UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4642
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KRISTY MICHELLE STOWERS, a/k/a Kristy Michele Stowers, a/k/a Kristy
Sparger,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00024-JPJ-PMS-22)
Submitted: March 8, 2018 Decided: March 22, 2018
Before KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dana R. Cormier, DANA R. CORMIER, P.L.C., Staunton, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean
Barrett Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kristy Michelle Stowers appeals the district court’s judgment revoking her
supervised release and imposing a sentence of three months of imprisonment and an
additional 36 months of supervised release. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether the prison term is plainly unreasonable and
whether the district court erred by imposing a special condition of supervised release
requiring Stowers to spend six months at a halfway house. We affirm in part and dismiss
in part.
Stowers first challenges her three-month sentence. We observe that, during the
pendency of this appeal, Stowers was released from prison and began serving the additional
supervised release term. As a result, Stowers’ appeal of her prison sentence is moot. See
United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 285 (4th Cir. 2008). We therefore dismiss this
portion of the appeal.
Counsel also questions the district court’s imposition of a six-month term at a
halfway house as a special condition of supervised release. Because Stowers did not object
in the district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d
416, 422 (4th Cir. 2015). We readily conclude that, as a result of the nature and
circumstances of Stowers’ violations of supervised release, her history and characteristics,
and the opportunity to provide appropriate training and treatment, the district court did not
err in requiring Stowers to spend six months at a halfway house. See United States v.
Douglas, 850 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (providing standard).
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore dismiss as moot the appeal of the
prison sentence and affirm the revocation judgment in all other respects. This court
requires that counsel inform Stowers, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Stowers requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Stowers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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