NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CRAYA C. CARON, No. 17-55963
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:17-cv-00565-JLS-JDE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FLETCHER JONES MOTOR CARS, INC.;
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Craya C. Caron appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of her purchase of a pre-
owned vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and on the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
basis of the statute of limitations. Ventura Mobilehome Cmtys. Owners Ass’n v.
City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Caron’s Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (four-
year statute of limitations for civil RICO claims begins to run when a plaintiff
knows or should have known of the injury underlying the action); Grimmett v.
Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing injury discovery rule for
civil RICO claims).
The district court properly dismissed Caron’s claim under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTCA”) because the FTCA does not confer a private cause of
action. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining
that the FTCA rests remedial power solely in the Federal Trade Commission and
there is no private right of action to bring a claim under the FTCA).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Caron’s action
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court can dismiss without leave to
2 17-55963
amend where amendment would be futile).
Caron’s request to strike portions of the answering brief and petition for writ
of administrative mandamus, set forth in her reply brief, are denied.
Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc.’s motion for judicial notice and motion to
dismiss and/or strike (Docket Entry Nos. 7 and 12) are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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