances.” (App. Vol. II at 18.) She

argues the trial court did not acknowledge that she missed those drug screens

because she was “hospitalized and incarcerated during part of this time, . . .

[and there was a] difficulty of communication with DCS and the complication

of geographical distance.” (Br. of Appellant at 24.) Mother’s argument is an

invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses,

which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not

reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[19] Mother also challenged the trial court’s Finding 30, which states:

30. The following day, October 13, 2016, Mother was arrested
for possession of a syringe in Benton County, Indiana.
Following that arrest, Mother was incarcerated until December
20, 2016 before participating in an impatient [sic] rehab program
until January 17, 2017. Thereafter Mother returned to jail for a
short period of time and then has had no less than six changes of
residence with a stay at the Kentland Motel, another
hospitalization, a short time with friends in Illinois, short
incarcerations in Lake and Benton Counties and living with
friends as she testified to at the hearing of July 27, 2017.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 10 of 19
 (App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the finding is “clearly erroneous because it

omits uncontroverted testimony about Mother’s change in residences.” (Br. of

Appellant at 24.) Mother contends the trial court did not consider the fact she

maintained a residence at the same address for eight months prior to October

2016, and that, but for her assault in September 2016, “Mother probably would

have remained at the Kentland Hotel, contemplated a move to Milford and

settled at [an address] in Kentland, Indiana for a total of two to three moves.”

(Id.) Further, Mother asserts, “[b]eing hospitalized by a vicious assault should

not be counted as nomadic behavior or characterized as ‘another

hospitalization.’” (Id.) Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the

evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the

credibility of witnesses). Even if we were to agree with Mother that her

hospitalization when she was assaulted should not be included as a change of

residence that demonstrates her “nomadic behavior,” Mother does not

challenge the trial court’s finding that between October 2016 and July 2017,

Mother resided in Benton County Jail, at inpatient rehab, with friends in

Illinois, in Lake County Jail, and with friends in Indiana, which is at least five

locations in ten months. The court’s finding is supported by the evidence.

[20] Additionally, Mother challenges Finding 33, which states:

33. The history of these Children has been prior DCS
involvement with the filing of child in need of services actions in
Benton County. Ongoing involvement by Mother in the criminal
justice system and the use of controlled substances illegally. [sic]

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 11 of 19
 Mother has been unable to maintain employment and housing in
which to host her Children. Efforts at family therapy, while for a
short period proved hopeful, have not been successful in dealing
with Mother’s emotional and mental health issues and substance
issues to any degree of consistency to cause the Court to believe
that there is hope that conditions that prompted the removal of
the [C]hildren can be corrected.

(App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the trial court’s finding is not supported by

the evidence because she had employment during the proceedings when she

was not incarcerated.

[21] During the termination hearing on July 27, 2017, Mother testified had been

employed by Vanguard National Trailers since July 24, 2017. She also testified

she worked at Lyons Production Incorporated for “a few months,” (Tr. Vol. II

at 138), and at Mexico Lindo for four years. Mother testified she lost the job at

Lyons when she was hospitalized. Mother offers no case law to indicate how

this sporadic record of employment does not support the trial court’s finding

that she was “unable to maintain employment[.]” (App. Vol. II at 18.)

Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265

(appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[22] Except for those discussed supra, Mother does not challenge other findings

related to the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability

that the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would not be remedied.

Therefore, those unchallenged findings stand proven. See Madlem v. Arko, 592

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 12 of 19
 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (“Because Madlem does not challenge the findings

of the trial court, they must be accepted as correct.”). Thus we turn to Mother’s

challenges to the court’s conclusions.

[23] Mother challenges the trial court’s Conclusion 12, 7 which states:

12. By clear and convincing evidence the allegations of the
Petition concerning the Mother and Father are true in that there
is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
removal of the Children or prevent reunification with the
Children will not be remedied[.]

(App. Vol. II at 15.)

[24] Regarding whether the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would

not be remedied, the trial court made unchallenged findings noting the family

was homeless, as they were “traveling in a camper” at the time Children were

removed from Mother’s care. (App. Vol. II at 15.) At the campground where

their trailer was towed, police were called to address domestic violence

involving Mother and Father, and Mother was arrested on an outstanding

warrant. Father was later arrested, leaving Children homeless and without

someone to care for them. These were the conditions that led to the Children

being removed from Mother’s care.

7
The trial court later reiterates this language in Conclusion 23. In that conclusion, the trial court states:
“When viewed in their totality, the Court finds that the DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances that led to the removal of the Children will not be
remedied[.]” (App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother does not challenge Conclusion 23.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 13 of 19
[25] Mother admitted Children were CHINS based on her incarceration and the

family’s homelessness. Since that admission, Mother used illegal drugs on

multiple occasions and did not complete services as ordered by the court. The

trial court noted Mother visited Children while under the influence of drugs and

fell asleep while carving a pumpkin. Mother did not maintain stable housing,

as she moved between multiple residences when she was not incarcerated or

hospitalized.

