NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 28 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIN WILLIAMS REYES, No. 16-56225
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:15-cv-07661-PSG-AS
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 27, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, CANBY, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Erin Williams Reyes appeals pro se from the district court’s decision
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) conducted the required two-step
analysis and offered several specific, clear and convincing reasons, supported by
substantial evidence, for finding that Reyes’s testimony was “not entirely
credible.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014).
Addressing Reyes’s testimony about back pain, the ALJ properly concluded that
this testimony was not corroborated by the medical evidence, including a normal x-
ray and an orthopedic surgeon’s finding of a full range of motion in the lumbar
spine. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
although a lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting a
claimant’s pain testimony, the ALJ may consider the objective medical evidence in
his credibility analysis). In addition, the ALJ properly relied on the nonmedical
reasons Reyes gave for leaving her past employment. See Bruton v. Massanari,
268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ also properly relied on evidence of
Reyes’s activities, including her statements to an examining psychiatrist, which
contradicted her testimony about disabling depression. See Molina v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that ALJ may discredit testimony when
claimant “reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are
transferable to a work setting”). Any error in other reasons provided by the ALJ
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was harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (explaining that error is
harmless if it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination).
The ALJ properly relied on the opinion of Dr. Rama Nadella, an examining
psychologist, because no other doctor expressed an opinion on Reyes’s mental
capacity to work. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017).
(holding that to reject uncontradicted opinion of examining doctor, ALJ must state
clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence).
Taking into account Reyes’s pro se status, the ALJ fulfilled her duty to
develop the record. See Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930-31 (9th
Cir. 2014); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The
Commissioner made a reasonable effort by twice requesting records of
psychological treatment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d).
AFFIRMED.
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