NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAURENCE WOODS, No. 17-35729
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-02169-PK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
D. STATON, Sheriff; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Laurence Woods appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) alleging that defendants interfered with
the practice of his religion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s RLUIPA
claims because RLUIPA does not allow for damages against individuals sued in
their official or individual capacities or for injunctive relief for individuals that are
not incarcerated. See id. at 1031 (RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief is moot
where the plaintiff has been released from custody); Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899,
904 (9th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA does not authorize lawsuits against government
employees in their individual capacity); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [an inmate’s] suit for
official-capacity damages under RLUIPA.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s Free
Exercise Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants’ actions substantially burdened the practice of his
religion or whether the regulations were not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32 (defining substantial burden);
see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (factors for determining
whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological
2 17-35729
interest).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s
Establishment Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants’ actions had no secular purpose or whether
they had the principal or primary effect of advancing religion.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Woods’s Equal
Protection Clause claims because Woods failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against him due to his
religion. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2013) (requirements for an equal protection claim).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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