J-S03040-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
LAQUANTA CHAPMAN :
: No. 2963 EDA 2016
Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0002897-2009,
CP-15-CR-0004895-2008
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018
Appellant Laquanta Chapman appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County imposing a term of
life imprisonment without parole upon remand from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Appellant’s counsel seeks to withdraw his representation
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth
v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). We affirm the judgment of
sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Our Supreme Court summarized the factual background of this case as
follows:
On October 30, 2008, Appellant shot and killed his sixteen-
year-old neighbor, Aaron Turner, in the basement of Appellant’s
residence. Subsequently, with the assistance of his younger
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S03040-18
cousin, Bryan Bird, Appellant dismembered the victim’s body and
disposed of the remains in the trash.
Weeks later, law enforcement investigating the sale of illicit
drugs from Appellant’s premises obtained a warrant to search
them for evidence of drug activity. In the course of the ensuing
search, police discovered an abundance of residual, physical
evidence from the killing and dismemberment.
Commonwealth v. Chapman, 635 Pa. 273, 276-77, 136 A.3d 126, 127-28
(2016).
Appellant was charged for the murder of Aaron Turner and related
crimes at docket CP-15-CR-0002897-2009. He was also charged on a
separate docket, CP-15-CR-0004895-2008, for numerous counts of drug and
weapons charges for contraband found in his residence as well as receiving
stolen property and cruelty to animals. Appellant was tried on both dockets
in a consolidated trial.
A jury subsequently convicted Appellant of first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, possession of an instrument of crime (nine
counts), abuse of corpse, hindering apprehension (two counts), receiving
stolen property (two counts), possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver, simple possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and cruelty to animals. The trial court separately convicted
Appellant of seven counts of Persons Not to Possess Firearm.
After a separate penalty phase, the jury sentenced Appellant to the
death penalty for the murder charge. The trial court also imposed a
-2-
J-S03040-18
consecutive, aggregate sentence of 85-170 years’ imprisonment for the
remaining charges at both dockets.
On direct appeal of this capital murder case, the Supreme Court vacated
Appellant’s death sentence upon finding that the Commonwealth had not
presented sufficient evidence of an aggravating circumstance warranting
capital punishment. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that Appellant’s
prior out-of-state convictions did not qualify as felonies and thus, could not
serve as the basis for the aggravating circumstance in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9711(d)(9), which requires a finding of a significant history of violent felony
convictions. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
In the same opinion, the Supreme Court disposed of Appellant’s
remaining issues raised on direct appeal. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
concluded that it was not necessary to remand for this Court to complete direct
appellate review:
In some recent decisions, this Court has transferred death-penalty
appeals to the Superior Court, which administers as-of-right direct
appellate review in non-capital cases, when it has become clear in
our own review that a death sentence is unavailable. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 592 Pa. 411, 418, 925 A.2d 167,
171 (2007). Here, however, the guilt-phase review is not
burdensome and was complete as of the time it became clear that
imposition of a life sentence was required. Therefore, and to
promote efficiency, we have completed the guilt-phase review,
above.
Chapman, 635 Pa. at 287, 136 A.3d at 134, n.8.
-3-
J-S03040-18
Thereafter, on August 16, 2016, upon remand, the trial court imposed
a sentence of life imprisonment as directed by the Supreme Court. At this
point, Appellant was represented by P.J. Redmond, Esq. Approximately three
weeks later, Appellant fired Atty. Redmond and instructed him not to file
anything further in the case. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal at both
dockets that was self-dated September 13, 2016. The Clerk of Courts did not
docket the notice of appeal until September 19, 2016.1
This Court remanded for the trial court to conduct a Grazier hearing to
assess Appellant’s choice to represent himself. On December 8, 2016, the
lower court held a hearing at which Appellant confirmed that he had chosen
to represent himself. The trial court determined that Appellant’s choice to
waive his right to representation to counsel was knowing and intelligent.
However, three months later, Appellant petitioned this Court for the
appointment of counsel. This Court denied Appellant’s request for alternative
counsel but indicated that Appellant could reapply to this Court for relief if he
wished to have the assistance of the Chester County Public Defender’s Office.
