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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
RICKY RIDELL WASHINGTON :
: No. 972 EDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0001193-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 28, 2018
Ricky Washington challenges the sentence he received after pleading
guilty to, among other charges, attempting to elude a police officer. He
contends the 1 to 3 year sentence of imprisonment, to be run consecutively
to his 8½ to 17 year sentence imposed on the same date for violently beating
his cousin and her friend, was an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.
We affirm.
Washington admitted to the following facts as the basis for his guilty
plea. See N.T., 1/13/16, at 41. Washington was driving with a suspended
license. See id., at 38. Officer Kenneth Michels’s license plate reader alerted
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Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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him that Washington was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant for
aggravated assault and parole violations. See id.
Officer Michels attempted to pull Washington over, but Washington
increased his speed. See id., at 38-39. Washington proceeded to drive
recklessly at a high rate of speed through streets busy with pedestrian and
vehicle traffic. See id., at 39. Ultimately, Washington abandoned his vehicle
and attempted to flee on foot. See id. When he was arrested, Washington
admitted to fleeing because he was aware of an open arrest warrant. See id.
Washington concedes his sole issue on appeal is a challenge to
discretionary aspects of his sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary aspects
of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the
right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee,
849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted; brackets in original).
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Washington filed a timely appeal, and he preserved his issue through a
post-sentence motion. He argues the consecutive nature of the sentence for
fleeing arrest when added to sentence imposed for the underlying aggravated
assault results in an excessive aggregate sentence. He believes the court
imposed consecutive sentences because it failed to properly weigh mitigating
factors such as his difficult childhood and substance abuse issues. He concedes
the sentence imposed is within the standard range of the sentencing
guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15.
“Although Pennsylvania’s system stands for individualized sentencing,
the court is not required to impose the ‘minimum possible’ confinement.”
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted). “Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion
to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being
imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to
the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.”
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a); Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665
A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating an appellant is not entitled to a
“volume discount” for his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently).
“The imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise
a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where
the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes
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and the length of imprisonment.” Moury, 992 A.2d at 171-72 (citation
omitted).
We do not find that an “extreme circumstance” is present here.
Washington’s individual sentences are reasonable. And his aggregate
sentence of 9½ to 20 years is not unduly harsh, given the flagrant disregard
for the rights of others Washington exhibited in the high speed chase. Thus,
regardless of his substantive arguments on the issue, Washington has failed
to present a substantial question for our review.
Even if we had reached the substance of his arguments, we would find
no abuse of the court’s discretion. Washington pled guilty to recklessly leading
police officers on high-speed chase through crowded city streets to avoid
arrest. When combined with the violent crimes on which the jury convicted
him in the related matter, it is clear the safety of the public required a lengthy
term of incarceration.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/28/18
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