Mother’s assertion that she had “stable housing, had cleared up all criminal

offenses and had successfully completed an inpatient drug rehabilitation

program,” (Br. of Appellant at 23-4), ignores her history of instability and

dangerous life choices. Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the

evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the

credibility of witnesses). The trial court’s findings support its conclusion there

was a reasonable probability that conditions under which Children were

removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied. 8 See In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d

8
In addition to her contentions that DCS did not present sufficient evidence to support the findings and the
findings did not support the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the conditions that
resulted in Children’s removal would not be remedied, Mother argues “the Court did not specifically point
out how the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to the well-being of the children, and DCS did not
present specific evidence on this point.” (Br. of Appellant at 24.) DCS does not have to prove both
“reasonable probability” and “threat” because Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive,
such that DCS must prove either by clear and convincing evidence. Because the findings support the
conclusion there was a reasonable probability the conditions leading to Children’s removal would not be
remedied, we need not address whether the findings also support a conclusion that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children’s well-being. See In re L.S. 717 N.E.2d 209 (because Ind.
Code §31-35-2-4 (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, court needs to find only one requirement to terminate
parental rights).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 14 of 19
 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (While the trial court must consider the

improvement made by a parent at the time of the termination hearing, it must

also “evaluat[e] the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the

probability of future neglect or deprivation of [a] child.”), trans. denied.

Best Interests of Children

[26] In determining what is in Children’s best interests, the juvenile court is required

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.

A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the

parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental

rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 990

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager and court-

appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in Children’s best interests. In

re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[27] Mother challenges Finding 34, which states:

34. The reports and the testimony of the CASA [Court
Appointed Special Advocate] are received by the Court. The
CASA recommends termination of the parent child relationship.
While the interaction between CASA and Mother has been
limited, the limitation does not discredit the observation of
CASA of the condition of the [C]hildren in the placement of the
paternal grandmother. The CASA and DCS note that the
Children are well cared for and loved in the current placement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 15 of 19
 The Children are progressing in their therapy and the paternal
grandmother remains the only person who has provided the
Children with any type of a stable home. They are happy and
feel secure with [paternal grandmother].

(App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the CASA in the case “received the case

file less than a month before the termination hearing, never spoke to Mother

prior to making a recommendation for termination and never visited Mother’s

apartment.” (Br. of Appellant at 26.)

[28] In support of her argument, Mother cites In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014), trans. denied, where we held, when determining the best interests of

the child, “the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by

DCS and to consider the totality of the evidence.” Id. at 1005. Mother asserts,

based thereon, “[a] finding concerning the best interest of the children requires

consideration of the totality of the evidence, not just the case file and the

condition of the children in their adoptive placement.” (Br. of Appellant at 26.)

Mother is correct, and the trial court considered the totality of the evidence

outside of the CASA’s testimony. Regarding the Children’s best interests, the

trial court found:

16. After removal, the four children, including [L.D.C. and
J.C.], related witnessing domestic violence between Mother and
Father and also related that the Father had been physically
abusive with them and used inappropriate discipline.

*****

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 16 of 19
 20. During this period of time [the CHINS proceedings] the
Children were also evaluated and there was great concern for the
emotional state of [Children] to the extent that there was no
direct unsupervised contact allowed between the Children and
their parents. The review order of the hearing of March 14, 2014
identifies the severity of the condition of the Children and their
past experiences at that time. . . .

21. In the summer of 2014 the Children were placed with
[paternal grandmother] and have been in that placement
continuously since that time. Further the grandmother has
previously in past years been appointed and served as guardian
for the Children under a Newton County guardianship and has
served as caregiver for the Children throughout their lives.

22. The Children were previously the subject of child in need of
services cases in Newton County (J.C. twice in 2008 and 2009
and L.D.C. once in 2009) where issues of exposure to conditions
similar to the events and family conditions that necessitated the
present CHINS cases. The 2009 case involved the presence of
drugs at birth of L.D.C. with the [C]hildren placed with [paternal
grandmother] from August, 2008 until February, 2009 after a
trial home visit was commence [sic] with the Mother, the Benton
County case was closed on May, 2009. [sic] Mother participated
in therapy, drug screening and supervised visitation. Mother also
divorced the Father the first time during this time period.

23. Services were put in place for the Children and for the
Mother following her release from incarceration in May, 2015.
The findings were that the Children had been traumatized by the
Father and by the exposure to the conflict within the family to
the extent that the term “terrorized” was used to describe the
degree of conflict experienced by the Children.

*****

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 17 of 19
 29. On October 12, 2016 the Mother visited with the Children
and was under the influence of a controlled substance. Her visit
that day included an activity of carving a Halloween jack-o-
lantern. Mother, while plunging a knife into a pumpkin, feel [sic]
asleep during that activity. This event occurred in front of the
Children and caused great concern and distress to the Children.

(App. Vol. II at 16-18.) The FCM testified, “[paternal grandmother] can meet

[Children’s] needs. She’s had them in her care for several years and they are

doing well in her care.” (Tr. Vol. II at 84.) The FCM further testified the last

unsupervised visit Mother had with Children was Halloween 2015.

[29] Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265

(appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

We conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that termination

was in the Children’s best interests. See In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004) (termination was in child’s best interests based on Mother’s

failure to maintain a drug-free lifestyle and maintain a stable source of income;

child needed permanency and was doing well in foster care), trans. denied.

Conclusion
[30] We conclude any error in the trial court’s finding regarding Indiana Code

section 31-35-2-4.5(d) was harmless because there existed additional sufficient

evidence and findings to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to

Children. Additionally, Mother’s arguments regarding specific findings are

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 18 of 19
 invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses,

which we cannot do. Finally, the trial court’s unchallenged findings support its

conclusions there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in

Children’s removal would not be remedied and termination was in Children’s

best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 19 of 19