NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS DANIEL CLARK, No. 16-16005
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:11-cv-03520-YGR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY A. BEARD, CDCR Secretary,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 13, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,** District
Judge.
Douglas Daniel Clark, a California inmate, appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to Jeffrey A. Beard in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
challenging a California prison regulation that prohibits inmates from filing more
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
than one non-emergency appeal of prison decisions, actions, conditions, or
omissions every two weeks. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.1(f). Because
the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.
Glacier Fish Co. LLC v. Pritzker, 832 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2016). Dismissal
for failure to state a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s screening
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, is subject to de novo review. Resnick v. Hayes, 213
F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Curry v. Yelp Inc., 875 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2017).
Assuming without deciding that Clark has standing to bring his access-to-
court claims and can allege some minimal infringement of his First Amendment
rights, the appeal-limiting regulation is nevertheless valid because “it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987). The regulation rationally advances the goals of preserving prison
resources and maintaining institutional security identified by California prison
officials, and Clark has not demonstrated that the regulation is an exaggerated
response to those objectives. See id. at 93.
Next, Clark’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails. Though Clark may
have alleged in his First Amended Complaint that prison officials retaliated against
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him by placing him in “the hole” for filing appeals, he failed to address this
argument on appeal and so has waived his right to relief on that basis. See Arpin v.
Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]ssues
which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening
brief are waived.”).
Finally, before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a
claim, a district court “must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint’s
deficiencies.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988). This statement of deficiencies “need not provide great detail or require
district courts to act as legal advisors to pro se plaintiffs, [however] district courts
must at least draft a few sentences explaining the deficiencies.” Eldridge v. Block,
832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). The district court provided Clark with an
opportunity to amend his complaint along with adequate guidance for how to state
a valid retaliation claim. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark
leave to amend his complaint a second time. See Ferris v. Santa Clara Cty., 891
F.2d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in striking a pro se plaintiff’s second amended complaint where the
plaintiff “already [] filed one amended complaint” that “failed to cure the defect
the court had told him about”).
AFFIRMED.
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