UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4650
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL LAMAR DUNN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:16-cr-00108-FL-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2018 Decided: April 2, 2018
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raymond C. Tarlton, TARLTON POLK, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Lamar Dunn pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base (crack), 500 grams
or more of cocaine, and a quantity of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B) (2012). The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence. On appeal,
Dunn’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether the Government breached the plea agreement in its sentencing
arguments and whether the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. The
Government has moved to dismiss Dunn’s appeal based upon a waiver of appellate rights
in his plea agreement.
To the extent counsel argues that the Government breached the plea agreement in
its sentencing arguments, we disagree. “[W]e will not hold the Government to promises
that it did not actually make in the plea agreement, for neither party is obligated to provide
more than is specified in the agreement itself.” United States v. Obey, 790 F.3d 545, 547
(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing leads us to conclude that the appeal waiver contained in Dunn’s plea agreement is
valid, as he entered it knowingly and intelligently. See United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d
621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). Dunn waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence,
including any issue related to the establishment of the Guidelines range, reserving only the
right to appeal from a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guidelines range.
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Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal
as to any issues within the scope of the waiver.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal that are outside the scope of the appeal waiver or
are not waivable by law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the district
court’s judgment as to any issue not precluded by the appeal waiver. This court requires
that counsel inform Dunn, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Dunn requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Dunn.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART,
AFFIRMED IN PART
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