NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-2231
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CHRIS ANN JAYE,
Appellant
v.
JOHN HOFFMAN, NJ Attorney General, in his Official Capacity and individual
capacity; IONE CURVA, NJ Deputy Attorney General, in her Official Capacity and
individual capacity; THE HON. PETER BUCHSBAUM, (retired) is sued individually
and in his Official Capacity as Judge of the Law Division of Hunterdon County; THE
HON. JUDGE YOLANDA CICCONE, is sued individually and in her Official Capacity;
THE HON. JUDGE MARY C. JACOBSON, is sued in her individual capacity and in her
Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court Judge; THE HON. PATRICK MCMANIMON, is
sued in his individual capacity and in his Official Capacity as a judge on recall from
retirement paid by the State of New Jersey; CHRISTOPHER KOOS, Esq. is sued in his
individual capacity and in his Official Capacity as employee for the State of New Jersey;
JUDITH IRIZZARI, is sued in her individual capacity and in her Official Capacity as
Civil Division Manager for the Superior Court of Mercer County; CAROLINE
RECORD, is sued in her individual capacity and in her Official Capacity as NJ Supreme
Court's Secretary for the Office of Attorney Ethics; JUDGE ACCURSO, is sued
individually and in her Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE MANAHAN, is
sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE HAAS, is
sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE
YANNOTTI, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge;
JUDGE HURD, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court
Judge; JUDGE MARBREY, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ
Superior Court Judge; JUDGE INNES, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity
as NJ Superior Court Judge; JUDGE GOODLEITZ, is sued individually and in his
Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court Judge; ASHLEY CAGNON, is sued in her
Official Capacity and individual capacity; BRIAN WILSON, is sued in his Official
Capacity and individual capacity; BRIAN FLANAGAN, is sued in his Official Capacity
and individual Capacity; CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, is sued individually and
in his Official Capacity as NJ Supreme Court Judge, supervisor of the NJ Office of
Attorney Ethics, Trust Fund of New Jersey and Judgment Process Services of the State of
New Jersey; JUDGE PETER SHERIDAN, is sued in his individual capacity as well as in
his official capacity as a federal judge in the United States District Court of New Jersey;
CLERK MELFI, is sued in her individual capacity as well as in her official capacity as
Clerk for the Office of the Clerk of Hunterdon County; JOHN DOES 1-20, (Fictitious
Names) are sued individually and in their official capacities as State actors; JOHN DOES
(21-30), (Fictitious Names) are sued individually and in their official capacity as
employees of the United States District Court of New Jersey
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-07771)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 16, 2018
Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 19, 2018)
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AMENDED OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
In October 2016, appellant Chris Ann Jaye filed a complaint in the District Court
alleging, inter alia, that numerous New Jersey judges, court staff, and state government
employees violated her rights in connection with several state-court actions.1 In the
complaint, Jaye also named as a defendant the Hunterdon County Clerk, Mary H. Melfi.
She alleged that Clerk Melfi had recorded fraudulent liens and assignments against her
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Those cases primarily concern a dispute between Jaye and her condominium association
and other litigation relating to her residence in the Oak Knoll Village Condominium.
2
property, and had “deliberately refused to act to discharge recorded liens filed against
[her] home after they were paid, under duress, by [her].” (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, ECF No. 1.)
Jaye generally claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(2), § 1986, and the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act.
In April 2017, Jaye moved the District Court for “partial summary judgment and
emergent order for injunctive relief” regarding defendant Melfi’s allegedly fraudulent
filings. In the motion, Jaye asserted that defendant Melfi’s fraudulent actions had
“slandered her title . . . placing [her] at risk of a foreclosure.” (Br. at 1, ECF No. 39-2.)
She further alleged that the “false filings have been relied on as evidence and have
resulted in a series of suits which have resulted in great losses, impact[ing] [her] ability to
sell [her] home and other [costs] of litigation.” (Id.) Jaye sought an order directing Melfi
to “discharge all liens and assignments slandering title to [her] property.” (Id. at 6.) By
order entered May 2, 2017, the District Court denied Jaye’s motion. Jaye appealed.
We exercise jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying emergent
injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459
F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). “We generally review a district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but review the underlying factual findings
for clear error and examine legal conclusions de novo.” Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586
F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009)
The District Court properly denied Jaye’s motion. To obtain a preliminary
injunction, Jaye was required to demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) the probability of irreparable harm if relief is denied; (3) that granting preliminary
3
relief would not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the
public interest favors such relief. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708
(3d Cir. 2004). We see no error in the District Court’s decision to deny relief on the
ground that Jaye failed to demonstrate that she would suffer irreparable injury without the
injunction. The harms that Jaye articulated—being unable to sell her house and forced to
pay the costs of litigation—were not immediate and could be remedied with money
damages. See Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.
1980) (explaining that a probability of irreparable harm requires a clear showing of
immediate irreparable injury or presently existing actual threat
We have reviewed Jaye’s arguments in support of her appeal and conclude that
they are meritless. To the extent she challenges the District Court’s disposition of her
request for partial summary judgment, this ruling is not properly before us, as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the District Court’s denial of injunctive relief.2
2
Jaye’s Notice of Motion to Expand the Record and Motion to Stay State Action per 28
U.S.C. § 2283 are denied.
4