FILED
APRIL 3, 2018
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division Ill
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 34678-1-III
Respondent, )
)
V. )
)
JAIME STEWART ANDREWS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Jaime Andrews appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, challenging several actions taken by the investigating officers that the
trial prosecutor rightly acknowledged as "incredibly sloppy police work." Since he
cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the police actions, we affirm.
FACTS
Sunnyside Police Department Officer Christopher Sparks stopped a vehicle driven
by Mr. Andrews, whom he suspected of driving while license suspended (DWLS), on
April 19, 2016. Along with Mr. Sparks as a "ride-along" passenger was his wife, Jerrica
Sparks. Ms. Sparks was employed as a trooper for the Washington State Patrol (WSP).
She was not on duty for WSP while riding with Officer Sparks.
No. 34678-1-111
State v. Andrews
While pulling his car over in response to the officer's signals, Mr. Andrews threw
an object from his window. Officer Sparks observed the object, which he believed was a
glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. The officer asked Mr. Andrews ifhe had
been smoking meth; Andrews replied in the affirmative. The officer arrested Andrews
for DWLS and, in a search incident to that arrest, found a small "baggie" ofsuspected
methamphetamine. While the officer was arresting Mr. Andrews, Ms. Sparks went and
recovered the glass pipe from the roadway.
Ms. Sparks accompanied her husband and his prisoner to the police department
and, while there, conducted a field test on both the pipe and baggie. The test results were
positive for methamphetamine. The officer prepared an affidavit in support ofa search
warrant for Mr. Andrew's blood. The affidavit stated that Officer Sparks (rather than his
wife) had recovered the pipe and conducted the field test. All evidence collected, other
than the glass pipe (which was destroyed), was placed on evidence at the police
department.
The prosecutor filed a charge ofpossession ofmethamphetamine based on the
field test results. Despite notice that charges had been filed and a trial date set, the
evidence was not transported to the state crime laboratory for confirmation. The State
successfully obtained a continuance while awaiting the laboratory reports.
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No. 34678-1-III
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In the interim, Trooper Sparks was found to have lied to a supervisor on June 6,
2016, concerning a traffic stop she had conducted three days earlier. WSP advised the
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys of the finding. Trooper Sparks
resigned her position with WSP prior to an administrative investigation into the incident.
Upon discovering that the suspected methamphetamine had still not been sent to the
crime lab, the assigned deputy prosecutor had an officer drive the materials directly to the
laboratory for immediate testing. The test results were reported back by e-mail late in the
day, and the information was e-mailed to defense counsel the next morning. The July 25
trial date was reset to August 22; Mr. Andrews' speedy trial period expired on August 24.
The defense moved to suppress evidence or to dismiss charges due to
governmental mismanagement. CrR 8.3(b). The argument focused on Trooper Sparks'
participation in the evidence recovery and testing as well as the late transmission to the
crime laboratory. After hearing testimony from Officer Sparks and former Trooper
Sparks, the court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant had not
established prejudice. A jury subsequently convicted Mr. Andrews of possession of a
controlled substance.
The court imposed financial obligations totaling $1,950 on Mr. Andrews and
sentenced him to serve 18 months in prison. He timely appealed to this court.
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ANALYSIS
Mr. Andrews contends that the court erred in rejecting his CrR 8.3(b) motion. We
agree with the trial court that Mr. Andrews failed to establish that governmental
misconduct denied him a fair trial.
CrR 8.3(b) empowers a court to dismiss an action when, "due to arbitrary action or
governmental misconduct," "there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which
materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial." The trial court's rulings under CrR
8.3(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion; the extraordinary remedy of dismissal is only
appropriate when there has been such prejudice that no other action would ensure a fair
trial. State v. Garza, 99 Wn. App. 291, 295, 994 P.2d 868 (2000). Discretion is abused
when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll
v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
Mr. Andrews attacks Trooper Sparks' participation in his case by retrieving the
pipe and conducting the field tests on the suspected methamphetamine. He challenges
the trial court's conclusions that it was reasonable for the officer to have the trooper
retrieve the pipe and that it was not misconduct for her to conduct the field tests. The
court also determined, and Mr. Andrews also challenges, that the "insertion of Mrs.
Sparks into peripheral aspects of the criminal investigation had no material impact on the
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No. 34678-1-111
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chain of custody." Clerk's Papers at 94. He argues that there was a "cloud over the
credibility" of Officer Sparks and Trooper Sparks. 1 Brief of Appellant at 14.
The challenged conclusions need not be separately discussed here since all of them
are reflected in the ultimate conclusion that Mr. Andrews was not prejudiced by the
actions of Trooper Sparks. It was his burden to establish actual prejudice to his ability to
defend the case. Garza, 99 Wn. App. at 295. He has failed in that burden.
He does not suggest how his ability to defend the case was affected in any manner,
let alone that it was so devastated by the actions of the two officers that he could not
receive a fair trial. Instead, he simply focuses on trying to establish that the trooper's
actions were wrong. Even that is a very hard sell. That a trained officer2 retrieved
evidence and field-tested the suspected controlled substances somehow contaminated the
case simply because she was off duty and assisting another jurisdiction without
authorization is a difficult argument to understand. But, even if that was wrongful
conduct, Mr. Andrews does not explain how he was unable to defend the case due to the
trooper's action. Her unauthorized intervention probably helped his case by giving him
something to argue about. The actions of Officer Sparks also were presented at trial and
1
This was not part of his argument at the CrR 8.3(b) hearing, but it was a basis for
cross-examining Officer Sparks at trial. Report of Proceedings (Aug. 23, 2016) at 84-109.
2
Even civilians have been known to assist police by turning over evidence they
discovered or by assisting officers during emergencies. We know of no ban on civilian
obtained evidence, even if someone who is not a law enforcement officer becomes part of
the chain of custody for evidence.
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his credibility was clearly challenged in cross-examination. Report of Proceedings (Aug.
23, 2016) at 84-109. Those issues were presented to the jury-the body that decides
credibility issues.
Moreover, as tried, the evidence shows that the trooper's involvement was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Having been destroyed earlier, the pipe was not
presented at trial. The prosecutor expressly eschewed reliance on the residue from the
pipe as the basis for the conviction, focusing solely on the baggie of methamphetamine
and expressly asking the jury to return its verdict solely on that evidence. That evidence
was totally untainted by the trooper's actions. Since the bag of methamphetamine was
the sole basis for the jury's verdict, there simply was no harm to Mr. Andrews.
Having failed to satisfy his burden under CrR 8.3(b), Mr. Andrew's appeal lacks
merit. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.3
3 Mr. Andrews also asks that we waive appellate costs if the State substantially
prevails. Since he has not complied with our general order regarding request to deny cost
award by providing more comprehensive information about his financial circumstances,
we decline his request. See Gen. Order of Division III, In re Court Admin. Orderre
Request to Deny Cost Award (Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2016), http://www.courts.wa.gov
/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders&div=III. However, the State has indicated it
will not seek costs and, therefore, will not be filing a cost bill. Accordingly, Mr.
Andrews will not end up paying any appellate costs since the State would be estopped
from claiming them.
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A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Herre C.J.
�,g,
Pennell, J.
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