When Appellant filed a pro se letter indicating that he desired this
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s notice of appeal was time-stamped by the Clerk of Courts on
September 19, 2016, which is beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional limitation
imposed by Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). However, Appellant’s notice of appeal is dated
September 13, 2016, which is within the required time frame. Pursuant to
the “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal to be timely
filed. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining that a document
is considered filed on date pro se prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for
mailing).
-4-
J-S03040-18
representation, this Court reappointed Atty. Redmond and remanded for the
filing of a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement. On August 1, 2017, Atty.
Redmond filed a concise statement raising the following issue for our review:
Appellant should not have been exposed to a death-qualified jury
(i.e. a non-representative cross section and one more likely to
impose a conviction) in a case where there was no legal basis for
the prosecution to do so. This action as applied to Appellant was
a violation of his Article I, § 9 right to an “impartial jury,” as well
as his federal rights contained in Amendments XI and XIV, along
with his due process rights of Amendments V and XIV.
1925(b) statement, 8/1/17, at 1.
Thereafter, instead of filing an advocate’s brief, Appellant’s counsel filed
a petition to withdraw his representation and a corresponding Anders brief.
Appellant filed an additional motion for counsel, claiming that counsel
abandoned him by filing the petition to withdraw. This Court filed an order,
reiterating that Appellant had the option of proceeding pro se or through
privately-retained counsel. Appellant did not file a response.
When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review
the merits of the issues raised therein without first passing on the request to
withdraw. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders, counsel
must file a brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme
Court in Santiago. The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
-5-
J-S03040-18
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 602 Pa. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel must also provide
the appellant with a copy of the Anders brief, together with a letter that
advises the appellant of his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue
the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the
appellant deems worthy of the court's attention in addition to the points raised
by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349,
353 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
In this case, appellate counsel summarized the history of the case,
referred to an issue in the record that he believed arguably supported the
appeal and set forth his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous along with
citation to supporting precedent. Moreover, counsel has provided this Court
with a copy of the letter, which counsel sent to Appellant informing him of his
right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any points Appellant
deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude counsel has
substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago. We,
therefore, turn to the issue presented in the Anders brief to make an
independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 179 (Pa.Super. 2016).
On appeal, the sole issue presented by Appellant is whether he is
entitled to a new trial on both dockets on non-capital offenses before a jury
-6-
J-S03040-18
that is not “death-qualified;” Appellant specifically argues that a death-penalty
jury is “mathematically skewed in favor of conviction by the selection process.”
Anders brief, at 10.
First, we note that Appellant failed to raise this issue on his initial direct
appeal before the Supreme Court. Despite arguing that the Commonwealth
had not presented sufficient evidence in support of aggravating circumstances
that would warrant the death penalty, Appellant did not challenge the fact that
he had been tried by a death-qualified jury. Thus, to the extent that Appellant
argues that he should have not been tried by a death-qualified jury in a case
where there was no legal basis for the prosecution to do so, Appellant should
have raised this challenge before the Supreme Court if he expected to prevail
on his challenge to the aggravating circumstances supporting his death
sentence.
The Supreme Court, before vacating the death penalty and remanding
for the limited purpose of directing the imposition of a life sentence, reviewed
the merits of all of Appellant’s claims on direct appeal. As a result, as
Appellant did not raise this specific argument with respect to his death
qualified jury in his initial direct capital appeal, it is waived.2
____________________________________________
2 Even assuming arguendo that this issue is properly preserved for this appeal,
it has no arguable merit. Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court have consistently rejected similar constitutional
challenges arguing that death-qualified juries are unfairly biased towards
conviction. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90
-7-
J-S03040-18
For all of the foregoing reasons, and after an independent review, we
conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief and we grant counsel's petition to
withdraw his representation.
Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw
Granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/27/18
____________________________________________
L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Commonwealth v. Woodard, 634 Pa. 162, 129 A.3d
480 (2015), cert. denied sub nom., Woodard v. Pennsylvania, 137 S.Ct.
92, 196 L.Ed. 2d 79 (2016).
-8-