Ehab Farag v. Jefferson Sessions, III

Case: 16-60661 Document: 00514408043 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2018 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 16-60661 FILED Summary Calendar March 29, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk EHAB MOUNIR FARAG; MARTHA ADEL NAGIEB WASIELY, Petitioners v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A205 680 390 BIA No. A205 680 391 Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Ehab Mounir Farag and Martha Adel Nagieb Wasiely, natives and citizens of Egypt, petition this court for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing Farag’s appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Farag’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief. Farag contends that the IJ’s and BIA’s adverse credibility determination was not * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 16-60661 Document: 00514408043 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/29/2018 No. 16-60661 supported by substantial evidence, and he corroborated his credible testimony with sufficient documentary evidence. Where, as here, the BIA approved of and relied upon the IJ’s decision, in addition to providing its own review of the evidence and the law, our court has authority to review both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). We review factual findings, including credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. Id. Under this highly deferential standard, our court will not reach a different result unless “the evidence [is] so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it.” Id. at 537. The IJ’s and BIA’s adverse credibility determinations were based on specific inconsistencies and discrepancies among Farag’s testimony, his application for relief from removal, and his affidavits. Id. at 539–40. Farag’s attempt to merely explain away a few of the inconsistencies noted by the IJ and BIA is unavailing. The adverse credibility determinations are substantially reasonable and supported by the record. See id. Because Farag has not shown that, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him credible, we defer to the IJ’s and BIA’s adverse credibility determinations. Id. at 538–39. In the light of the adverse credibility determinations, Farag has not shown that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his requested relief from removal. See Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 657–59 (5th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Farag’s and Wasiely’s petition for review is DENIED. 2